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The pursuit of a seemingly unfruitful bilateral trade arrangement with South
Africa, and continued participation in overlapping, but non-functional regional free
trade areas, has left Zimbabwe in foreign trade dilemma, specially in the light of the
deteriorating terms of trade with South Africa, her main trading partner and
competitor for both mutual and regional trade.
This thesis examines the various regional trade possibilities involving Zimbabwe
and South Africa using the free trade area and customs union models of international
trade. Whereas a functional bilateral trade agreement or a regional customs union
culminating in a common market might improve Zimbabwe's regional competitive-
ness in the short run, due to South Africa's economic dominance and protectionist
trade policies, Zimbabwe's potential to benefit from trade with non-participants
would be severely curtailed. However, a broad free trade area, which allows
flexibility to pursue national trade policies, seems less harmful. The analysis
concludes that only a broad free trade area superseding all current eastern and
southern African regional trade arrangements would increase Zimbabwe's economic
welfare. It would be in the interests of all regional countries to finalize a single broad
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One feature of the international trading system since the 1980s has been the
proliferation ofregional trading arrangements in the form of preferential trade areas,
free trade agreements, customs unions and common markets. While economic forces
have internationalized markets, technology and investments, the same forces appear
to have helped expand regional trading blocs. The current wave of regional trading
arrangements, particularly in the lesser developed countries (LDCs), differ from the
earlier efforts in the 1950-60s. These earlier efforts were driven by import
substitution; the more recent trends tend to be export oriented and seek to attract
foreign investment.
The rationale ofregional arrangements is both economic and political. On the
economic level, they expand trade, expand economies of scale, increase welfare
through trade creation or by substituting lower cost imports for domestic and regional
production, and counteract possible protectionism in the export markets. On the
political front, there have been arguments that regional trading arrangements
strengthen the negotiating leverage of the group vice outsiders and promote regional
cooperation. At independence, many developing countries saw economic integration
as a way of reducing dependence links with former colonial countries. Regional
solutions were associated with attaining economic independence, development and
self-reliant industrialization.
However, economists and policy makers alike are divided on the wisdom and
utility of regional trading agreements. One school ofthought argues that trading blocs
reduce potential world welfare through trade diversion, beggar-thy-neighbor trade
policies and aggressive protectionism and tend to frustrate global liberalization of
trade. The other view is that global negotiations are slow in resolving trade issues.
One reason cited for this trend has been the frustration at the slow opening up of
export markets, and delayed conclusion of General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. Regional trading
agreements proved useful in addressing issues that GATT and the WTO failed to
resolve. Furthermore, GATT has failed to provide realistic solutions to international
trade problems, hence countries need to work out alternative welfare maximizing
solutions.
The turmoil in GATT in the 1970s, trade restraints as a result of recession and
subsequent crippling oil crises-induced debt spurred the trend toward regional trade
agreements. The inextricable nature of macroeconomic factors from microeconomic
issues or industrial structures also created global imbalances as countries tried to
respond to the international trade and financial crises.
Like most LDCs, Zimbabwe's experience with regional trading arrangements
has been mixed. In 1964, South Africa and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) signed
a formal bilateral preferential trading agreement on a most-favored nation status,
allowing unrestricted access to Zimbabwe's exports in certain sectors, (radios,
footwear, clothing and textiles, and agricultural products). On the other hand, South
Africa enjoyed access to the region's second most developed market for an array of
consumption goods, as well as agricultural, mining and industrial production inputs.
South Africa became Rhodesia's largest trading partner, for both exports and imports,
thanks to the 1964 Preferential Trade Agreement and the UN sanctions between 1965-
1980. At the same time, Zimbabwe (apart from Mauritius) is arguably South Africa's
main competitor for light manufactured exports to the southern-African region.
The main problem facing Zimbabwe has been the growing trade deficit with
South Africa, its largest trading partner, largely due to increasing protectionist
tendencies and unilateral actions in amending the 1964 trade agreement for its own
interests. In 1992, South Africa unilaterally "canceled" the trade arrangement, and
slapped Zimbabwean textiles with a 90% import tariff. South Africa's cancellation
of the preferential trade agreement affected many sectors, particularly Zimbabwe's
textile and clothing industries. The agreement has increasingly favored South Africa
at the expense of Zimbabwe, which has never attempted to invoke measures to
safeguard its interests for fear of triggering a trade war. Despite close political ties
with the new South African government, renewing the preferential bilateral trade
arrangement has proven difficult.
Concurrently, the southern African countries have been transforming the
Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) into a regional
trade agreement, called the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
SADC seeks among other things, to have a free trade area by 2005. This, it has been
argued, would obviate the need for bilateral agreements between the countries. South
Africa has also entered into a series of competing bilateral trade agreements with
Zimbabwe's neighbors. In theory, South Africa has closed the potential
(Zimbabwe's) for free trade in the region due to these bilateral and multilateral
agreements.
Two other important developments have occurred in Southern Africa since the
1980s. The first development is the overlapping membership of SADC and the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA). Zimbabwe is
a founding member ofCOMESA, but South Africa is not a member. COMESA was
formed in the early 1980s as a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). Its membership
includes 20 countries from as far north as Djibouti and Ethiopia. Of the twelve
SADC members, only two are not members of COMESA. In addition, five out of
twelve are also members of another higher-level regional grouping, formed in 1910,
called the Southern African Customs Union (SACU). The second major development
is the recent announcement by the'European Union (EU) and South Africa that they
intend to start negotiating toward estabhshing a free trade area, excluding all of South
Africa's colleagues in both SACU and SADC.
Analyzing the impact of the problems relating to the bilateral trade agreement
and the overlapping regional trade arrangements, all at different levels of integration,
could reveal how Zimbabwe can extricate herself from this external trade dilemma.
It will be argued that, political reasons aside, a bilateral trade arrangement with South
Africa will entrench that country's trade advantages over Zimbabwe. Furthermore,
neither a customs union, nor overlapping regional trade arrangements will optimize
benefits to Zimbabwe, let alone the region as a whole. Zimbabwe could increase its
welfare by concentrating on a free trade agreement with all the countries of southern
Africa, including South Africa, rather than pursuing individual bilateral agreements.
Individual agreements will compete with other bilateral arrangements that South
Africa has or is trying to negotiate. Overlapping regional trade arrangements will
increase protectionism, thus delaying broader trade liberalization in the sub-continent.
Finally, while a customs union might maximize welfare for South Africa, a free trade
arrangement would maximize Zimbabwe's economic welfare.
This thesis will use information from published sources on both the historical
economic development of Zimbabwe and South Africa, and microeconomic and
international economics/trade, with particular emphasis on bilateral trade and
regional economic groupings. Macroeconomic indicators and trade statistics of the
two countries will also be examined. While the relations between countries are
influenced by economic, political and social variables, this thesis does not examine
political and social issues, or analyze the impact of macroeconomic policies. It will
be restricted to microeconomic factors and trade policies which promote or restrict
mutually beneficial trade.
The economic, impact of the Zimbabwe-South Africa trade disagreements and
the effect oh Zimbabwe's welfare gains will be examined in the context of:
A Southern African free trade area vice harmonizing into a customs
union.
Bilateral trade arrangements with her neighbors.
Choosing between SADC and COMESA, or catalyzing the
amalgamating of the two overlapping organizations into a broader free
trade area.
The utility South Africa derives from this trade restriction strategy will be
examined. Specifically, the following questions will be addressed:
To what extent have South Africa's strategies trade Africa affected
Zimbabwe's economy and external trade competitiveness?
Given the historical background of the Zimbabwe-South Africa
bilateral trade agreements, what are South Africa's incentives to both
procrastinate its decisions on the preferential trade agreement with
Zimbabwe, and defer implementing the SADC Trade Protocol.
What are the alternatives to Zimbabwe's continued dependence on
trade with South Africa?
In terms of contemporary trade theories, what benefits is Zimbabwe
likely to derive from (1) bilateral trade agreements with its major
trading partners, including South Africa; (2) a regional free trade
agreement including South Africa, culrninating in a common market;
and (3) liberalizing trade to cover both COMESA and SADC and the
rest of the world.
The study will be organized as follows:
Chapter II will outline the theoretical foundations of international trade and
regional trading arrangements. It will then look at the origins of the multilateral
trading system, its collapse, and the rise of regionalism since World War II, including
the factors that influenced the rise of regionalism among developed and developing
countries and the role of governments in influencing the nature and forms of regional
groupings. It will also examine the more contemporary regional arrangements, such
as the European Union and North American Free trade Area, particularly how they
handle extra-regional agreements and the expansion of existing arrangements.
Chapter HI will focus on the southern African region. Specifically, it will look
at regional arrangements in southern Africa which have implications for either or both
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countries, including: the SACU, COMESA, SADCC and SADC. This will be
followed by an overview of the historical economic relations between Zimbabwe and
South Africa, the Preferential Trade Agreement and its weaknesses.
Chapter IV will concentrate on the key comparative macroeconomic indicators
of the southern African countries, specially Zimbabwe and South Africa. The issues
to be examined are: Gross Domestic product (GDP), productive investment,
population and employment levels. The balance of payments (BOP), debt, and the
role of public sector enterprises will be analyzed.
Chapter V will look at the trade policies ofZimbabwe and South Africa, the
impact of the bilateral (dis)agreement on the patterns of Zimbabwe's trade and tariff
structure, particularly Zimbabwe's strategy with respect to multilateral trade, and
regional groupings like COMESA, SADC and other bilateral arrangements. This part
of the study will analyze the volumes, destination of exports and sources of imports
of selected eastern and southern African countries, including Zimbabwe and South
Africa. A microeconomic analysis will assess the costs and benefits to Zimbabwe of
the existence or absence of a 'formal preferential trade agreement' between
Zimbabwe and South Africa. It will also examine the likely gains from a Southern
African Free Trade Area, culminating in a common market, and the multiplying free
trade areas vice amalgamating all the overlapping regional trade arrangements.
Of relevance, is the weak-strong country bilateral trade relationship regional
trade area framework (more than one free trade area), and within a customs union;
particularly where the weaker country is also the main competitor for regional trade.
Thus, Chapter V will also analyze how the trend towards regionalization of global
trade might constrain Zimbabwe's alternatives. The effects on factor movement and
direct foreign investment will be considered. Finally, the study will identify those
aspects which could contribute to the mutual benefit of both countries.
Finally, Chapter VI will present conclusions and policy recommendations.
H. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE TREND TOWARD REGIONAL ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION
A. LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Traditional and New Trade Theories of International Trade
Different and sometimes conflicting views have emerged from various
economic schools ofthought since the 16th century on how individual countries and
the world at large can optimize gains from international trade. Mercantilists saw
export expansion and import restriction as a means of creating domestic jobs and
wealth, and advocated strong government intervention in foreign trade to achieve
these goals. Adam Smith saw futility in the mercantilist concept of regulated trade
and formulated his theory of absolute advantage. This theory hypothesized that any
country with an absolute advantage in producing any commodity would gain by
engaging in free trade. 1
In response to Adam Smith, David Ricardo proposed the concept of
comparative advantage. He hypothesized that it was not necessary for a country to
have an absolute advantage for free trade to be beneficial. Even if one country were
less efficient than another in absolute terms in producing two goods, it could benefit
both countries to specialize and trade as long as each country was comparatively more
(less) efficient (inefficient) relative to the other.2
Trade arises because countries differ in tastes, technology, factor endowments
and factor intensity in the production process. This generates different prices or
Cited by Root, Franklin, R, "Comparative Advantage and Gains from Trade," in Internationa] Trade and
Investment, 6th ed., pp. 41-66, South Western Publishing Co., Cincinnati, OH, 1990.
Ricardo, David, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 3rd ed., R. D. Irwin, Homewood,
IL, 1 963. Ricardo used the example of cloth and wine production in England and Portugal to show that although
England had absolute advantage in the production of both goods, Portugal was less inefficient in wine production.
IfEngland specialized in cloth and Portugal in wine, both countries would increase welfare through free trade. The
key assumptions were constant returns and perfect competition.
lower price ratios among rent, interest and wages. 3 The actual gains from trade would
depend on the terms of trade for the traded goods, which in turn is detennined by the
reciprocal demand and changes in the absolute price levels (inflation/deflation) in one
or both trading partners. 4
The purpose of trade was imports. Exports were an indirect way of producing
imports because it is more efficient than producing them domestically. The restrictive
assumptions of the Ricardian model and its inconsistency with reality led some to
argue that starting with different assumptions one would get entirely different
outcomes.
The main arguments against the traditional Ricardian model center on the
assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns. It is argued that these
conditions have been supplanted by imperfect competition and increasing returns.
Furthermore, there has been an increase in intra-industry trade and competitive
advantage in similar but differentiated products. 5
Kelvin Lancaster showed that the diversity of consumer preferences and
uniqueness of specification were more relevant in explaining intra-industry trade
THecksher, Ohlin and Samuelson extended the Ricardian model to show that different factor endowments
and intensity in the production process led to different price ratios. See Root, Franklin R. , International Trade and
Investment, 6th ed., Cincinnati, OH.
^Because factors ofproduction are not perfect substitutes, and must be used in different combinations to
produce different goods, the dissimilar factor ratios give rise to dissimilar commodity costs that provide the basis
for trade. Trade tends to be inter-industry.
Competitive advantage differs from comparative advantage in that it is not endowed, but is created
through technological change, economies of scale, learning by doing, etc. This allows a country to create an
advantage over its partner.
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between similar countries. 6 Product differentiation can arise because of differences
in quality of the same product, or different varieties of the same quality. It is the
latter which gives rise to intra-industry trade, while the former is associated with
inter-industry trade.
Wilfred J. Ethier contributed to this theory by showing that intra-industry trade
in manufactures is complimentary to international factor mobility and that contem-
porary trade is characterized by international returns than national returns to scale. 7
It has also been shown that technological prowess, imperfect competition and
increasing returns may, in their own right, create comparative advantage and not the
other way around. Technological prowess may be generated by knowledge
externalities. 8
Only one or very few firms survive in certain hi-tech industries on a global
level (e.g., aircraft manufactures). Thus, differences between countries is one reason
for trade, with others lying in the inherent advantages to specialization and
arbitrariness in the initial capitalization and global location factors.
The new trade theory highlights five key issues: 9
Lancaster, Kelvin, "Intra-industry Trade Under Perfect Monopolistic Competition," in Journal of
International Economics, Vol. 10, pp. 151-75, 1980. His key assumptions were: 1) differentiated product
specification in terms of quality but with same generic characteristics in different proportions; 2) Consumer
preferences based on specification, not generic characteristics, so that Qd=f (price, specification); 3) A change in
specification results in loss ofeconomies of scale; 4) Constant returns; 5) Specification is unique to particular firm.
He came up with his product differentiation theory, and showed that protection of agriculture by a country with
comparative advantage tended to increase trade in manufactures. "Similar" countries refers to similarity in terms
of factor endowments, technology, type ofmanufactured goods, GNP levels, and income distribution.
Greenaway, David, Hine, Robert, and Milner, Chris, "Vertical and Horizontal Intra-industry Trade: A Cross
Industry Analysis for the United Kingdom," in The Economic Journal , 1 05, pp. 1 505-1 5 1 8, Blackwell Publishers,
November 1995. See also Dixit, Avinash K., and Stiglitz, Joseph E., "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity," in American Economic Review, Vol, 67, No. 2, pp. 297-308, June 1977 on consumer utility
and product variety.
Ethier, Wilfred J., "National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of International.
Trade," in American Economic Review, Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 389-406, 1982.
TCrugman, Paul, "Is Free Trade Passe," in Journal ofEconomic Perspectives . Vol. 1 , No. 2, pp. 131-1 44,
1987. See also Krugman, Paul, Rethinking International Trade , MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
9
Ibid.
International returns to scale depend on interaction between internal
and external economies.
The factor endowment theory is more robust than the traditional theory
in explaining scale economies.
Intra-industry, like inter-industry, trade has a factor endowment basis
and is complementary to international factor mobility.
Internal economies of scale and product differentiation have a signifi-
cant role in explaining intra-industry trade in manufactures between
identical economies.
The most competitive market structure, within the manufacturing
sector, both in autarky and in trade, will be perfect monopolistic
competition.
However, others have argued that increasing returns are not necessary to
account for intra-industry trade, suggesting that the new trade model is not inconsis-
tent with, but only a special relation to the traditional Ricardian determinants of
trade, 10 or that classical trade theory can explain intra-industry trade. ll
While some new trade models differ with the traditional approach, they are
agreed on the question of free trade and minimum government involvement in
influencing trade. 12
However, the strategic trade policy proponents postulate limited global markets
and that any increases in output or wages/profits must of necessity come only by
crowding out output or jobs elsewhere. Recent studies show that export subsidies,
temporary tariffs and other measures may shift: world production in a way favoring
10
For example, see Davis, Donald R., "Intra-industry Trade: A Hecksher-Ohlin-Ricardo Approach," in
Journal of International Economics, Vol. 39, pp. 201-226, 1995.
Hummers, David, and Levinsohn, James, "Product Differentiation as a Source of Comparative
Advantage?" in American Economics Review (AEA Papers and Proceedings! Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 445-449, May
1993.
12
For example, see Krugman, Paul, "Is Free Trade Passe?" in Journal of International Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 131-144, and Krugman, Paul, Rethinking International Trade, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1990.
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the protecting country. In a world of increasing returns and imperfect markets,
economies of scale allow the pioneer firms to earn super profits, larger than
opportunity costs. Assuming super profits are equated to national welfare/interest,
any assistance in the form of R&D, export subsidies, or externalities would tilt the
scale to favor domestic producers. 13 Brander and Spencer (1988) showed that
unionization of labor also results in wages higher than opportunity costs, damaging
competitiveness and enhancing the position of rivals. 14
Under certain circumstances, subsidies (explicit and implicit), promotion of
externalities like knowledge, technological innovation and protection, can promote
rather than discourage exports and possibly increase national income. This assumes
these policies do not have negative domestic effects of negative spill-overs that may
provoke retaliation and offset the previous gain. 15 Paul Krugman got similar results
in his study, but still opposed government intervention, arguing that any assistance
comes at the potential competitors expense, besides distorting internal markets. 16
Another observation has been that setting up national standards enhances
domestic firms competitiveness vice their potential rivals. The setting ofminimum
quality standards on imports yields negative protection. 17
See Corden, Max W., Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Clarendon, Oxford, 1974. See Brander,
James A_, and Spencer, Barbara J., "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," in Review ofEconomic
Studies. Vol. 50, pp. 707-722.
4
See Brander, James A., and Spencer, Barbara J., "Unionized Oligopoly and International Trade Policy,"
in Journal of International Economics . Vol. 24, pp. 217-2-34, 1988.
15
Brandef, James A., and Spencer, Barbara J., "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,"
in Journal of International Economics , Vol. 18, pp. 83-100. See also Bagwell, Kyle, and Staiger, Robert, "The
Sensitivity of Strategic Corrective R&D Policy in Oligopolistic Industries," in Journal of International Economics.
Vol. 36, pp. 133-150. See also Hartsmann, Ignatius J., and Markusen, James R., "Up the Average Cost Curve:
Inefficient Entry and the New Protectionism," in Journal of International Economics
.
Vol. 20, pp. 225-247, 1986.
Krugman, Paul, Rethinking International Trade . MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
1 Swann, Peter, Temple, Paul, and Shurmer, Mark, "Standards and Trade Performance: The UK
Experience," in The Economic Journal Vol. 106, pp. 1297-1313, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996.
11
The main criticism ofthe strategic trade policy is that government intervention
comes at a high cost, not only to the potential competitors, but also neglected
domestic sectors. Knowledge and subsidies, it has been argued, inadvertently benefit
foreign producers and consumers. 18 Others have also argued that the Brander and
Spencer model is too topical because the particular policy recommendations depend
on the details of the model. 19
However, definitional problems arise when one considers that a subsidy may
be direct or indirect. In addition, identifying the impact of indirect subsidies on
exports is difficult. Does government spending on education, skills training,
infrastructure, public health, reduction in corporate taxes, etc., which obviates such
spending by domestic exporters qualify or not? In strict economic terms, why should
these measures be less provocative than safety standards, pollution control, minimum
prices, funding R&D and export processing zones where equal dollar amounts have
been spent?
Nevertheless, most proponents of free trade do not dispute the justification to
protect infant industries. Also, the Keynesian case of less than full employment and
the Tinbergen active intervention have been acknowledged by economist as valid
concepts. 20
Also, the new trade theory's observation on diversity of specifications,
competitive advantages, increasing returns, and imperfect markets have relevance in
explaining contemporary trade patterns, at least those aspects not covered by the
18
See Eaton, Jonathan and Grossman, Gene M., "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly,"
in Quarterly Journal of Economics
.
Vol. 2, pp. 383-406. See also Golt, Sydney, Trade Issues in the Mid- 1 980s,
British-North American Committee.
19
Krugman, Paul, Rethinking International Trade , MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.
Keynes, John M., The General Theory ofEmployment Interest and Money , Harcourt, Brace and World,
Inc., New York, NY, 1965. See also Keynes, J. Maynard, The World Depression: 1929-1939 , University of
California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1973. For Tinbergen's arguments, see Knoester, A., and Wellink, A. H. E. M.,
Tinbergen Lectures on Economic Policy , North Holland, Amsterdam. See also Mussa, Michael, "Making the
Practical Case for Free Trade," in American Economic Review (AEA Papers and Proceedings') . Vol. 83, No. 2,
pp. 372-376, May 1993.
12
traditional theory. The arguments favoring strategic intervention are not inconsistent
with reality, at least in the short run, nor have they been convincingly refuted by
proponents of free trade. 21 Granted that the new trade theory is inconclusive and has
led to rather incomplete variants, what it has uncovered so far is that under certain
circumstances, managed trade can be welfare increasing.
2. Managed Trade and the Customs Union Theory
The conventional theory of regional trading blocs is based on the work of
Jacob Viner.22 Viner concluded that imposing a common external tariff in a customs
union may lead to "trade creation" and "trade diversion." Trade creation occurs when
new opportunities for trade are opened up. As trade creation increases, consumers,
firms and governments have a greater chance of achieving the most efficient
allocation ofresources. Conversely, trade diversion results when trade is restricted.
In a system fostering trade diversion, consumers, firms and governments do not
always have the opportunity to use the most efficient producer of a specific good,
service or resource.
International trade theory states that in a competitive global economy, free
trade will maximize global welfare. In this case, it is plausible that any movement
toward global free trade will be optimal, while moving toward regional trading
arrangements should be a second best solution. An expanded multilateral trading
system that results in increased trade creation and less trade diversion would thus be
the best policy option as it ensures increases in welfare for all participants.
^ee Mittelman, James H., "Globalization: Critical Reflections," in International Political Economy
Yearbook
. Vol. 9, Lynne Reiner Publishers, London, 1996. See Paul Krugman, "Free Trade: A Loss of
(Theoretical) Nerve? The Narrow and Broad Arguments for Free Trade," in American Economic Review (AEA
Papers and Proceedings). Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 362-366, May 1993, and Rachel McCulloch, "The Optimahty of Free
Trade: Science or Religion," in American Economic Review ("AEA Papers and Proceedings) . Vol. 83, No. 2, pp.
367-371, May 1993.
"Viner, Jacob. The Customs Union Issue . Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York,
1950. See also his later work, International Trade and Economic Development, Lectures Delivered at the National
University of Brazil, The Free Press, Glencoe.
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However, the Vinerian explanation has weaknesses:
There are definitional problems regarding tariffs. 23
The model assumes perfect competition, costless transfer of goods and
constant returns.
It implicitly assumes that tariffs are the only imperfections in the global
market, such that their removal/reduction will result in free trade.
The issues of increasing returns and imperfect competition have already been
alluded to. Focusing on "border" issues misses the more complex effects of deeper
regional arrangements which enforce efficiency (competition policy, common
agricultural policy, environmental standards, harmonization of economic policies). 24
Efficiency may increase by liberalizing regional imports, which may reduce export
production costs, albeit indirectly, e.g., increase in regional imports also lowers the
exchange rate and hence promotes exports. Also, if resources are freed from import
industries, they will become available for the export sector. The intra-regional
competition may also reduce partners' costs and attract foreign investment markets
due to preferential access to markets in the free trade area. Internal discipline of free-
trade areas may also weaken domestic special interest groups. 25
Small countries, in particular, may get the opportunity to trade in local or
regional currency, obviating the need for hard currency.26 Krugman has observed that
Ibid. See also Balassa, Bela, The Theory ofEconomic Integration. R. D. Irwin, Inc., 1961
.
Xawrence, Robert Z., Regjonalization. Multilateralism and Deeper Integration , the Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, 1996. See also Wonnacott, Ronald J., "Free Trade Arrangements: For the Better of Worse?" in
American Economic Review (AEA Papers and Proceedings)
.
Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 63-66. See as well Marusen,
James and Venables, Anthony J., "Increasing Returns and Imperfect Competition: Contradictory Results from
Competing Assumptions," in Journal of International Economics . Vol. 24, pp. 299-3 16, North Holland, 1988.
Lawrence, Robert Z.,"Regionalization, Multilateralism and Deeper Integration," the Brookings
Institution, Washington, D.C., 1996.
26
Tropp, Richard, "Seizing the Opportunity Preserved by LDC Blocs," in R. S. Belous and R. S. Hartley
(eds), The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy
.
National Planning Association, 1 990.
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if transport costs are significant, then trade diversion may be insignificant between
regions.
27
The effects of quotas and other non-tariff barriers are not explained by the
Venerian diversion model. Trade diversion does not even arise when quotas and
other non-tariff barriers in the form of health standards, anti-dumping laws, safety
standards, are predominant before the regional arrangement is formed. Wonnacot
argues that FTAs only reduce welfare as they multiply, not as they expand. Hence,
under certain circumstances, there is no negative effect on welfare. 28
Regional trade arrangements can be an alternative not to free trade, but to
existential reality of individual country protectionism and costly import substitution.
Since it is not possible to claim an increase or decrease in world welfare in every
case, trade creation and trade diversion is rather too situational and the strength of the
argument seems to rest on the assumptions made.
B. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE SINCE WORLD WAR II
1. Trends In International Trade Relationships
Since the end ofWorld War n, two different, but not mutually exclusive trends
have dominated international economic relations: one advocating free trade at a global
level and the other tending toward increasing regionalism through economic
integration.
Economic integration can be viewed as a process and a state of affairs. As a
process, it seeks to improve the allocation of resources between integrating parties by
abolishing discrimination between economic units belonging to different national
27
Krugman, Paul, "Is Bilateralism Bad?" in E. Helpman and A. Razin (eds), International Trade and Trade
Policy, pp. 9-23, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991. See also, Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein and Shang-Jin
Wei, "Improving the Design ofRegional Trade Arrangements," in American Economic Review (AEA Papers and
Proceedings) , Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 52-56, 1996. See also Balassa, Bela, The Theory ofEconomic Integration. R.
D. Irwin, Homewood, 1961.
28
Wonnacott, Ronald J., "Free Trade Agreements: For Better or Worse?" in American Economic Review
(AEA Papers and Proceedings), Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 63-66, 1996. See also Bliss, Christopher, Economic Theory
and Policy for Trading Blocks, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1 994. He uses the term "blocks" instead
of "blocs."
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states; as a state of affairs, it means the absence of discrimination between the
national economies and optimal allocation of resources. 29 Integration also differs
from cooperation (qualitatively and quantitatively). Cooperation includes actions
aimed at lessening discrimination, (e.g., international agreements on trade policies).
Economic integration involves some of forms of discrimination (e.g., removal of trade
barriers to selected countries).
At the global level the main features characterizing relationships have been
politics, economics and trade.
Political and economic power was concentrated in developed countries
which had similar levels of development and relatively few barriers to
tarde. The Bretton Woods system, formed at the end of WWII,
represented the first formal attempt to govern international economic
relations. It was envisioned to include the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank (WB) and a multilateral commercial
convention.30 After the approval ofthe IMF and WB, the US proposed
the Havana Charter which provided for the International Trade
Organization (ITO). The ITO was intended to produce a multilateral
framework for international economic relations. The General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), drawn up in 1947, was designed
to fill the gap in international trade until the ITO was approved.
However, GATT was made permanent after the failure to ratify the
Havana Charter. 31 However the socialist countries were not part of
GATT, but had their own exclusive arrangement called the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance, (CMEA).
The developing countries supplied raw materials to the developed
world while its modern sectors were dominated by foreign investment.
The system was made effective through the special role the US played
in mamtaining a convertible currency and allowing essentially
nondisciirriinatory access to its domestic market.
29
Belassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration
.
Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, EL, 1961.
*3elous, Richard, S., and Hartley, Rebecca, S., "Regional Trading Blocs: An Introduction," in R.S.
Belous and RS. Hartley, (eds), The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy , National Planning
Association, Washington, DC, pp. 1-21, 1990.
31
Root, Franklin, R., "Multilateral Agreements Under GATT," in International Trade and Investment
,
6thed.,pp. 193-212, South-Western Publishing Co., 1990.
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From the 1970s, interest in regional economic trading blocs increased. Several
factors can be cited for this trend:
As the growth of the world economy slowed during the 1970s, the
consensus on market openness and trade expansion decreased; at the
same time, public interest in protectionism increased, particularly in the
developed countries. Since the 1940s, the international institutions had
reflected the spirit of equal rights for each nation. But with the
realization of growing inequality among equals, the assumptions
changed. Most countries questioned continued US dominance,
particularly after the collapse of the financial system. Many third
world countries became reluctant to continue under the terms of the old
arrangements. 32
In contrast to the 1950-60s, the 1970s trade environment was
characterized by growing protectionism, anti-dumping complaints,
voluntary trade restraints, factitious trade negotiations, miniature trade
wars and drastic oil price increases.
The oil price increases propelled OPEC countries to a dominant
position on the world scene, along with the fast growing economies of
Germany and Japan. This shifted the economic power from the
previously dominant US and Western Europe. The developed countries
response to the oil shock of the 1970s and 1980s was to curtail import
demand largely through non-tariff barriers and by substituting imports
of primary product inputs.
Macroeconomic factors, that could no longer be easily separated from
microeconomic factors or industrial structure, contributed to dramatic
global imbalances. Of particular concern was the world financial crisis,
the twin deficits in the US, and the trade surpluses of Japan and the
Asian NICs. The developed countries' response to the 1970s and
1980s oil shocks was to curtail import demand largely through non-
tariff barriers and import substitution of primary product imports.
The LDC trade was characterized by dependence relationships between
the former colonial powers and the newly independent countries.
Development depended on favorable conditions for exports,
Belous, Richard S., and Rebecca S. Hartley, The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global
Economy, National Planning Association, Washington, DC, 1990.
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particularly un-fabricated goods, to DCs; meaning that slumps in the
latter worsened the terms of trade of LDCs.
For a large number of LDCs, commodity prices still determined their
capacity to import and service external debt. Accumulating debt as a
result of the oil crisis and the falling prices of primary commodity
exports, amid increasing manufactured import prices, affected LDCs
export volumes and values. The decline in export earnings put pressure
on their import demand for oil and import substitution production
inputs. This led to stagnation in the LDCs, encouraging them to seek
alterative arrangements. 33 This trend continued throughout the 1980s.
Less developed countries were also motivated by the desire for
economic development. The 'balanced-growth' doctrine also hypothe-
sized that economic integration would ensure a sufficiently large
market for the parallel development of new industries. Furthermore,
because of the increasing power of the European Community and
industrialized countries in general, it was hoped that a union would
increase the bargaining power and reduce the external vulnerability of
member countries.
For sub-Saharan Africa, exports in the 1980s grew by less than 1% a year in
the first half of 1990s (export growth per capita in 1991-95 being a mere -1.6%). The
countries as a group are expected to achieve an export growth rate of 4.8% over the
next decade. In Zimbabwe, inflation peaked at 47% in 1992, while in Zambia it was
at 207% during the same year. Zimbabwe's exports have been falling both in value
and in volume, from US$l,646m in 1988 to US$l,480m in 1993. The share of
manufacturing value added (MVA) in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 0.4% in 1970 to
0.3% in 1994. After growing very strongly in the 1960s (7.9% a year), Africa's
industrial output has been expanding at a little more than 2% per year, implying
falling MVA per capita. 34
33
Adams, Nassau, A., The World Apart: The North-South Divide and the International System , 1 993.
See also, "Current Trends and Policies in the World Economy," p. 30-47, World Economic Survey , The United
Nations, 1988.
Africa Quarterly Review
, The Standard Chartered Bank, Zimbabwe, April, 1995, October 1995, and
October 1996.
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The globalization of trade has been characterized by the rise in prices of final
manufactured products, services and financial markets. 'Globalization' refers to a
worldwide market place for standardized products. 35 It relies on economies of scale
in production, distribution, marketing and management. Globalization has important
implications for the volumes of world trade and patterns of trade. It gives countries
the opportunity to exploit comparative and competitive advantage on a world scale
as it removes all impediments to free trade.
Globalization can be viewed as a move toward a multilateral trading system,
which forces countries and firms to devise strategies for leading edge industries
relative to global competitors and competing investments. The resulting business
climate is defined by factors such as access to world markets and domestic
microeconomic and macroeconomic policies conducive to international competition.
Globalization also implies removing all impediments to free trade, providing the
means to solve disputes, protecting investment from (kscrimination and establishing
rules governing trade in services.
2. Role of the Governments in Transforming Regional
Arrangements
The changes in world trade relationships and economic structures have been
accompanied by changes in the role of governments. The political debates about the
justification of government involvement can be categorized into two schools of
thought. On the one hand, the 'traditional' trade theories argue that the government
should only have a moderate intervention role to regulate macroeconomic policies and
facilitate the private market. In contrast, the interventionists maintain that since the
market system alone will not achieve balanced development, it is necessary for
government to intervene in planning, coordinating and controlling the economic
strategy to overcome the 'imperfections' of the free market. This argument is
According to Farrow and York, this term was first used by Theodore Levitt. The interested reader can
see Farrow and York, "Regional Trade and Trends: A North American View from the Inside Out," in R.S. Belous
and R.S. Hartley, The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs m the Global Economy , pp. 76-92, National Planning
Association, Washington, D.C., 1990.
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influenced by the strategic 'new' trade theories which have provided intellectual
justification for pro-active innovation policies. It is further justified because most
successful European and Asian countries seemingly relied on large scale state
intervention in leading edge sectors, including subsidized terms of credit, provision
of infjastructure, suppression of wages and federal research and development to
correct 'market imperfections. ' The question in East Asia has not been whether states
should intervene, but what type of state intervention is appropriate in a specific
context.
36
The infant industry argument has also been used to justify government
intervention. Imperfect capital markets and externalities due to large start-up costs
created barriers to entry that limited the number of firms that could profitably be
active in certain industries. In LDCs, the government played a key role not only in
starting new industries, but also planning and controlling economic development,
through public sector enterprises.
The interventionist policies, particularly in the 'inward looking' import
substituting countries, faced problems since the 1970s, largely due to world recession,
inflation, unemployment, increasing debt and failing commodity prices. Faced with
these difficulties, they were forced to adjust and liberalize trade and ease domestic
controls to make exports more attractive, while leaving market forces to regulate the
levels of imports (mostly at the insistence of the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank). 37
Apart from political considerations, various factors were responsible for the
integration in Europe and other continents. 38
Mittelman, James, H., "Globalization: Critical Reflections" in International Political Economy
Yearbook, Vol. 9, Lynne Publishers, Boulder, London.
37
"International Monetary Fund, Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy," various issues.
Tor details see Balassa, Bela, The Theory of Economic Integration, 1 961 . See also Weiner, Herbert,
E., "America's Role in the Founding ofThe European Community," in R.S. Belous and R.S. Hartley, The Growth
ofRegional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy
, pp. 57-61, 1990; and Farrow and York, "Regional Trade and
Trends: A North American View from the Inside Out," in R.S. Belous and R.S. Hartley, The Growth ofRegional
Trading Blocs in the Global Economy
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The inter-war period witnessed considerable disintegration of Europe
and the world economies, partly as a result of increase in trade
impediments and payments. Imports of advanced industrial countries
in Europe shifted from developed to less developed economies (within
Europe) which did not specialize in manufacture goods.
Disintegration was further caused by increasing state intervention in
economic affairs to counteract cyclical fluctuations, sustain full
employment, correct income distribution and influence growth.
The establishment of the customs union was expected to help mitigate
cyclical fluctuations transmitted through foreign trade-relations. Thus,
interest in economic growth further contributed to economic
integration.
Stalled negotiations, among other things, led to pessimism regarding
multilateral arrangements and the rise of regional blocs. The movement
towards regional agreements involved 71 countries in 1990, including
all the industrialized countries except Japan. The few countries that
liberalized trade unilaterally on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis,
mainly in conjunction with a reorientation of domestic policies, did so
in the context of regional, bilateral, or sectoral initiatives.
GATT was seen as part of the US versus those of the then USSR
hegemonic interests, and incapable of dealing with the new world
realities. While it is relatively easier to reduce tariffs, it has been more
difficult to resolve the issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and to
extend GATT to cover other areas like agriculture and services. GATT
has also generated adjustment costs, especially for the US which bore
the post-WWII reconstruction costs of the European and Asian
economies.
The new trends in the role ofgovernment, together with the transformation in
the global economic structure are being accompanied by the new structures in
international trade.
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C. REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
1. Regional Trade Arrangements
Historically, as early as 1834, the Zollverein Customs Union was used by
Bismarck to bring the small states of Germany under Prussian dominance. 39 Modern
regional arrangements started with the European Community in 1957 and spread
across the world. In the 1980s, there was growing interest in regional trading
arrangements. The trend toward regional trade arrangements is viewed by many as
a cause for concern; others view it as a natural consequence ofthe regional integration
that has taken place both formally and informally. These developments raise the
question ofwhether the arrangements are likely to hinder or support open, multilateral
trade system. Multilateralism describes an open trading system that includes many
nations.
Although GATT did not include all countries of the world (e.g., communist
countries who had their own Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)), the
term "globalism" was often used in reference to the GATT and its guiding
philosophies. Thus, GATT is multilateral rather than a global trading system.
Furthermore, GATT does not regulate trade between contracting GATT members, as
long as the arrangement does not conflict with GATT rules.
In the Uruguay round, negotiated between 1986 and 1993, more than 100
governments agreed to new rules for more open trade in goods and services. The new
World Trade Organization (WTO), with enhanced enforcement powers, became legal
on 1 January, 1995. But the Third World countries are still unhappy with WTO
benefits, which did not seem to address their plight, particularly investment in LDCs,
raising the level of both trade and cooperation among LDCs, attracting technology,
debt cancellation rates and continued subsidization of agriculture by developed
39
Kenen, Peter B., "The Future of the Trading System," in Refer Kenen (ed) The International Economy ,
3rd ed., pp. 256-297, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
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countries. The feeling is that LDCs need to widen cooperation among themselves,
even in areas like investment and technology transfer. At the same time, however,
many regional economic arrangements have been negotiated or revitalized. It is
estimated that 90% percent of all contracting parties to the GATT are signatories to
regional arrangements, with Japan, Hong Kong and India among the 10 or so
exceptions.40
At the same time, the increase in regional economic integration has not totally
hindered the process toward multilateral liberalization. The arrangements have been
highly integrated and have relatively low levels of protection against third countries
in most areas of trade. Member countries have gained from both regional integration
and exposure to multilateral competition. Although multilateral trade may tend
toward the first best choice, many countries have lost faith in GATT/WTO and are
turning to regionalism as the realistic second best option.
Compared to the difficulty in reforming the GATT, regional blocs are
supported because:
Regional trading blocs allow countries and companies to adapt to
numerous economic changes at a more manageable level.
It is easier to negotiate a bilateral or regional agreement than a
multilateral one, thus circumventing the problems associated with non-
tariff barriers. Others have argued that the GATT itself was borne out
of several regional blocs.
Regional trading blocs and the GATT system differ in certain principles and
characteristics. The GATT system rests on two key principles: nondiscrimination and
the reliance on tariffs vice quotas for protection. 41 Nondiscrimination means trade
'^Lawrence, Robert Z.. Regionalism, Multilateralism and Deeper Integration . The Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC, 1996. However, Panafncan News Agents Reports ofNovember and December 1996 on the
continued dissent by LDCs over the perceived discrimination in the new WTO arrangements.
41
Belous, Richard S., and Rebecca S. Hartley, The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global
Economy , National Planning Association, Washington, DC, 1990.
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should be open to all nations who are willing to follow certain rules. All GATT
members are, in theory, bound to grant the same treatment to all other GATT
members in applying tariffs and other regulations - the most-favored-nation (MFN)
clause of the GATT. No country may give special privileges to another member of
GATT. Regional trading blocs are founded on the principle of regional preferences
and do discriminate against non-members, even if they are signatories to the GATT.
The second GATT principle is that protection for domestic industries should
be provided through tariffs to the maximum extent possible, to make protection
transparent. Regional blocs typically use non-tariff barriers, like quotas and other
restrictions, especially on textiles and agricultural products.
Proponents of GATT tend to base their views on concepts such as
multilateralism, free trade, comparative advantage and economic liberalism, which
is consistent with the traditional concept of comparative advantage. Those who back
regional blocs favor free trade in certain cases but also favor economic nationalism,
regionalism, bilateralism, ideas consistent with the strategic/managed trade theories
and neo-mercantilism.
GATT addressed regional blocs by establishing "escape clause" regulations
that tolerate regional trading blocs in certain cases. Under Article XXTV of GATT,
a regional bloc maybe considered consistent with GATT if the bloc meets a three-part
test.
42
The bloc or free trade area must include a substantial share of all the
merchandise traded between nations inside the bloc area.
The nations that form the bloc must go through a notification process
within GATT.
The bloc must not be formed to raise new trade barriers to nations
outside the bloc.




Free trade allows 'free riders' to benefit without taking significant steps to
liberalize their own trade. However, GATT does have cases of conditional benefits,
which can be enjoyed only if a country contributes toward liberalization. On the
other hand, a regional trading arrangement can exclude non-contracting third parties
through preferences and chscrimination.
Both in theory and in practice, the controversy between multilateralism and
regionalism has proven difficult to resolve. Economic rationale suggests that free
world trade is optimal. Multilateral free trade allows for a single set of nonchscrimin-
atory rules to govern all trade. But achieving multilateral liberalization in large
negotiations that extend benefits unconditionally to all nations has proven difficult.
There are four major questions which need to be asked when considering
which of the two alternatives offers an optimal solution: 43
To what extent does the agreement raise barriers to nonmembers?
Does the agreement foster stronger economies that are better able to
adjust in the future and better able to participate in broader multilateral
liberalization?
Does the agreement address NTBs issues in a manner consistent with
GATT?
Do concessions that member countries make to each other preclude
liberalization under GATT?
Above all, in the absence of concrete global liberalization, any arrangement
that removes trade restrictions may deserve the benefit of the doubt, as a means to
reduce external tariffs. For developing countries, it may not be necessary, after all,
to negotiate rules too far ahead of immediate problems they seek to solve.
Morici, Peter, "Regionalism: Motivations and Risks," in Belous Richard, S., and Rebecca S Hartley;
The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy
, pp. 131-36, National Planning Association,
Washington, DC, 1990.
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2. The Levels of Regional Agreements
Regional economic integration can be achieved in various stages: 44
Preferential Trade Area - members charge each other lower tariffs than
those applicable to non-members. Customs duties are levied on
imports from other members; there is not yet a free movement of goods
within the area.
Free Trade Area - eliminates internal tariffs and NTBs but does not
harmonize external barriers. Free Trade Areas may be established in
two stages: an Industrial Free Trade Area which liberalizes trade in
industrial goods; a Full Free Trade Area encompassing all products.
The process may also start by reducing quantitative restrictions then by
replacing quotas with tariffs.
Customs Union - removes internal barriers and establishes common
external tariffs and quotas.
Common Market - eliminates barriers to the mobility of factors, labor
and capital. Countries also establish a common currency and common
economic policies.
An Economic Union or Confederation - suppresses restrictions on
commodity and factor movements and harmonizes economic policies
to remove discrimination through macroeconomic policies. A complete
economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal,
social, and counter cyclical economic policies. It requires a supra-
national authority whose decisions are binding for the members.
Each mechanism involves successively greater integration. Theoretically and
historically, agreements at lower levels evolve into higher levels of integration. 45 At
each level, there are various types of agreements which are largely influenced by the
political and economic circumstances of the integrating partners and the concomitant
development strategies. The content and strategies pursued also tend to influence
success and failure.





These arrangements reflect obligations and corresponding benefits for the
participants, depending on the goals of the members and the desired effect on
outsiders. Some of the goals may be economic as well as political. For example, a
free trade area limits the power of partners to reinstate internal barriers to trade, but
gives the flexibility to adjust external barriers as appropriate, or to negotiate other
trading arrangements with outside countries. Nevertheless, the free trade agreement
may harmonize customs arrangements and internal institutions to resolve disputes.
To achieve harmony, each partner may also need to adjust its fiscal and monetary
policies to rninimize region-wide distortions. In a customs union, negotiation with
outside parties is done jointly, and the harmonizing institutions are more explicit.
When the countries reach the common market stage, some national institutions may
be subordinated to common market-wide institutions. In fact, countries may have to
cede sovereignty to the common market institutions.46
3. Contemporary Regional Economic Groupings and Bilateral
Arrangements
a. The European Union
The foundation ofEuropean integration is internal trade liberalization.
The process of trade liberalization within the European Union has undergone several
major phases: the elimination of customs duties and quanritive restrictions from 1958
to 1968; and the successive enlargement of membership from six to twelve by 1973
while eliminating internal barriers. By 1992, the other phase of free movement of
goods and factors was completed.
4
u'he participant may be interested in shallow integration (i.e., removing border barriers and providing
for national treatment while not necessarily creating genuinely integrated markets). Shallow integration does not
often inhibit any of the participants from entering into free tarde arrangements with other parties, provided such
arrangement does not impinge on the duties and obligations of the first agreement. Alternatively, participants may
want to enlarge and deepen the integration. With deeper integration, any negotiation with other parties is conducted
by the whole union, not individual states. See Lawrence, Robert, Z., "Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper
Integration," The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., 1996.
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An earlier precursor to the European Union (EU) was the European
Coal and Steel Community (The Treaty of Paris of 1951). Since its early periods,
Europe has nearly transformed itself, starting as a customs union with six members,
but expanding into a fully fledged single market with fifteen countries sharing
common micro- and macro-economic policies. The E.C. and EFTA (Austria, Finland
and Sweden) have merged, while several east European countries have signed free
trade arrangements with the EU, notably Czech, Hungary and Poland. Preferential
trade status is likely to extend to other east European countries, like Russia. 47 The
pace of integration has accelerated, as made evident by the proposed European
Monetary System and the plans the monetary unification.
The basis for the EU is the 1957 Treaty ofRome that established the
E.C. The treaty's goal was to form a common market, by removing tariffs and
quantitative restrictions (QR) between member states. The treaty also abolished
obstacles to the free movement of services, people and capital.
b. Achievements
One way to access the success of regional trading arrangement is to
consider the alternatives available, e.g., comparing the external barriers of countries
like Sweden and Switzerland to the EU; or to compare Spain and Portugal's
agricultural trade barriers before and after they joined the EU. The evidence in both
cases suggests mat joining the EU has reduced barriers to trade. 48
Progress in Europe is attributed in part to establishing an international
code of conduct governing financial, exchange and trade relationships in the wake of
Kelly, Margaret and Annie, K McGuirk, in International Monetary Fund: World Economic and Financial
Surveys: Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy, p. 5, August 1992. See also, World Economic
Survey , various issues.
HDe Melo, Jaime and Panagariya, Arvind, New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Center for Policy
Research, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.
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WWII. But Europe has contributed much to the design, development and implemen-
tation of that code.
The first major achievement was eliminating internal tariffs in 1968.
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991, establishing the Single
Market Program, and prospects for accommodating former communist
countries have expanded the EC and other preferential trade arrange-
ments.
The voting system was changed in 1987 to facilitate passage of
decisions. Parliament was given more direct decision roles.
The EU also created three main institutions - the Parliament, the
Commission and the European Court of Justice. The European Court
of Justice accelerates decision making, implementation and enforce-
ment.
Several other steps were taken toward the goal of a single market.
These are:
The decision to phase-in mutual recognition of academic degrees and
professional qualifications.
Phasing out restrictions on the movement of capital.
Liberalizing insurance arrangements and government procurement.
On the whole, the European integration has led to substantial
multilateral liberalization, beyond what would have materialized without the EU. 49
c. Obstacles
Progress in other areas has been slow due to several interrelated
concerns:
The indifferent state of the E.C. economy and its structural rigidities.
The perception that the E.C. was falling behind due to competition
from the US and Japan in hi-tech industries.
4
Sapir, Andre, "Regional Integration in Europe," in The Economic Journal . 102, pp. 1491-1506,
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Reluctance by member countries to bequeath sovereignty to EU
institutions.
Disagreements on future common tariffs and non-tariff adjustments.
Difficulty in harmonizing standards for government procurement and
investment incentives.
Lack of consensus on competition policy (liberal versus strategic
approach). 50
From the foregoing, it is clear that economic integration is a lengthy and
difficult process which needs commitment by the partners. As the process progresses,
it becomes difficult to proceed without appropriate and correctly empowered institu-
tions.
4. North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA)
The forerunner to the NAFTA was the US-Canada Free Trade Area (FTA).
Before the FTA, the US and Canada had several bilateral agreements, notably, the
Reciprocity Treaty of 1874, two trade liberalization agreements in the 1930s, and
free trade in agricultural machinery and implements in 1944. The latter agreement
is still in place.
The two countries had different but coincidental motivations to enter the
FTA. 51 Relative to the US, Canada is a small export-dependent economy. It lacks a
market large enough to realize economies of scale and specialization. The bilateral
agreement with the US assured Canada of a market for three-quarters of its exports,




rarrow, Maureen A., and Robert C. York, "Regional Trade and Trends: A North American View from
Inside Out," in Belous and Hartley, The Growth of Regional Trading Blocks in the Global Economy
, pp. 76-92,
1 990. When the Canadian economy is booming, they tend to look inward and subsequently engage in nationalistic
economic policies including restraint in trade. When times are bad, they look outward to export markets to cure
their woes. The US had a similar but reverse cycle: the US looks outward in times of prosperity and inward when
the economy slumps. See also Aho, Michael, A "Recipe for RTBS-Resentment, Inefficiency, Bureaucracy, and




thus obviating trade diversion on both sides of the border. The US was motivated by
delays in concluding the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. The FTA was a
precautionary move against inconclusive GATT talks. If the GATT failed, the FTA
would be a precedent for other bilateral, or trilateral, trading deals. Under the US-
Canada FTA, two rounds of accelerated tariff cuts, covering US$ 8 billion of two way
trade, were completed in 1991 without any hitches. 52 The FTA's weakness was
failure to address issues like subsidies, intellectual property rights and agricultural
liberalization.
In April 1991, Mexico was admitted into the what became the North American
Free Trade Area ( NAFTA). In contrast with the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement,
NAFTA' s sectoral coverage is more comprehensive and contains more concessions
on national sovereignty. NAFTA also has a clause covering most favored nation
(MFN) provisions in sectors not included in the agreement. The objectives of
NAFTA are:
To liberalize trade and bilateral investments, and create a better
framework for bilateral investment and trade relations.
To solve bilateral trade problems in the automobile sector.
To solve problems related to subsidies and tariffs.
To create new rules to regulate services trade and liberalize the
financial services market.
To promote multilateral cooperation within the GATT framework .
One of the most significant provisions is the commitment to eliminate all
tariffs and quotas within 15 years. Sixty percent of the tariffs and quotas were
eliminated by 1994, with the rest to be phased out in 5-15 years. NAFTA provides
that the countries can eliminate tariffs and quotas earlier by mutual consent.
However, each NAFTA member retains the right to re-impose restrictions in limited
Kelly, Margaret, and Annie K. McGuirk in "IMF: World Economic Surveys: Issues and Developments
in International Trade Policy," p. 21, August 1992.
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circumstances, (e.g., to protect human, animal, or plant health) and special rules for
agriculture, the automotive sector, energy, textiles and apparel.
On the services sector, NAFTA disciplines government regulatory measures
relating to banking, insurance, securities. In addition, it sets out country-specific
liberalization commitments and transition periods for compliance.
In the agricultural sector, NAFTA sets out separate bilateral agreements on
cross border trade in agricultural products: Canada versus Mexico, US versus
Mexico, and Canada versus US. This arrangement also has a transition mechanism,
with trilateral provisions covering domestic support for agricultural subsidies.
Additional features of the agreement are:
The eventual elimination of barriers to automotive products.
Non-discrimination on intra-NAFTA investment, and investment
protection and security in accordance with international law.
Protection of investment against unwarranted expropriation, except for
public purpose in a non discrirninatory manner.
Provisions to safeguard intellectual property rights.
Establish institutions to implement the Trade Commission and the
Secretariat.
Labor market and immigration issues are not covered in the agreement.
The rules of origin in NAFTA are more restrictive, especially on textiles,
automobiles and some electronics. NAFTA liberalized foreign investment, services,
and intellectual property rights earlier than GATT, but in others areas it has not
moved further than GATT. 53
In most respects, NAFTA members are free to follow domestic policies.
Individual member countries are also free to conclude separate trade agreements with
Lawrence, Robert, Z., Regionalism, Multilateralism and Deeper Integration , The Brookings Institute,
Washington, DC, 1996. For example, harmonization of competition policies, elimination of administered
protection m anti-dumping, countervailing duty provisions and subsidies.
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third countries as circumstances permit. 54 However, the enforcement of each nation's
laws is subject to free trade area scrutiny and sanctions in several areas, including the
administration of trade rules, labor market policies and environmental policies.
These two examples illustrate that economic integration is a long and difficult
process which involves many logical steps. Full integration needs the political and
economic commitment of all member states. Appropriate and correctly empowered
institutions are crucial in facilitating the process.
The EU's approach of deeper integration leaves less flexibility for members
to act unilaterally as they achieve successively higher levels of integration. In
contrast, NAFTA, with shallow arrangements, gives the members flexibility to enter
into other extra-regional arrangements and to coordinate national macroeconomic
policies.
Regional arrangements need concrete but achievable goals. While each of the
two arrangements has different objectives and depth (on issues like tariffs, movement
of factors, coordination of economic policies), national interests have not been
ignored.
54
The US has bilateral agreements on various goods with Australia, Japan, Germany, and the E.C.
Mexico has complemented its membership in NAFTA by negotiating free-trade agreements with numerous
countries in South America, (Chile, Columbia, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Bolivia and joined both the Asia-Pacific
Economic (APEC), in which all NAFTA countries are members, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). See "IMF'. World Economic and Financial Surveys," various issues.
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HI. REGIONAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
A. BACKGROUND
1. Historical Southern Africa Trade Arrangements
With independence, African countries saw regional economic integration as
a way of reducing dependence links with former colonial countries. Regional
solutions were associated with attaining economic independence, development and
self-reliant negotiations. Several regional arrangements have been formed,
particularly between the 1960s and 1970s, but few have produced tangible results.
hi any event, this lack of success has not affected renewed interest in regionalization
as a way of promoting sustainable development and economic growth.
The first formal regional grouping in Africa dates back to 1910 when the
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) was formed. 55 The SACU established
common external tariffs and a common monetary area, but it did not seek a common
market or confederation status. In the 1960s and 1970s, several regional trading
arrangements of different types emerged. Notable was the East African Community
(EAC) of 1967, involving Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. The EAC's long term
objective was coordinating economic development and estabhshing a common
market. However, the EAC was disbanded in 1977 before it could achieve this goal. 56
In the 1970s, monetary unions emerged in Central and West Africa, among others, the
Communaute Economique de FAfirique de 1'Quest (CEAO); the West African
Monetary Union (UMOA), and the Mano River Union (MRU). Monetary unions
T"he percussor to SACU was the 1 889 economic integration between the Cape of Good Hope and the
Orange Free State, and by the mid- 1 890s all the territories of South Africa came together into a customs union.
For details, see Gavin Maasdorp, Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Prospects for Regional Integration.
RISCT, London, 1992.
Earlier in the 1 950s some political federations, which were de facto economic communities, were
formed e.g., the Federation of Central Africa, comprising the present Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi (all were still
British colonies). The federation was disbanded in 1963, largely for political reasons and a perceived
industrialization bias toward Zimbabwe.
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emphasized coordinating monetary policies and using common currencies and
exchange rates, with little emphasis on free trade.
The third wave of regional economic groupings, its seeds sown in the 1960s,
started in the second half ofthe 1970s to early 1980s under the auspices of the United
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU). The OAU saw regional cooperation as the only viable strategy for the
continent's development. This approach advocated four separate regional economic
groupings in Africa to provide sufficiently large markets and economies of scale: the
Maghreb Union in the North; Economic Community for West African States
(ECOWAS); the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC), and the
Preferential Trade Agreement for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA). While the
ECA favored both monetary unions and common markets, the emphasis was on free
trade and regional common markets. This offered the most direct route toward full
economic collaboration, culminating in an African Economic Community (AEC).
In 1980, the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC)
emerged. SADCC 's approach was different from previous regional economic
arrangements; it emphasized regional cooperation for economic development rather
than trade. Previous studies have adequately dealt with the origins, progress and
prospects for regional economic groupings in Sub-Saharan Africa. This study will
concentrate on those that have a direct bearing on Zimbabwe and South Africa, like
the SACU, PTA and SADCC.57 Table 3.1 shows the country membership of various
groupings. 58
57
See Foroutan, Fazaeh, "Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past Experience and Future
Prospects," in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (ed.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration, pp. 234-
277, Center forEconomic Policy Research, Cambridge, 1993; see also Gavin Maasdorp, Economic Cooperation
in Southern Africa: Prospects for Regional Integration, RISCT, London, 1992; and Johnson, Omotunde, E.G.,
"Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing Prospects for Success," in The Journal ofModem African Studies ,
vol 29, No 1
, p. 1-26, 1 99 1 ; Goodison, Paul, and Bernadette Nee, "The SADCC Experience" DPMN Bulletin, 2
(1), April 1994; Mandaza, Ibbo, and Tostensen, Arne, Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Future; from the
Conference to a Community. Southern African Development Community, Gaborone, Botswana, 1994; and Hanlon,
Joseph, "SADCC: Progress and Prospects," in The Economist Intelligence Unit Report, No. 182, 1984.
58
In 1 990, the Cross Border Initiative (CBI) was set up with the backing of the EU, WB, IMF and African
Development Bank (ADB) to promote cross border trade and investment. This regional arrangement is not
discussed further in this study. The interested reader can refer to. Holden, Merle, "Economic Integration and
Trade Liberalization in Southern Africa. Is There a Role for South Africa?" The World Bank, 1 996.
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Table 3.1. Country Membership of Regional Groupings


















South Africa X X X
Sudan X






Source: Lists ofRegional groupings.
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B. REGIONAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
1. The Customs Union Model
a. The Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
SACU was set up in 1910 as a pragmatic trade and payments agreement
not as a growth or development oriented integration program. The present agreement
was renegotiated in 1969. SACU embraces South Africa and countries that were
once economic regions of South Africa, and latter British protectorates, viz;
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, which was under South African
occupation until 1990 (commonly referred to as the BLNS states). SACU provides
for duty free movement of goods (except agricultural products), services and factors
among member states, and for a common external tariff against the rest of the world.
South Africa unilaterally determines all customs rates, and operates the system to
maximize the market for its producers behind substantial protective barriers. SACU
operates as a customs pool, with South Africa collecting all import duties for all
states.
In terms of the agreement, any BLNS country may protect new
industries by levying additional duties on imports for a maximum period of 8 years.
Nevertheless, the country has to specify which industries are of importance to the
economy as well as the period over which these industries will receive tariff
protection or relief. They may also prohibit goods for economic, social and cultural
reasons. In addition they may import goods duty free from outside the SACU, but
may not re-export to SACU without full duty being paid.
Revenue is shared among the member states according to a formula, in
proportion to their share of trade. 59 The revenue distribution scheme was designed
59
The formula has three essential parts: 1) The calculation for each state is based on its total imports, both
from South Africa and outside; 2) the figure of imports for two years previously is used as basis for initial
payments, this means customs revenue on any increase is two years out of date, with no interest! 3) the figure of
actual import share is multiplied by a factor of 1 .42% to give other members an extra 42% of the total accrued
customs revenue. In 1976, the agreement was amended to constrain revenues to 20% of duty, inclusive of the
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to 'compensate' the BLNS states for leaving trade, monetary and fiscal policies, and
industry decisions entirely to South Africa. This arrangement also makes some
revenue available to the smaller states for development purposes. Owing to a lack of
meaningful industries, the customs revenue constitutes a large proportion of Gross
National Product (GNP) of the BLNS countries. 60
Instead of deepening the integration toward a common market, as is
consistent with regional integration theory, SACU has tended toward more shallow
arrangements, e.g., less freedom ofmovement of labor and more individual members
participating in competing regional trade arrangements, particularly by the BLNS
states.
61 The agreement also does not cover strong mechanisms to counter
polarization nor does it aim to promote a more balanced spatial location of industries.
However, no significant industrialization has occurred, partly due to stringent export
regulations and at times quotas that the BLNS states have to meet to export to South
Africa, to minimize damage to its own import substitution program.62
Since the mid-1970s, the BLNS states have also expressed disquiet
over the revenue sharing scheme and South Africa's unilateral decisions on the type,
level and timing of customs rates to suit her own domestic macroeconomic goals. It
value ofimports and excisable production. See Holden, Merle, Economic Integration and Trade Liberalization in
Southern Africa. Is There a Role for South Africa? World Bank, Washington, D.C., 1996.
60
See Grundy, Kenneth, W., "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa" in Gwendolen
M Carter and Patrick O'Meara, (eds.), International Politics in Southern Africa, pp. 148-178, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1982.
61
A11 BLNS joined SADCC, whose objective was to de-link from South Africa, and all, apart from
Botswana, became members of a rival regional trade arrangement, the PTA.
For example, Namibia abandoned a car assembly project due to difficulties in securing export markets
to South Africa Several other BLNS industrial ventures faced similar problems after South Africa imposed strict
safety, health and local content regulations. See SADC, Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A
Macro Framework Study Report SADC, Gaborone, Botswana, 1993; see also Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC: Progress
and Prospects," in The Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report No. 182, London, 1984.
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is argued, this tends to impede economic development and perpetuate dependence in
BLNS states.63
Finally, the agreement inherently suffers from a conflict of interests.
For the other states, customs duty was seen as a source of revenue, whereas to South
Africa it is a method of restricting imports, to protect its domestic industries; during
the apartheid era, it was a major foreign policy instrument to provide stability in the
region.64
b. The Common Monetary Area as an Arm ofSACU
Related to SACU is the Rand Monetary Area (RMA), first formed in
1974. RMA formalized a defacto monetary union. The RMA was re-negotiated in
1986 to become the Common Monetary Area (CMA). The CMA involves all SACU
members except Botswana, which opted to establish its own currency and Central
Bank. The agreement allows other SACU members to use the South African
currency, or to establish their own currencies while providing for free movement of
funds between member states. All CMA members have access to the South African
money and capital markets, and foreign exchange from the South African Reserve
Bank. The arrangement also provides for compensation for forgone interest from
external reserves, consultation on policy decisions, especially on changes in interest
rates, exchange control and the right to transfer funds and profits abroad.
In a Ford Foundation study, Lesotho is said to have discovered that South Africa's ex-factory prices
were, on average, 37% higher than on the world market, and with transport costs, still 23% higher; in principle,
ifLesotho left SACU and imported goods from the rest ofthe world, it could charge an average of23% import duty
and get more revenue than at present Another study showed that Lesotho gained only Rim by exporting to South
Africa, while South Africa gained R66m from selling to Lesotho (1 US$=4.5 South African Rand).
See Libby, Ronald, T., The Politics ofEconomic Power in Southern Africa, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, and Joseph Hanlon, ed, Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa. Catholic Institute
For International Relations, London, 1987.
Grundy, Kenneth, W., "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa" in Gwendolen M.
Carter and Patrick O'Meara, (eds.). International Politics in Southern Africa, pp. 148-178, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1982; see also Joseph Hanlon, ed., Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern
Africa, Catholic Institute For International Relations, London, 1987.
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The 1986 agreement provides for separate bilateral agreements between
South Africa and each of the CMA countries to establish their own currency, make
direct foreign currency payments using the rand, and issue local currency subject to
full backing in rand with the South African Reserve Bank. Namibia's independence
in 1990 led to a revision of the agreement in 1992, and the introduction of the
Namibian dollar. 65
Theoretically, each country is responsible for its own monetary policy
and financial institutions; in reality South Africa manages the rand, gold and foreign
reserves of all the CMA countries.
2. Free Trade Area Model: The PTA and COMESA
The PTA was established on 21 December 1981, with its headquarters in
Zambia. Initially, the PTA had 18 members; eventually membership increased to
some 23 countries and a potential market of around 300 million people. 66
The PTA Treaty had fourteen protocols which set out, in great detail, the
modalities of co-operation. The treaty explicitly recognizes an economic community
as its ultimate goal, in conformity with conventional theory of regional economic
integration. To move toward this objective, the PTA drew up a common list of
commodities, covering 212 categories, on which member states were to eliminate all
trade barriers by the year 2000. Customs duties were to be reduced by 25% every
two years until eliminated by 1992. To promote trade and overcome currency
convertability and shortages, a PTA Clearing House was established in Zimbabwe to
65
The Southern African rand is still legal tender in the CMA countries, but is gradually being phased out.
Seinorage is calculated by estimating rands in circulation each hear based on the amount agreed to in December
1993. See Holden, Merle, "Economic Integration and Trade Liberalization in Southern Africa. Is There a Role
for South Africa? in World Bank Discussion Paper No. 342, Washington, D.C., 1 996.
66
The current members of the PTA, now COMESA, are: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Entrea,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia,
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The PTA and SADCC have been working
toward a merger, to reduce duplication and competition. Of the SADCC countries, only Botswana opted not to join
the PTA/COMESA. Also, South Africa was excluded for political reasons.
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settle accounts between member states. Balances are offset among different
currencies, with outstanding balances settled in hard currency every two months. In
1988, the PTA also established a PTA Trade and Development Bank in Burundi
(which was temporarily transferred to Kenya due to civil war). This bank issues PTA
travelers checks in the PTA currency, the UAPTA. Other important achievements
were setting up a PTA Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the PTA Association of
Commercial Banks, and harmonization of road transit charges. 67
In November 1993, the PTA Treaty established the Common Market for
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). The treaty was signed in Kampala, Uganda
by sixteen of the member countries, including Zimbabwe, but has yet to be ratified
by at least eleven of the required signatory states. 68
COMESA embodies all the original principal elements of the PTA, like the
free trade area, but the target date has been pushed forward to 2005, with a customs
union ten years later. In addition, emphasis has been placed on establishing a
payments union within the monetary harmonization program and eventually
establishing a Monetary Union and free movement of citizens by the year 2020.




For details See also, Gavin Maasdorp, Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Prospects for
Regional Integration. RISCT, London, 1992; and Foroutan, Fazaeh, "Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Past Experience and Future Prospects," in, Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (eds), New Dimensions in
Regional Integration, pp. 234-277, Center for Economic Policy Research, Cambridge, 1993.
Djibouti, Seychelles and Somalia have yet to sign the treaty, while Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia,
Tanzania and Zambia have yet to ratify it.
T^evertheless, the agreement permits member countries to temporarily re-impose tariffs to compensate
for 'excessive' revenue losses arising from the tariff reductions. Uganda recently exercised this right by imposing
a "temporary"10% surcharge on imports from its COMESA partners. See Africa Quarterly Review, Standard
Chartered Bank, Harare, Zimbabwe, October, 1996.
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The main objectives ofCOMESA are:
To attain sustainable growth by promoting a more balanced and
harmonious development of its production and marketing structure.
To promote joint economic development in all fields and joint
adoption of macro-economic policies and programs and to foster
relations among its member states.
To create an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and
domestic investment including the joint promotion of research and
development.
To strengthen bargaining positions with the rest of the world.
To help establish the African Economic Community.
Notable PTA/COMESA problems are:
Delays in concluding the agreement on the common lists due to
arguments as to what goods to include or exclude, difficulty in defining
the rules of origin, and disagreements over compensatory mechanisms
for those countries that would suffer tariff revenue losses.
In economic terms, COMESA is the second largest grouping in Africa
(after the West African grouping), but because most members are poor
and depend on one or two primary export goods, trade was dominated
by Kenya and Zimbabwe, who are also highly protective of their own
domestic markets.70 There is also lack of complementarity and uneven
distribution ofbenefits which has stalled any meaningful and effective
integration.
Instability, cultural and political differences, and strong ties to former
colonial markets tend to reduce the potential for full trading.
COMESA groups many countries with little mutual trade, and
questions have been raised about the size of the grouping and the lack
of common economic, historical and political links. While the
COMESA Treaty emphasizes trade and monetary affairs, the programs
also cover transportation, communications, agriculture and natural
resources, duplicating efforts under SADCC.
'iCenya and Zimbabwe accounted for 32 and 27% of intra-PTA exports respectively, while absorbing
only 15 and 7% ofimports. See Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC: Progress and Prospects," in The Economist Intelligence
Unit Special Report, No. 182, London, 1984; and Gavin Maasdorp, Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa:
Prospects for Regional Integration, RISCT, London, 1 992.
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Another important conflict has been between SACU and COMESA.
The COMESA treaty demands most favored nation (MFN) treatment
among member states, but SACU does not permit members to enter into
concessionary agreements with outside countries unless all partners
agree. South Africa and Botswana have vetoed Lesotho and
Swaziland's concessionary agreements in the past. COMESA had to
compromise by allowing Swaziland and Lesotho a 5-year transitional
period which was extended for another 5 years. The failure to merge
the SADCC and COMESA has been cause for concern. 71
3. Cooperation for Development Model: Southern African
Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC)
SADCC was formed in 1980 by nine southern African countries, Angola,
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and
Zimbabwe, to coordinate cooperation for economic development activities in a limited
number of sectors where clear benefits could be gained from regional approaches.
Namibia joined the organization upon its independence in 1990. This system of
functional regional cooperation was significantly different from the mechanisms for
regional cooperation elsewhere in Africa. There was little emphasis on trade and
tariff reduction.
Given ideological differences and on-going political and military
confrontation in the region at the time, SADCC's primary objective was to reduce
dependence of the member countries, especially South Africa, and to promote and
71
For example, in January 1997, Mozambique and Lesotho announced their intention to quit COMESA
due to its 'monstrous' size and lack of beneficial trade from the arrangement. See Panafrican News Agency,
"COMESA to Establish a Common External Tariff," PANA, Dakar, Senegal; and Electronic Mail & Guardian,
20 Jan 1997.
44
coordinate regional developmental projects. Other important SADCC objectives
were:
To forge links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration.
Although bilateral trade agreements and counter trade between member
states were encouraged, economic integration toward free trade areas,
customs union, common market and economic community appeared as
long term goals. Hence most members ofSADCC became members of
the Preferential Trade Agreement for Eastern and Southern Africa in
1981, and three of them also remained in SACU and two in the CMA.
To mobilize resources to promote national, interstate, and regional
policies. The argument for cooperation was based on the rationale of
least cost, economies of scale, and easier coordination at a regional
level.
Concerted action to secure international cooperation within the
framework of economic liberation. Almost 90% of SADCC funding
and technical assistance was provided by 'international partners in
development cooperation,' like the European Community, the Nordic
countries, US AID, the UN and the Commonwealth.
Several reasons led to the emphasis on balanced growth rather than free trade.
Most SADC countries were pursuing import substitution
industrialization, and apart from Botswana, they were also facing acute
foreign currency shortages. Issues like tariffs and non-tariff barriers
could not address problems facing SADCC, since the obstacles to trade
lay in inadequate industrial capacity.
^Although SADCC was formed mainly to exclude South Africa, note must be made that South Africa
was, and is still, party to several arrangements to promote cooperation, at multilateral, bilateral, sector specific or
project specific level, e.g., the Southern African Regional Tourist Council (SARTOC), Southern African Regional
Commission for Conservation and Utilization of the Soil (SARCCUS), Southern African Liaison Meeting on
Roads, (SALMOR), Sua Pan Soda-Ash project in Botswana, the Highlands Water Project in Lesotho. Also several
agreements on migrant labor and energy were in place with many of the SADCC members. For a detailed
discussion on the formation and objectives of SADCC, see Mandaza, Ibo, and Tostensen, Ame. Southern Africa:
In Search ofa Common Future: From the Conference to a Community, Southern African Development Community,
Gaborone, Botswana, 1994; and Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC: Progress and Prospects," in The Economist
Intelligence Unit Special Report, No. 182, London, 1984.
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All SADCC countries distrusted free trade areas, due to bad
experiences, whereby such arrangements ensured that industrial
development was concentrated in the most developed country. 73
The free trade concept assumes trade is an end in itself, yet the SADCC
concept saw development and production as the goal, with trade as the
means to that goal. In addition, a 1975 United Nations Commission for
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had recommended cooperation on
joint industries and transport projects among developing countries,
instead of integration.74
The need to de-link from South Africa's multinational corporations and
political processes.
The main SADCC institutions were a small Secretariat based in Botswana, plus
some technical working groups; the main decision making body was the Annual
Consultative Conference, attended by Heads of states. Most of the SADCC projects
were coordinated nationally at the sectoral level, with the presumption that each
project would benefit most, if not all, SADCC member countries. Each SADCC
country was thus responsible for coordinating certain sectors of economic
development. 75
SADCC initially emphasized creating transport and communications
infrastructure and the Southern African Transport and Communications Commission
(SATCC) was established in Maputo, Mozambique. The reason was that civil wars
in that country and Angola had destroyed or disrupted most of the region's shortest
and most economic trade routes except through South Africa. Ironically, South Africa
73
For example, the 1953-63 Central African Federation between Zambia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe
benefitted the latter, the Southern African Customs Union benefits South Africa; the East African Community
between Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda benefited Kenya and the Portuguese Community involving Portugal, Angola,
Mozambique, etc., benefited the colonial power.
Tor details see, Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC: Progress and Prospects," The Economist Intelligence Unit
Special Report No. 182, London, 1984.
ror example, transportation and port development in Mozambique; food security research in Zimbabwe;
energy - Angola; animal disease, coordinated by Botswana; tourism by Lesotho; fisheries by Malawi (marine
fisheries were later given to Namibia); mining by Zambia; industry and trade, Tanzania; and human resources -
Swaziland.
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was largely responsible for perpetuating the economic problems of SADCC member
countries by sponsoring the civil wars in these two countries. For example, the
closure of trade routes due to war in Angola denied SADCC access to local sources
of oil and the accompanying proximity savings. 76 Some studies estimate that it cost
SADCC countries almost four times as much to use South Africa's ports. 77 SATCC's
major achievement was rehabilitating the rail, road, ports and oil pipelines in
Mozambique.
However, by 1987 SADCC focus began to shift toward industry and trade.
One reason for this shift was that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Bank (WB), among other things, opposed the delays in reducing tariffs and
government trade controls in heavily indebted developing countries.78 Thus, most
SADCC countries embarked on economic reform programs whose critical facet was
trade liberalization. Zimbabwe, for her part, started the economic structural
adjustment program in 1991. 79
Another important reason was that of lack of mutual trade between SADCC
countries. Although not a pure trade arrangement, Zimbabwe accounted for 70% of
intra-SADCC exports and only 13 % of imports. Paradoxically, South Africa's trade
76
Until the end ofthe 1980s, SADCC states and their infrastructure were targeted for destabilization by
South Africa and its allies militarily, politically, economically and psychologically. In 1 979 and the early 1 980s,
South Africa suggested forming a Constellation of Southern African States (Consas). Consas 'veiled' objective
was to win back 'SACU's transgressors' (Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland), and the economically desperate, but
politically strategic countries like Zimbabwe and Mozambique. The grouping would also include South Africa's
homelands and occupied Namibia The announced objective was stability through regional economic development
and guarantee the continued operation of South African-based MNCs in the region. Others have argued that South
Africa's MNCs were used to interfere in the SADCC economies. For details see Libby, Ronald, T., The Politics
ofEconomic Power in Southern Africa, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987.
77
Gavin Maasdorp, Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Prospects for Regional Integration.
RISCT, London, 1992.
Tor details, see International Monetary Fund, "Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy,"
(several issues).
79Govemment of Zimbabwe, "Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95)," Harare,
1991.
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with SADCC did not fall. South Africa supplied 90% of imports to Lesotho and
Swaziland, 80% to Botswana; 75% to Namibia, 40% to Malawi, and about 20-23%
to Zimbabwe, Zambia and Mozambique. 80
C. PREVIOUS TRADE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING ZIMBABWE
1. Background to Zimbabwe's Political Economy of Development
Zimbabwe-South Africa relations date back to the last century when a South
African-based MNC, the British South Africa Company (BSAC), colonized the
present day Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) on behalf of Britain. BSAC administered
the country for three decades until 1923. British capital, mostly through South
African subsidiaries, dominated all foreign investment. In fact, most of the trade was
with Europe until the 1940s, when South Africa became more significant as a source
ofimports and market for cash crops. Due to the small internal market, the economic
growth and success of industrialization was and still is dependent on foreign trade. 81
Several phases can be discerned in Zimbabwe's trade relationships in the
southern African region: 82
Explosive growth was associated with the strong external stimulus of
WWI and WWII demand for foodstuffs and raw materials, especially
asbestos and chrome.
The 1953-63 federation with the now Zambia and Malawi gave
Zimbabwe unlimited regional export markets for light manufactures.
Tor details, see Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC: Progress and Prospects," The Economist Intelligence Unit
Special Report. No. 182, London, 1984.
81
See Amghi, Giovani, The Political Economy of Rhodesia , Mouton, The Hague, 1967; Kay, George,
Rhodesia A Human Geography. University ofLondon Press, 1970; Nelson, Harold, D., ed.. Zimbabwe: A Country
Study, The Secretary of the Army, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1983; Grundy, Kenneth,
W., "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa" in Gwendolen M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara,
(eds), International Politics in Southern Africa. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982; and Strack, Harry,
R., Sanctions: The Case ofRhodesia. Syracuse University Press, 1978.
82
Strack, Harry, R., Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, Syracuse University Press, 1978, and Arrighi,
Giovani, The Political Economy ofRhodesia. Mouton, The Hague, 1967.
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Until 1966, Zambia and Britain accounted for almost 50% of exports,
with South Africa and Germany accounting for about 10% each. The
import breakdown was roughly 30% from Britain, 23% from South
Africa, with the US, Japan, West Germany and Zambia accounting for
a total of 20%.
Between 1965 and 1980, Zimbabwe's trade relations also changed as
a result of economic isolation; Zimbabwe was forced into trade
arrangements with previously less significant partners, like South
Africa and Portugal, to guarantee export markets. 83
From 1965 to 1980, Zimbabwe's economy developed under highly
protective tariffs to minimize the disruptions caused by international
sanctions and mitigate foreign exchange shortages. However, from
1980, the protectionist policies were largely for import substitution
protection. The emphasis also shifted from traditional primary goods
exports to manufactures, increasing export value-added, and non-
traditional agricultural exports.
In 1991, Zimbabwe embarked on an economic reform program, one
facet ofwhich was international trade liberalization to reduce exchange
controls and barriers to free trade.
2. Historical Zimbabwe-South Africa Trade Agreements
It must be noted that apart from the South Africa-Zimbabwe bilateral trade
agreement, there were and still exist several similar arrangements involving all
southern African countries. 84
The preferential bilateral trade agreement with South Africa (on a MFN basis)
commenced on 1 January 1964. The agreement had an initial five year term with
TJntil 1965, Zambia received up to 37.5 % of Rhodesia's exports in some sub-sectors, 66% of re-
exports, with total interdependence on power from the jointly owned Kariba Power station from which Zambia sold
70% of its share of electricity to Zimbabwe. Zambia also purchased 1 00% of all coal requirements. Coal imports
from Zimbabwe were cut to 0% by 1 97 1 as were other imports. See Nelson, Harold, D
.
, ed. , Zimbabwe: A Country
Study. The Secretary of the Army, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1983.
^•br example, the Zimbabwe-Botswana and the Malawi-Botswana bilateral agreements, both dating back
to the 1950s. There are also the South Africa-Malawi, Zambia-Botswana (later renounced by Zambia),
Mozambique-Tanzania, Mozambique-Malawi, Mozambique-Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe-Tanzania, Tanzania-Zambia,
Angola-Mozambique and Zimbabwe-Namibia bilateral agreements. For details, see Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC:
Progress and Prospects " in The Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report, No. 182, London, 1984. Zimbabwe
had other bilateral trade agreements with Portugal and its colonies.
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automatic renewal unless either party gave 12 months notice of cancellation. It
provided for duty free, preferential entry or restrictive quotas for Zimbabwean goods,
particularly clothing and textiles, footwear, radios, rod and wire, and selected
agricultural products. On the other hand, South African exports include production
inputs, some pharmaceuticals, and consumer goods. The arrangement was designed
to maximize the diversity of Rhodesian entry while minimizing disruptive effects on
South African industry. 85
South Africa's exports fitted neatly into Zimbabwe's economy (production
inputs) with little competition in spite of import substitution, largely because of the
extensive South Africa MNC subsidiaries in the latter. Furthermore, the Zimbabwe
dollar was only convertible with the South African rand. This trade was almost three
times the volume of any other country; the South Africa domination was maintained
(albeit reduced) even after removing sanctions in 1980. Others estimate that
excluding agricultural products and alloys, South Africa took up to 75% of
Zimbabwe's manufactured exports in 1980. 86
South Africa's economic growth depends on external trade. Compared to the
rest of the world, Zimbabwe has always been a minor trading partner for South
Africa, but a significant one in the southern African region. In 1984, 75% of South
African exports went to developed countries, while only 14% of exports, mostly
manufactures, were sold to Africa, excluding SACU. 87 In 1978, Zimbabwe
contributed 2-3% of South Africa's imports needs and took just 7-8% of exports.
Except for the gold trade, South Africa has had a negative trade balance with all its
developed country trading partners, but maintains a concomitant large trade surplus
TDetails of the agreement are given in the Southern Rhodesia Government Notice No. 81 1 of 1964.
Strack, Harry, R, Sanctions: The Case ofRhodesia, Syracuse University Press, 1 978; see also Nelson,
Harold, D., ed., Zimbabwe: A Country Study. The Secretary of the Army, US Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1983.
87
In order ofimportance, the main export markets were the US, Japan, Switzerland, UK, Germany, and
Africa, while import sources were Germany, the US, Japan, UK, France, and Italy. See Libby, Ronald, T., The
Politics ofEconomic Power in Southern Africa. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1 987.
50
with African countries. In particular, trade with Africa helps balance her trade deficit
with developed countries. Furthermore, southern Africa consumes the bulk of South
Africa's exports, especially capital-intensive manufactures. 88
Zimbabwe's benefits from the trade arrangement with South Africa are:
The agreement helped earn and conserve vital foreign exchange for the
highly import-dependent economy; the trade sector constituted about
one-third of GDP.
The export market was guaranteed and long term planning and scale
production was possible.
Proximity reduced transportation costs, hence holding down domestic
and export prices.
In spite of sanctions, the Zimbabwean economy grew impressively between
1964 and 1974. In 1974, the economy faced acute foreign currency shortages,
balance of payments problems and inflation. Some argue that stagnation was
inevitable as the benefits of import substituting production of consumer goods were
exhausted; others maintain that exogenous factors like the world recession, oil price
shocks, civil war, etc., contributed to the decline beginning in 1975. 89
Despite the advantages, several weaknesses can be identified in the
preferential trade agreement with South Africa:
The economies are in most respects competitive rather than
complementary. Zimbabwe's major exports are agricultural and mining
products, with manufacturing geared toward the domestic and less
developed economies of southern Africa. Because South Africa is a
major producer and exporter in the same sectors, Zimbabwe could only
get access in those areas in which the domestic market was available.
South Africa's failure to penetrate Western manufactured goods
88
Ibid.
8%ee Nelson, Harold, D., ed, Zimbabwe: A Country Study, The Secretary of the Army, US Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1 983. See also Joseph Hanlon and Colin Stoneman, "Zimbabwe: The Private
Sector and South Africa'" in Joseph Hanlon, ed., Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa,
pp. 199-218, Catholic Institute For International Relations, London, 1 987, and Strack, Harry, R., Sanctions: The
Case ofRhodesia, Syracuse University Press, 1978.
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markets meant that the Zimbabwean goods were in direct competition
with South African producers in Africa.
The agreement was not based on principle of reciprocity. Zimbabwe'
s
economy was inherently desperate and vulnerable, owing to
international sanctions, and too dependent on exports (and implicitly
imports) to survive.90 South Africa became a captive supplier and
source of imports, and unilaterally amended the agreement on several
occasions. They imposed quotas in certain areas while reducing others
at will.
As competition from Zimbabwe stiffened, some South African
manufacturers pressured their government to restrict the preferential
access of Zimbabwean goods. For example, in 1976, Zimbabwean
textiles were forced to meet limited quota ceilings as an alternative to
an increased duty which might have priced them out of the South
African market. 91
The agreement did not have a devaluation clause and most quotas were
specified in value terms, using the South African currency. 92 Where
value quotas are used, any inflation, devaluation or depreciation in the
specified currency reduces tradeable volumes. Because exports
become more expensive, this reduces the foreign exchange potential of
exports. Zimbabwe's desperate economic position made tradeables
price inelastic. To South Africa, it is evident that imports from
Zimbabwe were less inelastic (clothing, textiles, agricultural products,
radios, etc.) and easily replaceable with local production and/or
competing imports.
On the import side, it is alleged that some South African exporters
added currency devaluation effects to the prices. 93 Since Zimbabwe's
90
The Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, is quoted as saying on April 1975, "...the imposition of
sanctions created many trading problems for us... we are compelled to export at a discount and import at a
premium....we lose on both transactions...This has the effect of reducing profit margins internally, and at the
national level it has an adverse effect on our BOP and foreign reserves." Another Govt. Minister, J. J. Wrathall
had this to say, "....exports are our life blood. Our success or failure as a nation depends on our ability to make
good, by whatever means possible, the loss of the export markets which have been closed by sanctions." Strack,




See Southern Rhodesia Government Notice No. 81
1
of 1 964.
See Strack, Harry, R., Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia. Syracuse University Press, 1978.
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imports are predominantly production inputs and capital goods,
increases in import prices directly affect production costs, with obvious
consequences on the export prices. Any increase in export production
costs leads to increased export prices, making the country less
competitive in all export markets in which South Africa and Zimbabwe
compete.
The agreement is out-of-date, and has not been systematically revised
to include new products and increasing production capacities.
The existence of SACU, and South Africa's bilateral agreements with
most of the southern African countries, curtailed Zimbabwe's
competitive potential in the region.
With poor political relations between Zimbabwe and South Africa
between 1980 and 1994, most of South Africa's decisions on the
agreement were based more on political intolerance than economics.
For example, in 1980, the South African Credit Guarantee Insurance
Cooperation limited coverage to just 25% on all new exports, and in
March 1981, South Africa gave 12 months notice to abrogate the
bilateral trade agreement, with at least 7000 jobs lost in the textile
sector. Under international political pressure, South Africa grudgingly
extended the agreement less than a fortnight before the agreement was
due to expire in March 1982. However, most South Africa buyers had
already found alternative sources for many of the goods; worse still,
uncertainty remained as to the next action.94
Nevertheless, unilateral revision of the agreement continued. The clothing
and textile tariff was increased from 30% to 90% between 1992 and 1996, amid
reluctance by South Africa to renegotiate. It is estimated that the Zimbabwean
clothing and textile sectors lost 17,000 jobs (1 1,000 in textiles). Much of the blame
has been laid at the door ofhighly protectionist policies in South Africa, traditionally
the industry's chief export market. The situation was worsened when the
Zimbabwean government removed subsidies on locally produced cotton lint.
Substantive negotiations only started in June 1996, again after pressure from the US
nanlon, Joseph, Beggar Your Neighbors: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, Catholic Institute For
International Relations, London, 1987.
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and the EU.95 The ongoing negotiations have produced some progress on reducing
tariffs to their 1992 levels on clothing and textiles, cotton lint and footwear, but very
little progress in agriculture and light manufactures. 96
D. TRANSFORMATION OF SADCC INTO THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)
1. Evolution of SADC
Among other things, SADCC was transformed into SADC because of the need
to benefit participation in all sectors, especially the region's productive investment
and trade. The Declaration and SADC Treaty were signed in Windhoek, Namibia
in August 1992. The treaty emphasizes growth through free trade. Instead of
cooperation, it emphasizes financial mechanisms to support intra-SADC trade, cross
border investment, free movement of factors of production and strengthening of
institutions. The sub-objectives include: self-reliance and interdependence, strong
political relations, peace and security goals.97
The SADC Trade Protocol moves toward a free trade area over eight years to
give members time to re-adjust and minimize shocks and adverse effects on their
economies. The movement toward free trade will be through phased tariff
reductions, but details are still being finalized. As in the old SADCC, the protocol
95
See Africa Quarterly Review. Standard Chartered Bank, Harare, Zimbabwe, October, 1995.
nPANA, "South African Tariff Cut Negotiations Continue," Panfrican News Agency. Dakar, Senegal,
3 December 1996.
97
For details see Mandaza, Ibbo, and Tostensen, Arne, Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Future;
from the Conference to a Community. Southern African Development Community, Gaborone, Botswana, 1 994;
and SADC, SADC: Resources. Institutions and Capacity for Integration; The Proceedings of the Consultative
Conference, held in Lilongwe, Republic of Malawi, SADC, Gaborone, Botswana, 1-4 February, 1995. See also
Paul Goodison and Bernadette Nee, " The SADCC Experience," DPMN Bulletin. 2(1), April 1994.
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encourages a system of bilateral trade measures, bilateral trade arrangements and an
exchange of reciprocal preferences. 98
In this light, the SADC approach departs from the conventional economic
theory of regional economic integration, which does not encourage concurrent
bilateral trade agreements by participating countries."
The following constraints were to be addressed: 100
Bureaucratic, regulatory and administrative non-tariff barriers to the
movement of goods and services, and factors of production.
The non-convertability of currencies and other payments related
problems.
Physical and economic infrastructure which remains inadequate in a
number of areas.
Member states were to enter into specific agreements and protocols in these
areas, providing for the scope and activities of integration, and specifying the rights,
duties and obligations of the parties involved.
2. Important Developments Since the Signing of the Protocol
In spite ofmembership in SADCC and COMESA, most of Zimbabwe's trade
is still with South Africa. South Africa has maintained a positive trade balance with
Zimbabwe since the late 1970s. The trade deficit increased nine-fold between 1990
and 1995, from Z$580m to Z$6.8 billion. During the same period, Zimbabwe's
exports to South Africa as a proportion of imports from the same country declined
from 36% to 23%. This economic relationship with South Africa has been a source
of irritation between southern Africa's most industrialized countries. Of relevance
iouth Africa preferred a longer a period to allow other regional countries to adjust, but other countries
insisted on 8 years; SADC: Resources and Institutions and Capacity for Integration; The Proceedings of the
Consultative Conference, held in Lilongwe, Republic ofMalawi, SADC, Gaborone, Botswana, 1-4 February' 1995.
"Balassa, Bela, The Theory ofEconomic Integration. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, IL, 1961.
Mandaza, Ibbo, and Tostensen, Arne, Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Future: from the
Conference to a Community. Southern African Development Community, Gaborone, Botswana, 1994.
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was that South Africa, with a population of less than half of SADC, had a GDP nearly
three times that of all SADC countries combined. 101
South Africa's public enterprises significantly increased their regional role in
areas of energy; Eskom negotiated deals in Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe on
hydroelectric interconnections, rehabilitation, and new power sites. SADC members
recognized South Africa's importance in any future regional arrangement. Thus,
democratic South Africa was duly granted SADC membership in 1994, followed by
Mauritius in 1995.
The resumption of negotiations to resolve long-running trade disputes between
member countries (e.g., Zimbabwe with South Africa and Botswana with South
Africa) has strengthened the political will to resolve contentious issues through
negotiation.
The Consultative Conference held in Malawi in 1995 endorsed SADC
protocols outlining short-term, medium-term, and long term goals. The protocols
cover finance and investment, coordinating fiscal and monetary policies to harmonize
interest rates, reducing inflation and government budget deficits, establishing a
development bank, energy, transport and communications, mechanisms for
compensation, property rights, trade, public sector enterprises, free movement of
labor and capital, and strengthening institutions. Active participation by the private
sector and labor organizations, both in SADC and bilateral discussions, enhances the
chances of the agreements being ratified.
101
Standard Chartered Bank, Harare, Zimbabwe, October, 1995. 1 US$= approx 10.8 Zimbabwe $. See
also Gavin Maasdorp, Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Prospects for Regional Integration, RISCT,
London, 1992; Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC: Progress and Prospects," in The Economist Intelligence Unit Special
Report. No. 182, London, 1984; and Grundy, Kenneth, W., "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern
Africa" in Carter, Gwendolen, M., and O'Meara, Patrick, ed., International Politics in Southern Africa, pp. 148-
178, Library of Congress, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982.
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Voluntary tariff reduction by Zimbabwe early in 1997 enhances
competitiveness. For example, tariffs on capital imports were cut from 0-25% to 0%,
and on raw materials from 40% to 5%. 102
The Consultative Conference resolved that new protocols should not reverse
the gains by countries which are already at a higher stage of integration (e.g., SACU),
but that the other countries will have to eventually 'catch-up' with SACU. 103 This
set the stage for the eventual signing of three of the fourteen Protocols in Lesotho in
1997 104
The size of South Africa's market and relative strength of its economy has
caused most southern African countries to rush to have favorable hub-and-spoke trade
arrangements with South Africa as quickly as possible. The hope is that South Africa
will provide a stronger basis for regional economic cooperation and integration in
southern Africa. This also duplicates the roles of COMESA and SACU. 105 South
Africa has limited resources and her own internal macroeconomic imbalances to deal
with, hence many countries believe that the best way to guaranteed access to these is
to establish a close relationship as soon as possible. Because current bilateral
negotiations are not taking place within a broader framework, the danger is that some
bilateral agreement could extend to long term relationships. This could shape the
future of the region, likely with adverse impacts on SADC.
On the other hand, because most African countries are reluctant to surrender
sovereignty where potential benefits are low, SADC leaders seem to have realized
1
Zimbabwe Announces New Tariffs," Pan African News Agency. Dakar, Senegal, 14 Feb 1997.
103SADC: Resources and Institutions and Capacity for Integration; The Proceedings of the Consultative
Conference, held in Lilongwe, Republic ofMalawi, SADC, Gaborone, Botswana, 1-4 February 1995.
At the time of writing, it was learned that the initial protocols involving, energy, trade and transport
and communications had been signed. However, details are not yet available. See "SADC Leads African Reform,"
Pan African News Agency, Dakar, Senegal, 10 February 1997.
See SADC, Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A Macro Framework Study Report
SADC, Gaborone, Botswana, 1993; and Mandaza, Ibbo, and Tostensen, Arne, Southern Africa: In Search of a
Common Future; from the Conference to a Community, Southern African Development Community, Gaborone,
Botswana, 1994.
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that it is better to concentrate efforts on modest activities in which benefits to all
participants are clear and appropriable. This approach is similar to the one adopted
by the European Community when it began its series of cooperation agreements on
iron and steel; and compares with NAFTA, where partners have complemented the
free trade agreement with a series of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, even
with partners.
The announcement that South Africa is soon to start free trade negotiations
with the European Union has caused anxiety in all southern African countries. This
arrangement excludes all SADC, let alone SACU members. Estimates indicate that
SACU members would lose about Rl billion in revenue if South Africa concludes a
free trade agreement with the EU. 106
It is not clear how issues like poor marketing, MNC trade with their
subsidiaries, inherited product preferences, bureaucracy, price and tariff policies or
lack of complementarity in products limit SADCC/COMESA trade. In this context,
the only effect of integration would be indirect and related to the new level of
protection by the group toward the rest of the world. In economic theory, in a two-
good model, trade will have trade creation and trade diversion effects when partners
each have a comparative advantage in production and export of a different good and
both goods are consumed by both countries. Factor endowments drive them to be
natural trading partners. Where states are similar, product differentiation and/or
complementary industrial sectors will result in intra-industry trade in manufactures,
owing to created competitive advantages. On the other hand, most southern African
countries produce similar primary products. This makes the arrangement inconsistent
with traditional and new international trade theories.
However, the EU disputed the accuracy of the Harare-based consultancy report. It has also been
suggested that theEU plans to compensate the losing SACU countries, although no mechanisms outside the LOME
Convention exist to compensate losing countries. See Electronic Mail & Guardian, "Free Trade With EU Will Hurt
SA's Neighbors," Mail and Guardian News, South Africa, 30 Oct 1996 and 05 November 1996; and Africa
Quarterly Review. Standard Chartered Bank, Harare, Zimbabwe, October, 1996. 4.5 Rand = approx 1 US$.
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IV. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS
This chapter analyzes some of the major macroeconomic indicators for
Zimbabwe and South Africa within the SACU, SADC and COMESA contexts.
Among the countries of southern Africa, there are differences in the size and growth
of GDP, structure and growth of production sectors, levels of economic development,
distribution of employment and output across sectors, government participation in the
economy, trade patterns and levels and structure of external debt.
Since the early 1960s, the countries of eastern and southern Africa have been
afflicted by national liberation and civil wars. This has affected all countries in this
region (militarily, economically, socially and politically) except perhaps Mauritius.
Zimbabwe and South Africa were subjected to international trade sanctions between
1965-80 and 1986-93, respectively. As such, the international trade statistics on items
like oil and arms are circumspect or understated. 107
Data availability and reliability in reporting has been affected by the effects
of civil wars, illegal border movement between countries and the relatively large
informal sectors in most countries, resulting in unrecorded data. Therefore, the
statistics that follow may only present a partial picture of intra-eastern and southern
Africa trade.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN
COUNTRIES AND REGIONAL GROUPINGS
1. Demographic and Basic Macroeconomic Indicators
South Africa dwarfs all the southern African countries in terms of population
(market size of the economy). South Africa contributes 78.6 percent of total SADC
output, two and one half times that of all COMESA countries and 93 percent of
SACU members. In 1994, South Africa's per capita GNP was three and one half
times the SADC average, and almost five times that of the COMESA. That same
""Several eastern and southern African countries are still engulfed by civil wars, e.g., Sudan, Somalia,
Zaire, Burundi, Uganda; while recently wars ended in Mozambique and Rwanda.
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year, total GNP was over 22 times that of Zimbabwe, with a per capita GNP was six
times as great. Only Mauritius exceeds South Africa's per capita GNP. Compared
to SADC and COMESA, Zimbabwe contributed just 3.4 percent and 11 percent,
respectively. The per capita GNP stood at four-fifths of the SADC average and 106
percent of that of COMESA.
The data on the remaining southern African countries is equally disparate
compared to South Africa. See Table 4. 1.
Table 4.1. SACU, SADC and Selected COMESA Basic Macroeconomic
Indicators
GNP
Country Area Population Total GNP per capita
(MKm2) (millions) (USSm) (USSm)
1994 1994 1994
SACU:
Botswana 0.58 1.4 3920 2800
Lesotho 0.03 1.9 1368 720
Namibia 0.82 1.5 2955 1970
Swaziland 0.02 0.8 840 1050
South Mica; '... j -2- 405 123120 £.
:3040
Total SACU: 2.67 46.1 132203 2337.5
Non-SACU SADC:
Angola 1.25 10.0 6500 650
Malawi 0.12 9.5 1615 170
Mauritius 0.002 1.1 346.5 3150
Mozambique 0.8 15.5 1395 90
Tanzania 0.95 28.8 2880 100




T^l-AJW ::villi 131 5 ^N
Non-SADC COMESA:'
Burundi 0.028 6.2 992 160
Ethiopia 1.097 54.9 5490 100
Kenya 0.6 26.0 6500 250
Madagascar 0.587 13.1 2620 200
Uganda 0.2 18.6 3534 190
764
.
..207.<? 48774 : f>4T3.
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Table 4.1. (Continued)
Country Area Population Total GNP
(MKm2) (millions) (US$m)
1994 1994
South Africa as % ofSACU 45.7 87.9 93.1
South Africa as % of SADC 17.6 30.9 78.6
South Africa as % ofCOMESA 15.9 19.5 252.5
Zimbabwe as % of South Africa 32 26.7 4.4
Zimbabwe as % of SADC 5.6 8.2 3.4
Zimbabwe as % ofCOMESA 5.1 5.2 11.1
Source: World Development Report, 1992, 1996.
"Data on other COMESA countries is not available or incomplete.
Eastern and southern Africa includes four of the world's poorest countries
(Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Malawi) and three of sub-Saharan Africa's
richest (Mauritius, South Africa and Botswana).
In general, SACU members exhibit comparatively higher per capita GNP levels
and growth rates than SADC and COMESA members, with the exception being
Mauritius. Thus, South Africa can be an engine for growth or a source of stagnation
for the entire region.
2. Economic Growth of Regional Economies by Productive Sectors
The statistics on the performance of individual economies is summarized in
Table 4.2. The smaller SACU members and Mauritius had the most consistent
growth during the period. Mauritius' decline in agriculture seems to have been
compensated by high growth rates in services and industry. Outside the SADC,
Kenya and Uganda performed well.
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Table 4.2. Economic Growth by Productive Sector
Average Annual
Real GDP Growth Rate
(%)
Growth of Production by Sector (%)





















Botswana 13.9 10.3 4.4 2.2 0.6 11.4 1.7 11.0 7.9 5.3
Lesotho 6.8 4.3 6.1 2.6 -2.3 7.2 11.4 3.6 4.7 -
Namibia N/A 1.1 4.1 1.8 6.8 -1.1 2.9 2.2 4.1 1.4
Swaziland N/A 9.0 4.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
South Africa
-
3J m lllti 3 Sill m §§§ ! §§§| m -Li
Angola N/A N/A 8.6 -0.5 N/A 12.6 N/A N/A N/A -4.6
Malawi 5.5 2.7 -0.7 -0.6 6.4 2.9 -0.4 3.0 -1.0 3.6
Mauritius 5.2 6.5 5.3 2.6 -2.1 9.2 6.0 4.2 10.4 10.8
Mozambique N/A -0.2 7.3 -0.6 6.4 2.9 -0.4 3.0 -1.0 -
Tanzania 3.9 2.8 3.1 4.9 5.8 3.4 9.7 2.8 -12.7 -0.4
Zambia3 2.0 0.8 0.1 3.6 2.1 1.0 -1.3 0.1 0.4 3.5
Zimbabwe* 5.0 3,5
!
LI 2A: L6 l§i|l -3.6 3,9 1 2,8
Burundi 7.1 3.3 -1.4 3.1 -3.1 4.5 -3.4 1.5 N/A 5.5
Ethiopia 2.7 1.8 N/A 1.1 - 0.1 - 4.4 - -
Kenya 6.8 4.2 0.9 3.3 -1.5 3.9 0.9 4.8 2.0 4.9
Madagascar 1.6 1.1 -0.2 2.3 3.3 6.0 9.3 3.5 7.7 N/A
Uganda 0.6 3.1 5.6 2.6 -2.1 9.2 6.0 4.2 10.4 -
Source: World Development Report, 1 992; 1 996; IBC USA Licensing Inc., 1 996.
a
In 1 996, Zambia estimates for GDP growth was 4.0%, Zimbabwe's was 7.0%, while South Africa and Angola
real GDP growth rates were estimated at 3.0% and 2.5% respectively.
*Manufacturing figures are included in industry data, hence should not be added to arrive at 100%.
Zimbabwe's economy achieved high growth rates up to 1990, but declined in
the 1990s. The decline resulted largely from poor performance in the agricultural
sector. Agriculture drives the economy. During the same period, South Africa
experienced a more or less similar growth pattern. Although correlation does not
prove causality, slow or negative growth in South Africa seems to have been repeated
in Zimbabwe, but not in smaller SACU members which trade freely with South
Africa.
The remaining SADC countries, except Angola and Mozambique, experienced
declines in secondary and tertiary sectors, but positive growth in the primary sectors.
Angola and Mozambique were largely engulfed by civil war.
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3. Productive Structure and Distribution of Gross Domestic Product
by Sector
The structures of regional economies can be described by the relative shares
of GDP attributed to agriculture, industry, manufacturing and services (primary,
secondary and tertiary industries, respectively). This data is shown in Table 4.3.
Apart from Namibia, Tanzania and Madagascar, the trend has been a decline in the
importance of agriculture relative to industry and services. Within industry,
manufacturing has successively contributed higher proportions.
Table 4.3. Distribution of GDP by Sector (Percentage of Total*)
Agriculture Industry Manufacturing* Services
1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994 1980 1994
Botswana 13 5 44 49 4 4 43 46
Lesotho 12 14 29 46 7 17 47 40
Namibia 12 14 53 29 5 9 35 36
SOHfe Africa
... iiilfl ,, 5







Angola (1990) - 13 - 44 - 4 - 43
Malawi 37 31 19 21 12 14 44 47
Mauritius 12 9 26 33 15 22 62 58
Mozambique 37 33 31 12 - - 32 55
Tanzania 46 57 18 17 11 8 37 26
Zambia 14 31 41 35 18 23 44 34
ZxMwte U !!!!!; . te 11 H! i mi 30 : 52 ,:.; 48
Ethiopia 56 57 12 10 6 3 31 32
Kenya 23 29 21 17 13 11 47 54
Madagascar 30 35 16 13 - - 54 52
Uganda 72 49 4 14 4 7 23 37
Source: World Development Report, 1992; 1996.
*To arrive at 100%, Manufacturing has been excluded as it is a part of industry.
South Africa's 50 percent decline in agriculture has been offset by a shift
toward the service sector. This reflects the higher level of economic development in
that country. Nevertheless, industry and mamrfactaring have remained relatively high
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compared to the primary sector. Countries with relatively large manufacturing sectors
are South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, Zambia, Kenya and Lesotho.
In Zimbabwe, the importance of agriculture, though still significant compared
to South Africa and Mauritius, declined by 16 percent over the period; the service
sector fluctuated around 48 percent. South Africa, Mauritius, Kenya, Mozambique
and Madagascar have higher service sector proportions than Zimbabwe, reflecting
strong tourism in the latter three.
4. Employment Levels and Distribution by Sector
Employment statistics show that agriculture still absorbs a high proportion of
the labor force in Zimbabwe (68 percent), with industry's contribution declining from
12 percent to eight percent between 1980 and 1990. It can be seen in Table 4.4 that
both the agricultural and industrial sectors lost labor, in spite of the accompanying
growth in the labor force. This pattern is repeated in most SADC countries, but
reversed in Mauritius.
Table 4.4. Urban Economically Active Population (EAP) and Contribution






























1980 1994 1990 1990 1990 1980 1990 1980 1990
Botswana N/A N/A 0.415 207500 50.0 63 46 10 20
Lesotho 1 1 0.59 40000 7.0 41 40 34 28
Namibia 1 1 0.55 236500 43 56 49 15 15







24 12.5 SOO0QO !|| 5 17 14 Pll 32
Angola N/A 4 4 1230000 31 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Malawi 3 5 3 436500 14.5 87 87 5 5
Mozambique 6 9 7.3 N/A N/A 84 83 7 8
Mauritius 1 1 N/A 1000000 N/A 27 17 28 43
Tanzania 9 15 12.5 N/A 5.7 86 84 4 5
Zambia 3 5 3.86 376900 10.0 76 75 8 8
Zimbabwe H&$m W'MW:\ 11940GQS nm 72 ; 6S 12 8 :'^' :
Source: World Development Report, 1996; SADC 1993.
*Figures include citizens employed in South African mines.
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In Botswana and South Africa, at least 50 percent of the economically active
population are formally employed, compared to 30 percent in Zimbabwe and 10
percent or less in the other countries for which data is available. One likely
consequence of low formal wage percentages is relatively low incomes and small
domestic markets. Disproportionately high agricultural/primary sector employment
also means low incomes, since the terms of trade often favor industry over
agriculture. The exceptions to this are Mauritius, South Africa and Lesotho.
Because of large subsistence sectors, and in particular the low participation by
women in the formal wage economy, the 15-64 age group is significantly greater than
the economically active populations in most SADC countries.
5. Urbanization of Population
Excluding Mauritius, all the southern African countries have experienced a
dramatic rise in urbanization of the population. This data is summarized in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5. Urban Population




1980 1994 1980 1994
Botswana 15 13 8.9 7.6
Lesotho 15 22 6.8 6.1




Malawi 9 13 6.1 5.7
Mauritius 42 41 0.4 1.4
Mozambique 13 33 9.1 7.4
Tanzania 15 24 6.8 6.4
Zambia 40 43 4.2 3.6
Zimbabwe ':: \- 22 ; : :3;17 6,0 lum
Burundi - 4 7 6.9 6.7
Ethiopia 10 17 4.7 3.2
Kenya 16 27 7.5 6.1
Madagascar 18 26 5.7 5.7
Uganda 9 12 4.9 5.6
Source: World Development Report, 1996.
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Given the slow growth in formal employment, as indicated in the previous
table, this trend implies urbanization without industrialization.
6. Labor Migration in SADC Countries
Table 4.6 summarizes the average number of employees from SADC countries
employed in South African mines. While this table shows only those employed in
mines, there is a large interchange of labor in southern Africa, particularly migration
toward the more prosperous countries like South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe.
Table 4.6. Average Number of Employees in South African Owned Mines
(Gold and Copper)
1975 1977 1981 1985 1990
Botswana N/A N/A 17543 18088 14920
Lesotho N/A N/A 110542 107447 103920
Swaziland N/A N/A 9480 13013 16834
Angola 3431 1043 - - -
Malawi 27904 3495 13809 18102 70
Mozambique 97216 36922 4148 51698 44408
Zimbabwe 24S5 18653 29m 5 ) 2
SUBTOTAL: 131036 60113 158492 208353 180154
South Africa 101553 189106 240082 303788; 257698
TOTAL: 232589 249218 399915 512416 437852
Source: SADC, "Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid," 1993.
Except for Zambia and Tanzania, all SADC countries have depended on
official migrant labor to South Africa. Although migrant mine labor decreased in
most countries in the 1990s, unofficial labor trekking to South Africa has not
declined. In 1996, an estimated 12,000 Zimbabweans who went to South Africa on
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6-month visa permits over a two-year period had not returned. Mozambique had
almost 60,000 "official" migrant workers in South Africa. 108
One reason for the continued "export" of labor to South Africa is higher wages
from both official and illegal employment. Migration is a source of household
income and government foreign exchange for citizens who would otherwise be
unemployed.
7. Inflation and Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
Inflation and PPP statistics in Table 4.6 show that those countries with
relatively stable prices have higher PPP. One implication of inflation for regional
trading blocs is the cross importation of inflation.













1987 1994 GNP per capita,
(Intl. $) 1994
Botswana 8.4 12.0 11.7 15.4 2.1 5210
Lesotho 6.7 12.7 14.0 6.6 6.7 1730




\: 14.4 143 23,9 111!! 5130
Angola N/A 400.0 900.0 N/A N/A N/A
Malawi 7.4 14.7 18.8 3.1 2.5 650
Mozambique - 36.6 58.3 27 1.7 430
Tanzania 9.6 25.8 33.3 2.6 2.4 620
Zambia 6.3 42.2 92.0 4.1 3.3 860
Zimbabwe 5,8 lO.g 19 7 •8.7 t 7.9 2040
Burundi 5.0 4.2 5.4 3.4 2.7 700
Ethiopia 3.4 2.1 N/A 2.0 1.7 430
Kenya 7.2 9.2 11.7 5.7 5.1 1310
Uganda 21.4 107.0 75.0 5.0 5.4 1410
Madagascar 17.7 17.1 15.8 3.1 2.5 640
Source: World Development Report, 1992; 1996; IBC USA Licensing Inc., 1996.
The Purchasing Power Parity figures are in GNP, not in GDP, as is consistent with the World Bank Atlas-based
estimates.
108PANA, October 29, 1996; PANA, January 2, 1997.
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Within the region, the country with the highest purchasing power is Mauritius,
followed by South Africa. PPP in Mauritius, Botswana, Lesotho and Uganda improve
over time, while PPP in the rest of the countries decline.
Angola had the highest inflation rate in 1984-94, followed by Zambia.
Inflation decreased in the remaining countries.
The wide fluctuations in inflation rates calls for coordinated macroeconomic
policies in a regional trade setting. Yet, coordinated macroeconomic policies are
likely to affect small and large countries differently. It is certain to affect Balance of
Payment (BOP) levels and movement of goods and services, particularly production
inputs. Imports ofraw materials for export production would also affect the price of
exports, hence negatively impacting the terms of trade.
B. EXTERNAL TRADE
1. Summary of Exports of Goods and Services
In absolute terms, South Africa clearly dominates the region in export capacity,
followed by Botswana and Zimbabwe. However, it is Mauritius and Botswana whose
exports contribute the highest proportion ofGNP. South Africa and Mauritius are the
only countries who have had consistently positive growth in exports between 1980
and 1994. Most other counties showed an upward trend in the 1990s, while
Zimbabwe suffered a decline of 6.6 percent; this coincided with South Africa's
restrictions on Zimbabwean exports. This data is shown in Table 4.8.
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Botswana 502 1845 53 52 N/A N/A 11.4 -0.8
Lesotho N/A N/A 20 15 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Namibia N/A 1321 76 53 N/A N/A N/A N/A
SwrtbAJnca* :
;
.2S50^j 25000 36 II M$ 39 ir : ::£4: 2:8 • 7:0;
Malawi 295 325 25 29 7 4 0.1 -1.8
Mauritius 431 1347 51 59 27 90 8.6 2.0
Mozambique 281 - 14 24 2 20 -10.5 -0.3
Tanzania 511 519 11 12 14 - -3.5 26.9
Zambia 1300 1080 N/A N/A 6 9 -1.8 10.0
Zimbabwe III?*!! mo ;.:;|> 30 & wmm 38:: 2 2 -6;6
Burundi 65 106 9 14 3 10 7.4 -4.8
Kenya 1250 1609 28 39 12 29 -1.4 3.9
Madagascar 401 277 13 22 6 20 2.6 16.6
Uganda 345 421 19 8 3 1 -1.4 3.9
Angola N/A 3000 - - - - - -
Source: World Development Report, 1 992; 1 996; South Africa Reserve Bank Annual Economic Report, 1 996.
* South Africa's figures include SACU member countries. However, there are limited statistics on Botswana,
Namibia and Lesotho.
The data also reveals an inverse ratio between exports as a percentage of GNP
and domestic market size. South Africa's total exports have progressively declined
in importance relative to GDP. This is consistent with its large domestic market.
However, the share of manufactured exports rose rapidly until 1993. The relative
increase in export's contribution to GDP reflects increases in manufactured exports
as most southern African countries liberalize trade. It is important to note that those
countries with close trade relations to South Africa (Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe,
and Mozambique) had negative export growth rates during the 1990. South .Africa's
exports grew by seven percent. This was the period during which South Africa was
under international trade sanctions, which likely reduced her imports.
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2. Structure of Imports
Although the magnitudes vary, all countries had fluctuating import growth
rates, as shown in Table 4.9. The larger increases across the region were mainly in
goods relative to services. This reflects the relatively low level of economic
development and industrialization. In 1994, the largest relative upswings in total
imports were in Uganda, Tanzania and South Africa. Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya,
Madagascar and Botswana had large contractions. The contraction of imports in
southern Africa resulted from foreign exchange shortages, import substitution,
disruption of economic activity during civil wars, and poor agricultural seasons.
Table 4.9. Structure of Imports
1980 1994 Average Annual
Growth Rate (%)




Botswana 692 262 954 1638 458 2096 7.7 -5.6
Lesotho 464 18 482 - N/A N/A - -
Namibia - - N/A 196 610 806 - -
Sou& Africa 1S60O tw 25989 23400 mis 30215:: -0,8
;
5.3
Angola N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 16300 - -
Malawi 439 199 638 491 148 639 0.7 -0.6
Mauritius 609 103 712 1926 459 2385 11.2 2.5
Mozambique 800 75 875 1000 403 1403 -1.0 2.9
Tanzania 1250 162 1412 1505 562 2067 -3.3 12.7
Zambia 1340 647 1987 - - 1953 - -
Zimbabwe mso 450 mo lllllllllls 2338: -2.2
:
-5.1
Kenya 2120 975 3095 2156 688 2844 1.6 -5.6
Madagascar 600 30 630 434 687 1121 -4.6 -5.6
Uganda 293 157 450 870 31 901 -0.6 28.7
Source: World Development Report, 1996.
For export dependent economies, any contraction in imports of production
inputs reduces the capacity to export, hence perpetuating the cycle of low export
growth.
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South Africa's export of services nearly doubled between 1980 and 1994,
while the rest of the countries in the region registered modest increases. Imports in
South Africa decreased over the period, while countries such as Mauritius showed
increases. This can be seen in Table 4.10. The main service sectors in smaller
southern African countries are tourism and migrant labor, whereas South Africa
exports tourism and know-how.
Table 4.10. Share of Services in Imports and Exports (%)
1980 1994
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Botswana 32 27 22 22
Lesotho 84 4 N/A N/A
South Airica 8 23 is ; ;' 23
Malawi 6 31 17 23
Mauritius 24 14 31 19
Tanzania 32 11 39 19
Zambia 20 33 N/A N/A
Zimbabwe 1% 27 :oxvX ::-x :x': : : - ** : -
Kenya 39 32 - -
Madagascar 23 - 40 24
Ethiopia 28 - 56 -
Uganda 4 35 34 -
Namibia N/A N/A 27 76
Source: World Development Report, 1996.
3. External Indicators
Table 4.11 summarizes three measures of a country's export position: export
concentration rates, terms of trade, and balance of payments. The export
concentration ratio measures the diversity of a country's exports. The higher the
export concentration index, the fewer the number of goods within a product
classification of a country's foreign trade. The terms of trade show a declining trend.
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except for Mauritius, Mozambique and SACU. The BOP deficits have persisted for
most countries from the 1980s to the 1990s.






Account as % ofGNP
(before transfers)
1984 1992 1985 1994 1980 1994





:&4$T::' 0378 H m[ H -0.2
Malawi 0.530 0.704 97 87 -27.4 -44.0
Mauritius 0.656 0.332 77 121 -11.1 -6.8
Mozambique 0.274 - 113 124 -20.7 -71.4
Tanzania 0.359 0.248 126 83 -4.8 -6.9
Zambia 0.844 0.787 89 85 -14.5 -0.20
Zimbabwe Q29S 329 mm Ml -4,8 -5.7
Burundi 0.776 - 153 82
Ethiopia 0.622 0.557 119 74
Kenya 0.340 0.305 124 80 -48.9 -15.6
Madagascar 0.466 0.285 124 82
Uganda 0.932 0.561 149 58 - -6.7
Source: World Development Report, 1 992; 1 996; IBC Licensing USA.
* Figures include those from SACU countries.
C. INVESTMENT AND RESOURCE FLOWS
1. Domestic Savings and Investment
As seen in Table 4. 12, most southern African countries were unable to save
enough to fund their domestic investment, with the exception of Kenya and
Botswana. South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mauritius were inconsistent in the
investment-savings balance.
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1990 1994 1990 1994
Botswana N/A 25 N/A 25
Lesotho 71 86 -41 -14
Namibia N/A 20 N/A 17
Soulfc Africa 19 25 j :.. 20
Malawi 19 16 10 -1
Mauritius 30 32 21 23
Mozambique 37 60 -12 5
Tanzania 25 31 -6 3
Zambia 14 7 17 4
;
Zimbabwe Hi 1 22 21 ] 17
Burundi 19 9 1 -10
Ethiopia 13 15 6 3
Kenya 24 21 18 24
Madagascar 12 N/A 8 -1
Uganda 12 14 - 4
Source: World Development Bank, 1 992; 1 996; South Africa Reserve Bank, 1 996.
2. Stock Market Trade
Stock markets mobilize both domestic and foreign resources for short term
finance, which helps alleviate domestic savings shortages. Table 4.13 shows the
number of companies offering stock in each country of the region, and the overall
turnover ratio.


























Cote dTvoire 31 2.8
Ghana 19 1.3
Source: Standard Chartered Bank, "Africa Quarterly Review," September 1996.
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The number of companies listed in Zimbabwe is 10 percent that of South
Africa. Compared to the rest of Africa, southern African stock markets are relatively
more developed and active. Nevertheless, stock market finance has little employment
growth potential.
3. External Financing
As can be seen in Table 4.14, many economies in southern Africa are
dependent on aid, including Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia,
Zambia and Malawi. Given that aid-funded projects tend to be less productive than
private investment, this dependence on aid invariably reduces the opportunities for
sustained economic growth and increased income.
Table 4.14. Official Development Aid and Other Resource Flows
Official Development
as%ofGNP
Net Private Capital Flows
(US$ millions)
1980 1994 1980 1994
Botswana 11.8 2.2 114 -50
Lesotho 14.9 8.3 7 14
Namibia 0.0 5.9 - -
South ASM* N./A WA .4755 6000 :-]
Malawi 12.6 37.0 30 -1
Mauritius 2.9 0.4 49 124
Mozambique 8.4 100.1 32
Tanzania 12.4 30.3 100 12





Burundi 12.8 32.2 -3 -1
Ethiopia 4.7 22.9 26 -12
Kenya 5.6 10.2 301 -272
Madagascar 5.8 16.0 131 2
Uganda 9.0 18.3 54 -11
Source: World Development Report, 1 992; 1 996; South African Reserve Bank, 1 996.
*In the case of South Africa, the figures are for 1 983.
Net private capital flows have been falling dramatically across southern Africa,
save in Mauritius, South Africa, Mozambique and Lesotho. With the exclusion of
South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa only attracted 1.7 billion US$ in foreign investment
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in 1993. Seventy percent of this went to oil projects in Nigeria and Angola. Others
note that while the world total of foreign direct investment increased six fold from
1987 to 1994, the share in southern Africa fell 10 percent in 1987 and 3.7 percent in
1994. This compared to east Asia's net increase of 34.9 percent and 55.3 percent,
respectively. 109
Table 4. 15 shows that within SADC, only Botswana has maintained a budget
surplus from 1985 to 1994; the deficit in Mauritius is negligible. Zimbabwe has had
the largest relative deficits in the region. This, combined with a BOP deficit,
negatively impacts the country's overall export performance.
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The government budget deficit financed through domestic borrowing tends to
crowd out private sector investment, push up interest rates, and consequently increase
,09PANA, February 25, 1997; Standard Chartered Bank, Africa Quarterly Review . April 1995.
Nevertheless, there seems to be an upward trend in foreign investment m Zimbabwe. See PANA, UNCTAD
Recognizes Zimbabwe's Performance , Baker, Senegal, May 9. 1997.
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production costs, including those for exports. This further reduces the country's
competitiveness.
D. PUBLIC SECTOR PARTICIPATION
Public sector participation can be estimated using total government
expenditures, i.e., total recurrent and capital expenditures relative to GNP. (See
Table 4.16) The level of participation has been high in South Africa, Botswana,
Zimbabwe and Kenya. Nevertheless, most countries are privatizing and/or
commercializing public enterprises.
Table 4.16. Public Sector Participation
Total Government Consumption as % ofGNP
1972 1980 1990 1994
Botswana 33.7 36.5 42.2 40.2
Lesotho 16.6 - 25.1 39.8
Namibia 42.8
Son 217 ' '^SSiM 34,6 36
Malawi 22.1 37.6 29.2 N/A
Mauritius 16.3 24.2
Mozambique N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tanzania 19.7 29.6 N/A N/A
Zambia 34.0 40.0 21.9 21
Zimbabwe ~ 35.3 40.5 45
Burundi 19.9 22.6 N/A N/A
Ethiopia 13.7 N/A N/A N/A
Kenya 21.0 26.1 31.4 31.4
Madagascar 16.7 N/A 19.4 N/A
Rwanda 12.5 14.3 N/A N/A
Uganda 21.8 6.1 N/A N/A
Source: World Development Report, 1992; 1996; Standard Chartered Bank, "Business Trends - Zimbabwe,
August 1 996.
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V. ZIMBABWE IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS
In Chapter III, it was noted that the current Zimbabwe-South Africa trade
negotiations are two-pronged: reviving and broadening the 1964 preferential bilateral
trade agreement, and transforming the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) into a free trade area over 8 years, culminating in a common market. It was
also noted that Zimbabwe and South Africa belong to other overlapping, higher-level
regional trade agreements: the COMESA and SACU.
The bilateral trade arrangement covers specific sectors, including textiles and
clothing, footwear, agricultural products and light manufactures. The negotiations
have been slow and controversial, but the two countries agreed to reduce tariffs on
textiles from 90% to 30% over five years. Nothing tangible has been achieved in
other sectors. 110
On the regional level, the SADC Trade Protocol was signed in March 1997.
It will establish a free trade area in 8 years, but will take effect only after technical
details have been finalized. The SADC free trade area would culminate in an
economic community, which subsumes a customs union. 111 On the other hand,
COMESA should achieve free trade status in 5 years.
U0Zimbabwe proposed an immediate restoration of the pre- 1992 tariff levels, and the broadening of the
agreement to include tariff items excluded from the 1 964 agreement, increasing quotas and converting quotas from
value to volume terms. Zimbabwe also proposed extending the rules of origin to include SADC produced content.
South Africa refused to reduce tariffs to the 1 964 levels, or to consider extending the rules of origin beyond SACU
members of SADC.
'"South Africa favored a longer transition period, arguing that the free trade arrangement would do more
harm than good in other countries, but was overruled by the 11 members. SADC. Made in SADC .
http://www.sadcexpo.org/newsl2.html.
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A. TRADE POLICIES OF ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA
In the 1980s, Zimbabwe's trade policies included export incentive schemes,
and cash export retention schemes to encourage exports. Zimbabwe also protected
domestic industries through restrictive tariffs and quotas. In the 1990s, several export
promotion schemes were introduced. These notable schemes include a policy which
allowed exporters to retain 50% of their export earnings to finance investment, and
the export support facility to benefit those ineligible for the export retention scheme,
and a 30% manufacturing export bonus. 112
Beginning in 1991, Zimbabwe started liberalizing trade, and reduced or
removed most of the export subsidies and import restrictions in line with GATT.
Import licencing has stopped. On average, import duties were set at about 30%, but
remained relatively high on cars, some commercial vehicles, batteries and clothing.
Zimbabwe also moved from non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to tariffs. In March 1997,
Zimbabwe further reduced tariffs, especially on items required by the manufacturing
sector; tariffs on capital goods were reduced to zero (except on motor vehicles), to
between 5-15% on tools, 0-20% on raw materials, a maximum of 30% on inter-
mediate goods, and a flat 15% on spares. In May 1997, Zimbabwe's president,
Robert Mugabe also called on Southern African countries to remove trade barriers,
indicating each country's commitment to liberalized trade in the region. 113 A new
export drive includes export processing zones (EPZs) which provide tax holidays,
waivers of custom duties and transfer taxes.
Before 1994, South Africa's trade policy included import controls, direct
export subsidies and R&D assistance. Import restrictions included tariffs and NTBs
covering all sectors; restrictions were more restrictive in agriculture, textiles, clothing
" 2IBC USA Licensing Inc, 1 996.
ll3Pan African News Agency, Mugabe Calls on Southern Africa to Remove Trade Barriers , PANA,
Dakar, Senegal, May 5, 1997.
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and manufactured goods. NTBs included surcharges on imports, in some cases as
high as 100%, anti-dumping policies, health requirements, quotas, licencing and
retaliation practices. Under the Terms of Import and Export Control of 1963, the
Minister of Trade can act in the national interest to prohibit, ration or otherwise
regulate imports. For example, tariffs on steel products have been increased by as
much as 180% under this provision. Local content restrictions have been tightened
in certain industries, notably in vehicle manufacturing. 114 While Zimbabwe
discontinued cash incentives for manufacturers, South Africa inaugurated a major
incentive scheme for its regional exports. Consequently, South Africa took some
markets from Zimbabwe. 115
The new trade regime reduces some tariffs (clothing) to 45% over 12 years and
vehicle duties from 100% to 50% over 5 years. 116 Export subsidies are acmiinistered
through the General Export Incentive Scheme (GEIS). This scheme provides up to
25% cash incentives on f.o.b. value. While this scheme was to be scrapped by 1995,
some export subsidies are still in place and hurting regional trading partners. 117 Also
in place is the export marketing scheme, started in 1990, giving cash assistance for
primary market research, trade exhibition and trade mission participation. Another
incentive scheme is the customs tariff-exempt export development financing. 118
""US Department ofCommerce, Survey of Current Business , Vol. 7 1 , No. 8, Table 1 1.3, August 1 99 1
.
115Libby, Ronald T., The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa . Princeton University Press,
Princeton. 1987.
" 6IBC USA Licencing Inc., 1 September, 1996.
"'Recently, the Zambian Association of Manufacturers complained about the effect of South African
subsidies on the Zambian manufacturing sector. "SA Goods Clamp Down," Mail & Guardian News, April 16,
1997.
118US Department of Commerce, "Survey of Current Business," Vol. 7 1 , No. 8, Table 11.3, August 1 99 1
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Without adequate data, it is difficult to conclude which of the two countries
has the higher effective rate of protection. However, on the items mentioned above,
it is evident that South Africa's duties and export incentive schemes exceed those of
Zimbabwe. 119
Tariffs can be restrictive or protective. Restrictive tariffs are designed to
reduce imports, while protective tariffs protect domestic industry from competing
imports. Restrictive tariffs have two effects: cutting consumption of the imported
good and increasing domestic production. Problems inherent in tariff measurement
present additional problems for estimating the degree of protection. The height of
tariffs is difficult to measure restrictiveness, nor can tariffs levels be measured with
the desired precision. The most common measurement problems are: 120
Differences in nomenclatures make it difficult to measure the effect of
tariffs even if identical measures are used.
Unweighted averages are superior to weighted averages. Weighted
averages distort results since totally prohibitive tariffs are given a
weight of zero (they do not even appear), and low duties are given large
weights.
Additionally, tariff measures do not capture the differential impact
between participating and non-participating countries. Within a
customs union, low-tariff countries will find it easier to encroach upon
the markets of high tariff members than South Africa, while for non-
participants the most negative impact is on those countries previously
trading with the low tariff union members.
Measurement may also be complicated by the divergent size and
structure of industries. In small countries, quantitative restrictions
applied to relatively small range of import values can protect a
II9Repeated requests for tariff information from both Zimbabwe and South Africa was abandoned because
the respective customs organizations insisted the writer pay for the documents; these references were not readily
available from local resources.
120
Balassa, The Theory ofEconomic Integration
, Richard D. Irwin, 1 961 ; see also, Margaret Kelly and
Annie, K. McGuirk, "Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy," International Monetary Fund: World
Economic and Financial Surveys , Washington, DC, August 1992.
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relatively large portion of domestic production. The smaller the
country, the smaller the quantitative restrictions required to provide
high protection. The coverage of quantitative restrictions indicate only
the existence of one or more restrictions, but do not show the scarcity
of the value they restrict.
Reducing duties on inputs but not on final goods expands protected
production and may increase the effective rate of protection of final
import-competing goods. 121
Aggregation also conceals some important differences within tariff
items, such that saying that materials have an average tariff of 55%
when some are subject to 0% and others are at 90% exaggerates the
harmony.
Trade is not only restricted by tariffs; the non-tariff barriers are varied
and even more difficult to quantify.
1. Trade Relations in the Eastern and Southern African Region
a. Exports ofSelected Southern African Countries By Industrial
Origin
Table 5. 1 shows that the major exporters in southern Africa are in South
Africa-dominated SACU, Zimbabwe, Mauritius, and Kenya. Southern Africa has a
strong bias toward agriculture and mineral-based exports. Apart from SACU/South
Africa, the composition of exports is similar across countries, with most specializing
in natural resource-based products and light manufacturing. They differ primarily
in proportion and magnitude. In SACU, the largest exporting sub-sectors are other
manufactures (including arms, gold and diamonds), followed by metal manufactures
and base metals. Textiles, food and beverages and tobacco are also significant.
l21
Kelly, Margaret, and Annie K. McGuirk, "Issues and Developments in International Trade Policy,
International Monetary Fund: World Economic and Financial Surveys . Washington, DC, August 1992.
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Table 5.1. Exports of Selected Southern African Countries by Industrial
Origin (% of Total Value)
SACU* ZIMBABWE























1.4 1.4 42.0 49.8
2. Mining/Quarry 18.6 22.1 77 a 3 1.6 2.0 2.6
3. Manufacturing 76.9 73.8 503 54,4 96.9 96.7 56.0
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33. Wool/Products 0.5 0.7 L0 13 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.6
34. Papers/Products 2.9 2.5 0.3 0.1 0.7 1.5
35. Chemicals 5.9 5.4 ;; 40 3.0 1.1 15.3 14.9
36. Non-metal
minerals
0.9 0.8 09 u 0.2 0.3 1.4 2.8
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8.4 8.8 : v4:: so 4.4 3.6 3.0 3.2
39. Other Manufac-
turers
40.4 40.4 lt« 2 4.2 3.5 22.5 6.7
*SACU figures comprise mainly those of South Africa.
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Trade by Country, 1994.
Zimbabwe's strongest exporting sub-sectors (excluding gold) are base
metals, textiles, food and beverages, and tobacco. Mauritius' exports are predomin-
antly textiles and food and beverages. Kenya's strongest sectors are chemicals, food
and beverages, tobacco and textiles. With such a pattern, trade competition, like
protectionism and subsidies, becomes inevitable, unless measures are taken to
improve interdependence and complementarity.
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b. Imports ofSelected Eastern and Southern African Countries
The composition of imports, as shown in Table 5.2, indicate a similar
pattern to exports. As shown in Table 5.1, only Zimbabwe exports a limited
amount of industrial inputs, but her potential to meet South Africa's processed
industrial inputs is limited, given the higher industrialization in South Africa. On the
other hand, South Africa may be able to supply some, if not most, of their industrial
inputs requirements.
Table 5.2. Imports of Selected Southern African Countries, by Broad
Economic Category (% of Total Value)
SACU* ZIMBABWE MAURITIUS KENYA
1989 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993 1990 1993
1. Food/Bev 2.5 4.8 24 60 11.6 12.8 8.8 12.1
1 1 . Primary 1.0 2.3 1.7 2.7 4.5 5.3 4.1 5.0
12. Processed 1.4 2.5 .0.7 U 7.1 8.0 4.6 7.1
2. Industrial Supplies 24.5 29.4 359 369 44.3 46.9 27.2 35.9
21. Primary 3.0 4.5 2.3 7.6 3.6 3.4 2.3 2.7
22. Processed 21.5 24.9 33 6 | im 38.8 43.1 25.0 33.2
3. Fuels N/A 0.2 15.1 14.3 7.5 6.7 19.4 14.5
4. Machinery 3.7 28.9 217 215 12.3 13.5 20.5 16.5
5. Transport 20.8 28.9
:
& 4 14 2 13.7 7.0 19.5 10.8
6. Consumer Goods 6.2 10.3 5.6 4.3 9.9 12.9 5.6 8.7
Other Goods 12.4 9.0 10 L7 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.5
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, Trade by Country, 1 994.
*SACU figures mainly comprise those from South Africa
The data in Table 5.3 shows that Zimbabwe dominated exports to
SACU in 1992, mainly to South Africa. Zimbabwe contributed 39.9% of agricultural
exports, and 19.7% of textile exports. The high textile component partly reflects the
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relatively low wages in Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe's preeminent position also results from
the bilateral trade arrangement with South Africa. The rest of the region's exports to
SACU were negligible.
Table 5.3. Imports of SACU from the Rest of Southern Africa
January to June 1992
Value % Total Zimbabwe %of Zimbabwe
(R000)* from Region Total Zimbabwe % Regional
mm Total Total
1 . Agricultural 218462 44.1 154537 39.9 70.7
Products
2. Mineral Products 32823 6.6 32245 8.3 98.2
3. Chemical Products 6955 1.5 65.8 1.7 93.7
4. Plastics/Rubber 7988 1.1 52.4 1.3 64.1
Products
5. Hides, Skins, and 8820 1.9 7983 2.0 9.5
Leather
6. Wood & Products 20710 4.4 16797 4.3 81.1
7. Paper & Products 3381 0.6 3346 0.9 99.0
8. Textiles 97633 19.7 72979 18.7 74.7
9. Footwear 12514 2.6 125 14 3.2 100.0








::o:'xo::^^^*? :x ;x : :': : 0.7 99.9
11. Article of Base 40009 8.1 36366 9.3 90.9
Metals
12. Machinery/ 22180 4.5 21541 5.5 97.1
Appliances
13. Veh& Related 11359 2.3 7106 1.8 62.6
14. MiscMfres 6528 1.3 6406 1.6 98.1
15. Officials 583 >0.1 354 >0.1 60.7
Art 76 >0.1 70 >0.1 92.1
Unclassified 2053 0.4 1855 0.5 90.3
Total 495696 389098 78.5
*1U$ = 4.5 Rand.
Source: SADC: Regional Cooperation Post Apartheid, 1993.
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Table 5.4 summarizes the bilateral trade relations between Zimbabwe
and South Africa in 1993. South Africa's imports are mostly primary-based products,
Table 5.4. South African Imports and Exports: Zimbabwe in 1993 (By
Order of Importance)
Imports R (million) Exports R (million)
24. Tobacco 60.5 84. Boiler/Machinery
Appliances
293.4
52. Cotton 54.3 87. Motor Vehicles 166.6
25. Salt, Sulphur 40.8 Nickel & Related 132.3
Lime & Cement Articles
44. Wood/Charcoal 38.4 Iron/Steel 119.1
12. Seeds/Grain 36.8 Plastics & Related
Articles
100.2
64. Footwear 34.3 Products of Chemicals 84.7
Source: Holden, Merle, "Economic Integration and Trade Liberalization in Southern Africa," Is There a Hole for
south Africa, World Bank Discussion Paper Number 342, 1 996. Quoted with permission from World Bank. 1
U$ = 4.5 Rand.
rather than capital goods. Trade between the two countries seems to be inter-industry.
However, South Africa is also a major exporter of the goods that Zimbabwe exports
to South Africa, as shown in Table 5.1. Thus, trade in some of the sectors is actually
intra-industry, hence competitive. Also of note, Zimbabwe imports critical produc-
tion inputs, which naturally tend to be demand inelastic. Where the inputs are
differentiated, Zimbabwe's imports tend to be tied to South African suppliers. In
contrast, the natural resource-based imports from Zimbabwe are relatively more price
elastic. Furthermore, Zimbabwe has an incentive to lower trade barriers on produc-
tion inputs, so as to nunimize production costs. 122 On the other hand, South Africa's
imports are largely consumption goods. South Africa would have little incentive to
122To do otherwise would be 'shooting one's own foot" since this would lead to higher prices, with
negative consequences on export competitiveness.
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lower trade barriers on imports from Zimbabwe, because these products can be
replaced by domestic production.
Because of high trade restrictions, Zimbabwe faces in the developed
countries for commodities like textiles, clothing, and agricultural products, and the
limited markets due to low incomes in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa
becomes the most logical alternative. 123
Table 5.5 summarizes the direction of trade, in value terms, for 1995.
Clearly, South Africa dominates two-way trade with all the countries of the region.
Within southern Africa, Zimbabwe remains South Africa's major trading partner,
accounting for 29% of exports. From a global level, Zimbabwe remains a small
market for South Africa. Zimbabwe receives about 8% of South Africa's exports and
provides around 1% of total imports. South Africa's other important export markets
are Mozambique, Zambia, Kenya, and Malawi, in order of importance.
Like South Africa, Zimbabwe had a trade surplus with all her regional
trading partners except South Africa during the same period. Zimbabwe also remains
South Africa's nearest challenger for regional trade. Exports to South Africa were at
20% ofZimbabwe's total world exports, compared to 18% to the rest of Africa. The
other main regional markets include Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and
Kenya, in order of importance. Of her total exports to Africa, South Africa received
35%; SADC accounted for 38%. Imports from South Africa, 29%, were lower than
the total from the rest of Africa (3 1%). As to be expected for countries at different
levels of industrialization, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Mauritius had
triangular trade patterns, exporting to less developed countries and importing from
developed countries. Also, the trade balance favored the relatively more developed
countries. For Zimbabwe, two-way bilateral and regional trade is vital; for South
Africa, export markets are relatively more important.
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The proximity effect is evident in southern and eastern African
countries, especially Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. Another notable feature is the
limited trade between Angola and the rest of the region, except for imports from
South Africa and Zimbabwe. 124 Finally, the direction of trade statistics show that
while South Africa is not member of COMESA, her trade with those countries
exceeds Zimbabwe's intra-COMESA trade. It may just be a matter of time before
South Africa eitherjoins COMESA or enters bilateral trade agreements to protect her
interests with most non-SADC COMESA members, including Kenya, Uganda, Zaire
and Madagascar. This may lead to stiffer regional competition with Zimbabwe.
South African exports to COMESA for the period from 1989 to 1993
are shown in Table 5.6. Exports to COMESA as a proportion of total South African
exports grew, largely due to growth in exports to members ofCOMESA that are also
members of SADC. The proportion of exports to non SADC members ofCOMESA
remains approximately 2.5 percent.
Imports into South Africa from the COMESA grew over the same five-year
period. (See Table 5.7). In 1989, they accounted for 1.6 percent of South African
imports, rising to 2.3 percent in 1993.
Despite the increases in trade between South Africa and southern
Africa, both SADC and COMESA countries remain relatively unimportant trading
partners. The southern African trading blocks only account for small proportions of
South African trade, with the exception of Zimbabwe. Excluding gold, arms and oil,
SADC accounts for 10 percent of South Africa's exports and two percent of their
imports. Including COMESA increases these proportions to 12 and 2.3 percent,
respectively.
124Angola is a major oil exporter, but sells very little to the region, including her neighbors Zambia,
Namibia, Zaire and Botswana Like Angola, Mozambique and Zaire have artificially low intra-regional trade yet
are potentially rich, with huge populations. Thus, these countries represent an under-exploited potential for future
trade. Nevertheless, South African trade with these countries is comparatively higher than Zimbabwe's with the
same countries. This state of affairs was probably caused by the civil war and is likely to be reversed once peace
is consolidated.
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Table 5.6. South African Exports to COMESA: 1989-1993 (R million)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Angola 18.8 53.2 138 369 263
Burundi 5.2 5.9 10.9 12.0 13.2
Comoros 23.6 21.8 33.1 31.6 36.9
Djibouti 0.4 0.2
Ethiopia 1.1 2.2 0.7 3.8
Kenya 10.3 24.3 30 147 205
Lesotho 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.7 0.002
Madagascar 24.1 53.3 42.9 52.8 60.9
Malawi 434.9 419.2 576.5 695.5 591.7
Mauritius 273 315 380 388 471
Mozambique 371.9 462.9 689.3 676.7 961.6
Namibia 0.04 0.1 0.3 0.06
Rwanda 0.7 0.4 0.6 7.2 408
Seychelles 41.8 45.7 49.4 60.8 78.5
Somalia 2.7 5.3 2.2 1.5
Sudan 10 26.9 6.2 21.3 31
Swaziland 2.1 0.1 0.1 2.4 0.2
Tanzania 3.0 11.1 10.0 25.7 57.7
Uganda 0.9 2.2 0.7 2.9 9.2
Zaire 363 467 307 290 131
Zambia 446.3 530.4 663.4 1111.7 1305.9
;.
Zimbabwe 991.5 1158.7 1600.7 1548.7 .1745.2





Total South Afiica 30800 32400 36800 42400 49500
COMESA % Total 9.8 11.0 12.3 12.8 12.4
Source: Holden, Merle, "Economic Integration and Trade Liberalization in Southern Africa. Is there a Role for
South Africa?" World Bank Discussion Paper, Number 342, 1 996. Quoted with permission. US$ = 4.5 Rand.
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Table 5.7. South African Imports from COMESA: 1989-1993 (R million)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Angola 9.9 0.06 0.02 0.5 1.1
Burundi 0.01 0.4 0.03 0.1
Comoros 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.3
Djibouti 0.02
Ethiopia 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.3
Kenya 17.1 10.5 17.5 23.2 30.2
Lesotho 0.3 0.2 0.36 0.06 0.02
Madagascar 0.4 1.3 2.7 6.6 4.1
Malawi 58.5 81.0 91.0 131.5 159.5
Mauritius 10.8 14.2 14.0 12.8 19.2
Mozambique 17.5 30.4 37.4 47.4 60.3
Namibia 0.07 0.6 0.7 0.59 0.5
Rwanda 0.01 0.9 105 0.1 0.4
Seychelles 0.5 0.3 1.1 0.7 1.0
Somalia 0.07 0.02 0.01
Sudan 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.3 6.3
Swaziland 0.2 0.06 0.4 0.9 1.3
Tanzania 1.6 2.5 0.95 10.3 21.8
Uganda 0.3 0.08 0.1 0.05 1.1
Zaire 47.6 21.8 12.9 11.0 262
Zambia 5.7 6.3 14.5 40.5 75.5
:-'^ -.-""'
' v^-: : . 440.7 471.6 810.6 659.0
Total COMESA 629 612 6*9 um 1304
TotaJ South Airica 3S682.7 380103.4 42054 46319 6 561247
COMESA % Total 1.6 1.6 1.6 2.4 2.3
Source: Ibid.
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B. FACTORS INFLUENCING ZIMBABWE'S DESIRED TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN
AFRICA
Zimbabwe's future trade relations with South Africa cannot ignore the rest of
the southern African region, particularly, South Africa's dominance of SACU and her
unilateral protectionist trade policies. 125 The strategy should consider the different
levels of economic integration across SACU, SADC and COMESA.
The details of the new SADC trade protocol were not available at the time of
this writing. The available SADC literature does not explain how a free trade area
will be achieved concomitantly with bilateral arrangements and overlapping SACU,
SADC and COMESA membership. The alternative merely observes that
harmonization will take place at a progressively higher level of integration within the
framework of the whole community. 126 For example, Zambia and Zimbabwe recently
announced the imminent finalization of a bilateral trade agreement. 127 The consensus
among SACU members is that the union should progress to the common market phase
of economic integration. 128 This seems logical, given that the union presently operates
as a defacto common market with almost free movement of factors of production,
particularly through the migrant labor system. This suggests that the 'catching-up'
125This issue has been discussed in detail in Chapter III.
126The SADC Treaty called for among other things, "...deeper economic cooperation and integration on
the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and the free
movement offactors of production, capital and labor across national borders; and Common economic, political and
social values and systems, such as free enterprise, free elections and multiparty systems, respect for the rule of law
and the guarantee of human rights" (original emphasis). See Mandaza Ibbo, and Tostemsen, Arne, (edited by
Emang M. Maphanyane), Southern Africa: In Search of a Common Future , Gaborone, 1994, and "SADC: The
Resources, Institutions and Capacity For Integration," Proceedings of the Consultative Conference held in
Lilongwe, Republic of Malawi, 1 st- 4th February, 1995.
I27ThePost, "Zambia-Zimbabwe to Finalize Trade Agreement," Zambia National www server, Zambia,
November 28, 1996.
128SADC, "Resources, Institutions and Capacity For Integration," The Proceedings of the Consultative
Conference held in Lilongwe, Republic of Malawi, 1 st- 4th February 1 995.
91
will of necessity harmonize at a higher level, like say a customs union, common
market or economic community, implying that non-SACU members will continue to
face trade barriers from South Africa.
Any bilateral agreement implicitly rules out Zimbabwe out-competing South
Africa in SACU, which is her de facto market. Concerning SADC, important issues
include SADC's tolerance of bilateral trade arrangements and its emphasis on
development cooperation and political relationships. This means that important issues
may continue to be resolved at the bilateral level, not within the SADC framework.
Finally, the strategy should not overlook the asymmetries in GNP, potential market
sizes (particularly non-SADC and COMESA countries), the level of development,
productive capacity, regional investment opportunities, the nature of imports and
exports, and the level of each country's protection. 129
The following options are open to Zimbabwe: 130
A free trade area within the COMESA, or SADC framework, or an
amalgamation of the two, encompassing SACU.
Harmonizing bilateral trade relations with South Africa for specific
sectors.
Continued duplicate and overlapping COMESA and SADC
membership with bilateral trade arrangements in specific sectors.
Harmonizing SADC and COMESA as a free trade area would require the rest
of the region to 'catch-up' with SACU to form a customs union or common market.
SACU member countries cannot revert to a lower level of economic integration (e.g.,
a free trade area).
129Althoughthe Southern African countries differ in size, income, and population, most of their output is
similar.
130These are not the only possible options, but in my view, they are the most realistic.
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A separate free trade area under SADC or COMESA means continued trade
barriers between the SACU and non-SACU SADC until the 'catch-up' occurs. This
would sharpen competition by the regional countries to enter into competing
arrangements with South Africa and/or Zimbabwe, delaying free trade. Each of the
possible options has costs and benefits, which should be analyzed.
1. Perspectives Regarding Customs Unions, Free Trade Areas and
Bilateral Trade Agreements
The debate concerning the 'traditional' Ricardian international trade theory
and 'new' international trade theory (strategic trade theory) has not been resolved
conclusively, as was shown in chapter n. Nevertheless, the composition and patterns
of global trade policies suggest that both approaches are relevant in certain
circumstances. Chapter II also showed that the Vinerian customs union theory on
trade creation and trade diversion is ambiguous. Regional trading arrangements can
address existential reality; the level of trade creation and diversion rests on the
assumptions made.
The issue is not whether regional economic integration reduces total global
welfare, but how a small country, competing with a large trading partner, can choose
the most appropriate integration model. 131 In other words, what type of regional trade
arrangement would improve Zimbabwe's welfare. 132 The analysis shall demonstrate
that multiple bilateral trade arrangements within the region, or competing free trade
arrangements as in the present SACU, SADC and COMESA, are welfare reducing for
Zimbabwe and South Africa. Both countries could improve their welfare by
131The extent of trade creation or diversion is irrelevant in this case.
1
"Others have argued that one reason why free trade areas form in the first place is to shift political power
centers from importers to exporters. Richardson, Martin, "Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion," Journal
of International Economics , Vol. 34, 3-4, pp. 309-24, 1993.
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finalizing a free trade area encompassing the present SACU, SADC and COMESA,
augmented by bilateral arrangements on specific issues.
I shall examine the advantages of a free trade area over a customs union,
compare a free trade area with bilateral agreements, and then look at an expanding the
free trade area vice multiplying free trade areas. Finally, I will look at dynamic gains
from trade, with an emphasis on economic growth, technology and investment, and
factor mobility. 133
a. Customs Union Versus Free Trade Areas
The literature on the superiority of a free trade area over CU has not
produced many composite, unambiguous and testable models. Most previous studies
focussed on the desirability of regional trade arrangements; they do not consider the
most appropriate model given the decision to form a regional arrangement. 134
Previous authors argued that a customs union will always dominate free trade areas,
and that a customs union can be extended to include all countries. 135 This conclusion
does not explain why free trade areas continue to exist. Frankel and others found that
133The analysis will be microeconomic based. It assumes that the first best solution of global free trade
is untenable, largely for political reasons, and is non-discriminatory (MFN) because of non-tariff barriers.
Therefore, the choice is within a regional trade arrangement, that is choosing a 'first best solution' within the
'second best.'
B4See for example, Kemp, Murray. C, and Wan, H. Y., Jr., "An Elementary Proposition Concerning the
Formation of Customs Unions," in Murray C. Kemp, Three Topics in the Theory of International Trade ,
Amsterdam: North Holland, 1976; and Dixit, Anvinash and Norman, Victor, Theory of International Trade ,
Cambridge University Press, London, 1 980.
135 See for example, Kemp, M. C, and Wan, H. Y., Jr., "An Elementary Proposition Concerning the
Formation of Customs Unions" in M.C., Kemp, Three Topics in the Theory of International Trade , Amsterdam:
North Holland, 1976; and Dixit, Anvinash and Norman, Victor, Theory of International Trade , Cambridge
University Press, London, 1980. For a review of this literature see Wonnacott, Paul and Wonnacott, Ronald, J.,
"Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Missing Foreign Tariffs," in
American Economic Review , Vol. 71, No. 4, pp. 7-14, September, 1981.
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partially eliminating internal barriers in a free trade arrangement would be better than
totally eliminating them under a customs union. 136
De Melo and others have emphasized the comparative institutional
issues affecting customs and free trade areas, but they have not concluded which
model is better for regional integration. 137 Under scale economies and imperfect
competition, a free trade area may lead to lower tariffs to maximize revenues from
import volumes. Lower production costs in the lower-tariff country would then help
force down tariffs in high-tariff countries. Also, an import tariff set by one country
will, if it reduces world prices, affect the rest of the free trade area; gains /losses
depend on whether a country imports or exports the goods.
Baldwin and Venables have also shown that ifrents from NTBs are not
captured domestically, a nation gains from any regional trade arrangement that
reduces its average (trade weighted ) tariff equivalent trade barriers.
138 Where the
countries are at the same level of economic development, with identical incomes,
trade would tend to be intra-industry. Zimbabwe and South Africa have pursued
strategic trade policies, have differentiated products and intra-industry trade, but do
not meet the criteria of similar development and income levels. Thus, it may be
inappropriate to use the Baldwin and Venables model. 139
136
Frankel, Jeffrey A., Stein, Ernesto, and Wei, Shang-Jin, "Regional Trading Arrangements: Natural Or
Supernatural?" American Economic Review (AEA Papers and Proceedings) , Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 52-56, 1996.
They used the gravity model to analyze bilateral trade on imperfect substitutes. The equation postulates that trade
between two countries is proportional to the product of their GNPs, and inversely related to the distances between
them.
137De Melo, Jaime, Panaganya, Arvind, and Rodrik, Dani, "The New Regionalism: A Country




139The issue of imperfect markets, increasing returns to scale, and strategic trade theory intra-industry
trade was dealt with at length in Chapter II.
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In a study on Mercosur, Legorburu used the consumer surplus approach
to show how a small country could increase national welfare by opting for a free trade
area as opposed to a customs union. 140 However, the study was confined to a
'harmless' small country among regional giants. It did not consider:
The case where the 'small' country is also a major regional competitor
to the larger country.
The effect of third country tariffs on the integrating partners.
The overlapping membership of regional trading arrangements at
different levels of integration.
Richardson applied the theory of political economy to show that the net
effect of forming a regional trade agreement depends on the pattern of external tariffs
applied to non-members. 141 Where protection arises endogenously, the welfare
reducing effects associated with trade diversion are diminished in the case of a free
trade area. A country with a comparative disadvantage compared to the partner will
not maintain protection against imports from the rest of the world, since support for
protection diminishes as the political influence of domestic industry declines. In his
model, tariffs are set to maximize a non-economic, political support function. By
isolating terms of trade from tariff effects, he shows that endogenously determined
tariffs will fall after forming free trade areas. Consequently, trade diversion becomes
trade creation. Thus, under certain circumstances, a free trade area possess all the
advantages of a customs union, and does not have the limitations faced by the
relatively rigid common external tariffs of a customs union. The model is shown by
the identity (RfftM), which is written as:
M0
Legorburu, Beatriz, Impacts of the MERCOSUR Agreement on the Uruguayan Economy , Master's
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 1994. She offers a very comprehensive analysis of tariffs and consumer
surplus.
14
'Richardson, Martin, "Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion," Journal of International Economics ,
Vol. 34, 3-4, pp. 309-24, 1993.
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R=tM=(p-p*)M'' (1)
where M1 denotes imports ofgood i (exports if negative), M is the nxl vector of non-
numeraire imports. R= scalar and denotes net tariff revenues. If B' is the
exogenously determined share of revenues that are allocated to capital owners in
sector i, then firms choose Labor (L 1) to maximize profits denoted Y:
r=p'F [K^J-wU+B'R (2)
The government's objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the utilities of
capital owners and workers. Where workers receive a share Bw of tariff revenues, this
is denoted as V* [p,!™], where 1"= income= wL+BwR and L denotes the total labor
supply in the economy. Full employment is implied. V [p,I l] represents the indirect
utility of X'-sector capital owners, the government's objective is to choose p, given
world prices, p*, to maximize:
n
G[p,P *] = £ aV[p,f] + aV[p,I-] (3)
i=l
n
where a1 and aw are positive constants. Bw +2^B' = 1. Demands are all homothetic.
i=l
Total imports are given by:
3>'[p]i - FtK- V] (4)
and aggregate income is given by:
n
I = ooL° + £piF'[K, V] + R (5)142
Using a Richardson model, we can illustrate these propositions.
Assume that there are three countries: a small country, Zimbabwe (Z), and two large
countries South Africa (S) and the rest of the world (R). All countries produce,
142 For the full derivation of the function and numerical examples, see Richardson, Martin, "Endogenous
Protection and Trade Diversion." Journal of International Economics , Vol. 34, 3-4, pp. 309-24, 1993.
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consume and export steel. 143 We also assume that Zimbabwe's steel industry is the
most relatively inefficient, followed by South Africa. The price of steel includes
transportation and all other transaction costs. At the pre-free trade area equilibrium,
all tariffs are non-discriminatory, all imports come from R and the political
equilibrium tariff is characterized by the first order condition for maximizing the
political support function. Assume further that the Zimbabwean government
objective function implies a global maximum at a price for steel between the partner
and world price, but less than Zimbabwe's autarky price. Thus, equilibrium tariffs
are positive, non-chscriminatory but not prohibitive. 144
Graphically, Zimbabwe's excess demand for steel is illustrated in
Figure 5.1. EDD" represents Zimbabwe's excess demand for steel, (imports). Ps and
Pr represent the prices in S and R respectively without tariffs. With tariffs, the
respective prices are Ps+t, and Pr+t. Since R is the most efficient supplier, Z imports











Figure 5.1. Effect of Flexible External Tariffs on Partner and the
Rest of the World
mA small country is one which cannot affect world prices or the quantity traded by altering its price or
quantity.
4
This assumption is made for each of the three countries.
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After forming a free trade area, Z's industry collapses; the country
switches imports to S, paying Ps, gaining A+C in welfare, but losing all tariff
revenue.
145 The net effect is C-B, which may positive or negative. Trade diversion
from R to S has clearly occurred. (The UTR theory suggests that Z would be better-
off reducing tariffs unilaterally, for a net gain of C+D+E).
Within an free trade area, all losses associated with diversion can be
avoided by reducing tariffs on imports from R to less than autarky (i.e., between Ps
and Pr), so that net gain is a+c and the tariff loss is A, with an overall gain of C. A
fall in tariffs against R, to between Ps and Pr has no consequences for domestic firms,
but yields some tariff revenue. 146 Where Z's steel industry is completely eliminated,
there is no incentive to maintain tariffs, since the mere existence of a free trade area
or customs union prevents the re-imposition of tariffs on S to make Pr <Ps. IfZ were
to eliminate all tariffs unilaterally, the country's net gain would be C+D+E
,
but this
is greater than loss in tariff revenue.
Thus, with endogenously determined tariffs, (through the political
support function), trade diversion may become trade creation as tariffs are dropped
against R. When the price Ps is the same as Pr, then Z should be indifferent and trade
diversion is eliminated. As tariffs fall on R, so that Pr+t<Ps+t„ all trade goes to R.
Depending on the governments political support function at Ps=Pr, tariffs may
actually fall, such that Pr+t < Ps.
This may force S to reduce the price of steel, an advantage not available
under a customs union. The free trade area merely started the decline of the domestic
l45Zimbabwe's industry is no longer protected against imports from S, and the industry starts to decline
via the free trade area through the political endogeneity of protection, leads to tariffs against R to fall.
l46There is no clear incentive for the domestic industry to lobby for maintaining a high tariff, nor are there
any new domestic employment effects associated with the second round of tariff reduction.
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industry, but this continues by the second round of tariff reductions. As industry
declines, so will its lobbying power and level of protection granted by the
government. 147
Under a customs union, this fall in tariffs would be subject to the
consent of all partners, with lobbying and counter-lobbying by the respective
industries and labor. 148 If the customs union common external tariff is set above Ps,
then Z would buy all steel from S. While domestic firms are indifferent to the source
of imports, industry in S would prefer that Z purchases from S; they would oppose
any preferential treatment for non-members under a customs union.
There would be no difference for the most efficient producer between
a customs union or free trade area; Z would naturally buy all its excess requirements
from S. Where transport and transaction costs add to prices, proximity may influence
Z to buy from closer sources. Tariff revenues from S that have been lost to Z are
irrelevant because both a customs union and a free trade area eliminate internal
barriers. The partial loss of tariffrevenue may be compensated for through increased
efficiency under either a free trade area or customs union. In this scenario, the tariffs
against the non-partner are not totally eliminated, hence enabling Zimbabwe to retain
tariff revenue earnings. Another consideration is possible retaliation by the partner.
Where the both countries have the flexibility to reduce external tariffs unilaterally,
this increases free trade with the rest of the world, hence improves global welfare.
This highlights the role of unilateral trade liberalization within a free
trade area, but not in lieu of regional trade arrangements. For a small competitor
country, such as Zimbabwe, a free trade area with unilateral tariff reduction would
147Where tariffs are granted solely for domestic political support, there is no explicit channel by which
firms in the partner countries could influence the process or retaliate.
148Even in the case of South Africa and her SACU partners, negotiations on common external tariffs have
taken up to two years without an agreeable solution. Mail and Guardian, "New Trade Data to Exclude SA's
Neighbors," April 21, 1997.
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be preferable to either a customs union, or a unilateral tariff reduction in lieu of a
regional trade arrangement. This argument can be extended to cover any number of
goods, particularly intermediate goods, and for any number of countries. It also
partially explains why trade may not increase within a free trade area in all
circumstances.
Where circumstances permit, external tariffs should remain flexible
downwards for a country joining a regional trade arrangement; this would allow the
smaller competitor country to take advantage of imports from more efficient
countries. The Richardson model would, in my view, apply whether trade is intra or
inter-industry, and subject to constant returns or increasing returns.
The main criticism of a free trade area is that it introduces complex
rules of origin. 149 Free trade areas are accompanied by complex elaborate rules of
origin and content requirements which are difficult to monitor. Since rules of origin
under a free trade area have no explicit revenue or production cost impact on the
domestic economy, a country advocating strict rules of origin disguise protection of
other intermediate sectors, imposing high welfare costs. However, in a customs union
(CU), lower tariff members are able to raise tariffs above pre-union levels. GATT
rules state that common external tariffs should be no higher than average of members
before the union. Furthermore, free trade areas also give reform-oriented small
countries flexibility to pursue their own trade policies, thus rninimizing the risk of
escalating trade restrictions.
On the other hand, a customs union obviates autonomy on trade policy.
Nations may end up with barriers that are not nationally optimal, possibly benefiting
149De Melo, Jaime, Panagariya, Arvind, and Rodrik, Dani, "The New Regionalism: A Country
Perspective," in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (ed), New Dimensions in Regional Integration , Cambridge
University Press, 1 993, and Baldwin, Richard E., and Venables, Anthony, J., "Regional Economic Integration,"
in GeneM. Grossman and Kenneth Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics , Vol. Ill, Elsevier, 1995.
101
by reducing external tariffs. In a CU, reform oriented states can get 'sucked in,'
toward higher tariffs, if lobbies favoring common high external tariffs are strong.
When imports start to enter through low tariff countries, this puts pressure on other
countries to lower tariffs. This contributes to the WTO spirit of global free trade. It
may not necessarily be injurious to the free trade area as it enhances efficiency.
Finally, at the macroeconomic level, problems of supporting inflation may arise in the
Southern African customs union, given the desperate inflation level shown in Table
4.7.
The counter arguments are that the least protective country in a
customs union, can force the other members to lower tariffs. A customs union may
also dilute protectionist lobbies in free trade areas, where lobbying is still at the
national level.
The actual costs of rules of origin are not easy to quantify, but they
clearly introduce transaction costs not present in a customs union. In some respects,
forming a customs union reduces global welfare; free trade areas leave more
flexibility to reduce tariffs without having to get a consensus from the other partners.
b. Bilateral Agreements Versus Free Trade Areas
Currently, most countries have sectoral bilateral trade agreements with
South Africa and/or Zimbabwe.
Balassa has raised several important points concerning sectoral
agreements: 150
Whereas simultaneous integration provides for the compensating
changes in all sectors, trade barriers in other sectors lead to adjustments
in the liberalized sectors alone, resulting in distortions in the economy.
°Balassa, Bela, The Theory ofEconomic Integration , Richard D., Irwin, Inc., 1961.
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Each step in the process results in a temporary equilibrium of prices,
costs and resource allocation. Production decisions are made on the
basis of prices that are relevant only in the given phase of integration.
Coordinating monetary and fiscal policy is difficult under sectoral
agreements, since different economic policies may influence
commodity and factor prices, importing inflation.
Non-economic problems like conflicts of interests between consumers
and both exporting and importing sectors may dictate that the ultimate
policy is determined by those with the most influence.
It has been argued that bilateral arrangements have advantages over
larger groupings, including quicker agreements, more easily monitored costs, and
more easily verified compliance with the agreement. 151 De Melo and others have
argued that the fewer the partners the better. This optimizes both the economic and
political objectives. 152 This argument fails to take into account that bilateral relations
are not mutually exclusive; a country may enter into several of them, potentially
covering the same general sectors. Even where all the bilateral agreements are
consistent (as suggested by Zimbabwe), this is unnecessarily wasteful. 153
Bilateral, sectoral agreements have been justified on the grounds that
free trade under a broad multi-country agreement will favor more economically
developed countries at the expense of the less developed. In Southern Africa,
151 See Richardson, Martin, "Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion" in Journal of International
Economics
.
Vol. 34, 3-4, pp. 309-24, 1 993. He uses the example of the US-Canada free trade area which went
beyond the past and current GATT agreement.
152De Melo, Jaime, Panagariya, Arvind, and Rodrik, Dani, "The New Regionalism: A Country
Perspective," in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (ed), New Dimensions in Regional Integration , Cambridge
University Press, 1 993
.
153A series of consistent bilateral agreements in lieu of a wide free trade area increases the transaction
costs for the exporters and importers. In any event, if they were all consistent, the simpler method would be to
make one trade agreement, instead of several. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that Zimbabwe's 'consistent'
bilateral agreements will not be rivaled by those involving South Africa, nor is it clear from the direction of trade
data whether Zimbabwe could provide an incentive to stop the other countries from concluding superior bilateral
agreements with South Africa.
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Zimbabwe, together with South Africa and Kenya, are considered potential
benefactors. While Zimbabwe may be concerned with full integration with South
Africa, countries like Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique, see Zimbabwe as a threat. 154
The most iUuminating argument on the effects of multiple bilateral trade
agreements has been given by Wonnacott (1991). 155 Wonnacott has shown that
competing bilateral agreements largely benefits the hub, at the expense of the spokes.
If South Africa (hub) were to sign separate bilateral trade agreements with Zimbabwe
and Zambia (spokes), South African firms would avoid trade barriers in both
Zimbabwe and Zambia; the spokes would only have free access to South Africa, not
to each other's markets. Zimbabwe and Zambia's firms would also lack access to less
expensive raw materials that would allow them to compete efficiently with South
Africa in all regions including in South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and in the rest
of the world. The more spokes South Africa 'takes in,' as she is currently doing, the
more it erodes previous gains to the spokes. The first country to sign a bilateral
agreement with South Africa suffers as more spokes are joined. This discrimination
would be avoided if the whole region entered a regional free trade arrangement. 156
South Africa's benefit from bilateral agreements comes largely at the expense of the
rest of the region:
I54Omotunde, Johnson, E. G., "Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing Prospects for Success," in
Journal ofModern African Studies . Vol. 29, No. 1
, pp. 1 -26, 1 99 1
.
'"Wonnacott, Ronald J., The Economics of Overlapping Free Trade Areas and the Mexican Challenge ,
C. D. Howe Institute, Toronto, 1991. The terms 'hub' and 'spoke' are also attributable to Ronald J. Wonnacott.
They refer to a situation where a dominant country concludes bilateral trade agreements with several smaller
countries in lieu of a formal free trade area encompassing all countries.
I56
lt has already been argued that South Africa's conclusion of a free trade agreement with the EU would
cost her SACU partners about R 1 million per year. See Electronic Mail & Guardian , "Free Trade With EU Will
Hurt SA's Neighbors," Mail and Guardian, South Africa, (30 October 1 996 and 05 November 1 996); and Standard
Chartered Bank," Africa Quarterly Review," Standard Chartered Bank, Harare, Zimbabwe, October, 1996.
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Only South Africa would enjoy free trade with all her neighbors.
By expanding her preferential trade agreements, she expands markets
and relative competitiveness.
The preferences she gets make her attractive for foreign direct
investment (FDI).
On the other hand, opting for a free trade area gives several benefits:
Comparative advantage and economies of scale are greater in a free
trade area than in bilateral networks. Bilateral agreements would
discriminate against Zimbabwean exports, making it difficult for
domestic Zimbabwean firms to remain competitive.
A multi-country free trade area would better protect national interests
by ensuring appropriate treatment of EPZs (subsidiaries). It would
prevent countries from artificially attracting industry and distorting
trade and investment.
A free trade area would ensure that new and competing bilateral
arrangements do not 'supersede' existing bilateral agreements.
Where other trading partners are moving toward free trade, there is a
high cost of being an outsider when trading partners are liberalizing
their trade.
With imperfect competition, industry location will be skewed towards
nations with large markets. In a hub-spoke arrangement, firms located at the hub will
have better access to consumers than those located in the spokes. This creates the
same access effect, helping the hub to have more industry, and possibly higher wages
than all spokes.
One possible reason countries join hub-and-spoke arrangements is that
powerful countries like South Africa can sign bilateral agreements with or without
general regional consensus. But this may also damage the bigger country's national
interests:
Separate bilateral agreements might give hub firms an incentive to
lobby against foreign competition, not only in the hub(s), but also in the
spoke countries. This would introduce trade distortions, rent-seeking
and waste.
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There are bound to be inconsistencies in the various bilateral
agreements.
Bilateral agreements introduce political and economic costs,
particularly accusations of regional hegemony.
Since South Africa and Zimbabwe accept countries into different
bilateral agreements, discrimination is bound to arise, thus distorting
terms of trade.
The hub itself loses control if the spokes sign their own hub-and-spoke
arrangements that reduce the hub to another spoke.
Hub-and spoke arrangements tend to be sectoral, introducing distor-
tions in the economy.
Decisions by the leading countries in the region may set the precedent
whereby all regional countries compete to gain better access to the
South Africa's markets.
Thus, countries signing bilateral trade agreements with dominant
partners in lieu of free trade arrangements invariably reduce their own welfare as
they compete with other countries to establish the best bilateral agreements. The
same hub-and-spoke arguments can be extended to Zimbabwe's own bilateral
arrangements with other smaller regional partners, except Zimbabwe is a junior
competitor to the larger hub (South Africa); Zimbabwe could be reduced to anther
'spoke' in a chain of hub-and-spoke relations, with most of the benefits accruing to
South Africa. It is not the small size of the spoke that is critical, but the future
potential trade loss.
c. Competing Regional Trade Arrangements (SACU, SADC,
COMESA)
The third possibility is continuing SACU, SADC, and COMESA as
separate overlapping regional trade organizations. The proximity theory postulates
that given sufficient demand for variety or differentiated goods, countries will enter
into trade arrangements with their neighbors. Where transportation costs are higher
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than the lowered duty, no trade will take place with distant countries. 157 For example,
Botswana and South Africa have to date declined to join COMESA; Mozambique and
Lesotho have decided to quit the organization. They argue that COMESA is
unwieldily and that there is limited intra-COMESA trade.
The benefits from intra-COMESA trade are presently enjoyed by a few
countries, notably Zimbabwe, Kenya and Mauritius, as shown in Table 5.1.
Mozambique and Lesotho would not suffer any immediate losses for withdrawing
from COMESA. 158 The proximity argument may be true for Mozambique and
Lesotho in COMSEA. It may also be true for Zimbabwe in the sub-Saharan African
context. In any event, bilateral benefits tend to be short term. In the long -run, the
opportunity costs of this approach may be high, for example, the subsequent build up
of costs in bilateral or future potential trade that may be damaged, as is the present
case with the 1964 trade agreement with South Africa which tied Zimbabwe's trade
to that country at the expense of the rest of the world. 159
Wonnacott (1996) has also shown that expanding free trade areas is
more welfare increasing for the countries than separate overlapping free trade areas,
since each free trade area thinks it is nberalizing trade, (but only in itself), yet to those
outside the trade arrangement, trade barriers to its own exports remain intact. 160
157Krugman, Paul R, "Is Bilateralism Bad?," in Elthaman Helpman and Assat Razin, (ed.), International
Trade and Trade Policy, MIT Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, pp. 9-23, 1991a. See also Perrom, Carlo and
Whalley, John, The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization or Insurance?" National Bureau of Economic Research,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1994.
l58Zimbabwe would suffer more than any other country if it were to withdraw because its trade with
COMESA is significant, but more importantly, it would leave a vacuum, which South Africa would gratefully fill.
159
For a lucid expansion of this argument, see Wonnacott, Ronald, J., "Free Trade Agreements: For Better
or Worse?," American Economic Review , Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 63-66, 1996.
I60Wonnacott, Ronald J., "Free Trade Agreements: For Better Or Worse " American Economic Review.
AEA Articles , Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 63-66, May 1 996. He found that an expanding free trade arrangement not only
generates welfare increasing trade diversion, but also reverses the previous negative trade diversion.
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It is not possible in this thesis to test the applicability of this theory, nor
is it easy to quantify the proximity theory, but if such an argument holds, then
countries like Kenya would not figure in Zimbabwe's regional strategy. Also, due to
differing market sizes and income levels, one may suspect that the hub-and-spoke
argument would not apply where transportation costs are prohibitive. But evidence
from Table 5.6 suggests that, in southern Africa, it is the level of development that is
correlated with large mutual trade, not geography.
Others may argue that any limited free trade organization would of
necessity be a form of hub-and-spoke with the rest of the world. However, where
trade with the rest of the world is an option, the expansion of free trade may be a step
toward global free trade. 161 South Africa's invitation to conclude a free trade
agreement with Europe is estimated to cost her SACU partners approximately 1
million Rand in revenue. 162 Yet, if the regional trade arrangement were a free trade
area, they could quickly adjust their own trade policies to cope with this problem.
Furthermore, any moves that liberalize trade in one way or another increase efficiency
and global welfare.
Under an expanding free trade area, each of the countries would expect
to augment its gain from preferential bilateral trade with a larger neighbor by:
Getting additional gains from tariff free trade with all the members of
SACU, SADC and COMESA.
Minimizing duplication of effort and waste.
Wonnacott's theory lacks a quantitative measure of the actual benefits
and losses in hub-and-spoke arrangements, but this does not dispute the conclusion
,61
Ibid.
'"Electronic Mail & Guardian
,
(30 Oct 1 996 and 05 November 1 996), "Free Trade With EU Will Hurt
SA's Neighbors," Mail and Guardian, South Africa; and Standard Chartered Bank," Africa Quarterly Review,"
Standard Chartered Bank, Harare, Zimbabwe, October, 1 996. R 4,5=approx 1 US$.
108
that multiplying regional trade arrangements or bilateral trade agreements in lieu of
wider free trade agreements is an inferior option. Possible policy conclusions imply
that hub-and -spoke agreements, in lieu of free trade areas, should be temporary, with
a definite phase out date. The exception is issues that are inherently bilateral, like
common rivers, hydro-electric projects, cross-border movements. Also, free trade
arrangements should not be re-negotiated each time a new member wishes to join.
This may undeirnine the original members' position.
From the three options considered, the free trade area option seems
strongly persuasive. Any of the alternatives above could predestine Zimbabwe to
perpetual trade deficits and unending quarrels with South Africa and other
neighboring countries over trade issues. Worse still, it might lead to unnecessary and
costly trade wars.
2. Free Trade and Economic Growth
Most regional trade models examine short term or static benefits of regional
integration. The analysis only considers the effects of free trade under the
assumptions of constant factor endowment and resource allocation, with constant
returns to scale and diminishing returns to factors of production. In the long term, the
benefits and costs of regional free trade can be measured in terms of the likely effects
of free trade on individual countries.
The neo-classical model of economic growth was developed by Robert
Solow. 163 The model assumes constant returns to scale, dimimshing returns to factors
of production and exogenous technological progress. Per capita production changes
arise from changes in the capital-labor ratio, or capital-land ratio. Due to dirninishing
returns, the marginal benefits decrease as capital increases. Growth in output
continues until the reallocation of resources has been completed. Solow' s model can
be expressed using a Cobb-Douglas production function; Qt=AtKtAa, LtA l-a.
163Solow, Robert, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function," Review ofEconomics
and Statistics . Vol. 39, pp. 312-320, 1957.
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Where Q=output, K=capital, L=labor, A=exogenous technological progress,
and t denotes time. Differentiating with respect to K, L, we get,
lnQ=A+lna*K+ln 1 -a*L (6)
The model assumes constant returns and exogenous technical progress. Thus,
At indirectly explains growth within the model. In reality, it is difficult to dis-
embody technological progress from capital and labor. The model also postulates
a trend towards convergence in productivity across countries over time. This is not
consistent with reality.
The Solow model also postulates efficiency and marginal cost pricing; in
reality, innovation requires monopoly profits. The assumption of constant returns to
factors is not realistic, as this does not capture the spill-overs of knowledge and R&D,
and other externalities like learning by doing, licencing, etc.
The new growth models have built on the neo-classical growth model to
incorporate increasing returns to scale, externalities, and endogenous technology and
human capital formation. The mainstream of the new growth theory models was
provided by Romer, 164 and further developed by Luca's5 and by Grossman and
Helpman. 166 As Grossman and Helpman point out, new researchers do not start from
scratch, but build on what is already in use. Productivity in the final goods depends
on the number of intermediate goods, 'n' and the fixed costs of its production. This
is a critical factor in explaining increasing returns.
The models of economic growth can thus be classified into two broad
categories: those with external economies of scale and those with internal economies
164Romer, Paul, M., "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Journal of Political Economy , Vol 94,
pp. 1002-1037, 1986a.
165
Lucas, Robert, E., "On the Mechanics ofEconomic Development," Journal of Monetary Economics ,
22, pp. 3-42, 1988.
166Grossman, Rene, M., and Helpman, E., "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth," Journal of
Economic Perspectives
. Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-44, Winter 1994. See also Romer, Paul M., "The Origins of
Endogenous Growth," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives . Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 3-22, Winter 1994.
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of scale. In the first category, it is assumed that private investment in capital
increases productive knowledge. This spreads through positive externalities to other
sectors of the economy or other countries. 167 Thus, extenalities offset the duriinishing
returns to scale, such that the production function becomes
Qt=BtKtAbKtAaLtA 1 -a (7)
where Bt is the basic knowledge that grows exponentially, and a+b is the output-
capital elasticity-which is different from the share of capital. The model assumes
increasing returns to factors, particularly through internalized learning by doing and
positive externalities. When a+b is equal to or greater than 1, per capita output can
grow without experiencing any diniinishing returns to capital.
Later models incorporate learning by doing and increasing levels of
technology through spill-overs. Human capital growth is influenced by previous
accumulation and its own utilization. 168 In a closed model, this would be limited to
the knowledge that labor accumulates within the country; in an open economy, the
spill-overs come from trading partners and investors.
The internal economies of scale models incorporate fixed costs in the
production of fixed inputs, R&D and differentiated products under monopolistic
conditions. 169 The model can be given by:
Qt=ZtA l-a-b,KtAa LtA l-a (8)
where Z=aggregate measure of intermediate inputs. Innovation sustains both capital
accumulation and growth, as opposed to the invisible hand as postulated by the neo-
classical model.
167Romer, Paul, M., "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Journal of Political Economy , Vol. 94,
pp. 1002-1037, 1986a.
168
Ibid. See also Lucas, Robert, E., "On The Mechanics ofEconomic Development," Journal of Monetary
Economics . 22, pp. 3-42, 1988.
169Grossman, Rene, M., and Helpman, E., "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth," Journal of
Economic Perspectives , Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-44, Winter 1994. See also Romer, Paul, M., "The Origins of
Endogenous Growth," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives , Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 3-22, Winter 1994.
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These models seem to offer a more realistic explanation of conditions in
developed countries. However, they could be useful for South Africa and Zimbabwe,
given their comparatively high level of industrialization, as shown by their export
structures in Tables 5.1 and 5.4. These models also imply that many states export
those goods for which they have higher technology and import those goods where
they have lower technology.
What the models suggest is that some policies can influence integration and
growth. 170 Residents of free trade countries benefit from knowledge and technology
externalities, with free trade facilitating speedy dissemination. Free trade also
exposes firms to international markets, forcing them to innovate at an international
level, rather than nationally. By expanding the market size, economies of scale also
dictate R&D incentives. A country that lacks the size and technical expertise to
support global-wide R&D will only specialize in those industries for which it has the
capacity. However, conclusions on the choice between a customs union and free
trade area cannot be drawn solely on the basis of models without empirical testing. 171
Nevertheless, the new growth models provide some useful insights, both for
a single country and for the region as whole. In relation to southern African regional
integration, the model has implications for government's role in the economy and
tariff structures. Government could encourage R&D and investment in capital stock
to improve factor productivity. Liberalizing trade does not guarantee that
I70Grossman, Rene, M., and Helpman, E. , "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth," Journal of
Economic Perspectives
.
Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-44, Winter 1994.
171Howard Pack has observed that while the new models are satisfying and do not rely on an unexplained
source of technological change, they are still not empirically developed in their explanatory power of sustained
differences between countries. Pack, Howard, "Endogenous Growth Theory: Intellectual Appeal and Empirical
Shortcomings," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives
. Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 55-72, Winter 1994.
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entrepreneurs sufficiently invest in human capital and new technology on their own,
where there are obvious externalities to others.
External tariffs should not be so high they discourage technology and
knowledge dissemination, yet they should be high enough to protect whatever
knowledge and technological advantages the country or region already has. Given the
different levels of technological development between South Africa and Zimbabwe,
a unilateral intra-regional tariff reduction, in lieu of a free trade area, would do more
harm than good to Zimbabwe. South Africa's comparatively developed R&D infra-
structural base would make it easy for human capital accumulation, relative to
Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe would preserve her interests well by directing her resources
where she has a comparative advantage or where competitive advantages can be
created vice the Southern African region, for eample, in human capital accumulation,
agriculture and light manufactures, and liberalize the import of those inputs used in
export production. Import markets should be liberalized quickly, and not selectively,
to avoid distortions, and not delay the problems. 172
The design of tariff structures could take either of two approaches. 173 One
approach is to reduce the tariff on intermediate capital goods while delaying reducing
it on consumption goods. This provides breathing room to adjust. This is the
approach that Zimbabwe took in 1997. The disadvantage is that it may introduce
distortions in the economy, particularly investment incentives. The other option is to
annually cut all tariffs across the board by a uniform rate. This approach is simple
and transparent, and high tariffs are reduced faster in absolute terms. However, it
does not consider third countries, preferred sectors, and assumes perfect competition.
172Hoekman, Bernard, and Djankov, Simeon, "Effective Protection and Investment Incentives in Egypt
and Jordan During the Transition to Free Trade With Europe," World Development . Vol. 25. No. 2, pp. 28 1 -29 1
,




3. Foreign Investment and Dissemination of Technology
Full trade liberalization will have many implications for labor and capital, both
local and international. The latter is crucial for small, less developed countries like
Zimbabwe, as it brings technology externalities. It should be noted that there are
many factors that influence investment, including the climate, incentives, interest
rates, and availability of services. These transaction costs need to be equalized before
foreign investment moves from one country to another. Increasing trade may affect
growth through its investment in human and physical capital, and through the rate of
investment and rate of improvement in factor productivity. To date, investment
prospects have not been bright in Zimbabwe. 174 On the other hand, South Africa has
a negative integration index (Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Zaire were the only
states with positive indexes in eastern and southern Africa). Yet, South Africa is still
attracting most investments to the region. 175 The explanation could lie in imperfect
competition, services, and the 'hub' status that South Africa enjoys. It may also
reflect future potential as perceived by investors, vis-a-vis the region.
What is critical for the regional trade arrangement is to address factor
productivity, incomes and factor payments. Balassa has argued that by making labor
and capital highly mobile, factor equalization may be accelerated. 176 Generally,
174Standard Chartered Bank, Africa Quarterly Review, 1 996; Mail & Guardian News, May 1 7, 1 996; See
also'Toreign Investors Stay Away From Zimbabwe," Mail &Guardian News . March 1 9, 1 997. Foreign investors,
are also said to be wary of investing in Namibia, preferring Zambia and Mozambique instead. In the case of
Zimbabwe, the reasons cited are unstable domestic climate, like the budget deficit and inflation. There is only a
50% implementation rate of new investment. Nevertheless, Export Processing Zones seem to be the going
momentum in Zimbabwe. See PANA, April 1 8, 1 997.
175The speed of integration indices measure the degree of economic liberalization in law and order,
political stability, infrastructure, institutional capacity, and enabling investment environment. For details, see
Standard Chartered Bank, "Africa Quarterly Review," Harare, September 1 996.
l76Some factors ofproduction are difficult to move, for example land and mineral resources. In addition,
other factors like transportation and information may be difficult to move. See Balassa, Bela, The Theory of
Economic Integration 1961.
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where capital is immobile, labor would tend to move. In this case, it will move to
South Africa. Capital moves if labor is immobile. It is one question to ask whether
trade equalizes factors under ceteris paribus assumptions; it is quite another question
to ask how technological progress and other dynamic changes affect factor prices.
More recent studies by Norman and Venables have revealed that trade in
goods alone will not equalize factor prices, but that a small reduction in the cost of
international migration could induce large scale labor migration to a labor scarce
economy. Migration would allow the country to become a large scale exporter of
labor-intensive goods. Hence, there is an incentive for factors to move
internationally. 177 In another study, Venables (1995) has shown that contrary to the
Balassa theory of factor equalization, economic integration under imperfect markets
can widen factor price differences, as an agglomeration of forces come into play. 178
A free trade area that makes countries compete in reducing external tariffs
would reduce average transaction costs, hence improving allocative efficiency. The
fall in transaction costs may better compensate for lost tariff revenues; the greater the
economies of scale, the greater the incentives to concentrate investment where firm
has better infrastructural advantages and services. The hub arrangement fosters this
tendency; it makes sense to invest in the hub so the firm has duty free access to many
countries. 179
Hoekman and others (1997), suggest that an effective way to encourage
investment is to treat all investors equally, without any limitations regarding equity,
177Norman , Victor, D., and Venables, Anthony, J., "International Trade, Factor Mobility and Trade
Costs." The Economic Journal 105 pp. 1488-1504, November 1995.
178Venables, Anthony, J., "Economic Integration and Location of Firms," American Economic Review.
Papers and Proceedings, (AEA) , pp. 296-300, January 1995.
179
Ibid. Hoekman Bernard, and Djankov, Simeon, "Effective Protection and Investment Incentives in
Egypt and Jordan During the Transition to Free Trade With Europe," World Development , Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 28 1 -
29 1 , Elsevier Science Limited, 1 997.
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shares or stakes operations. 180 Foreign direct investment in peripheral countries,
taking advantage of lower labor costs, may help compete with the stronger
countries. 181
The conclusions from trade theory literature and factor productivity are rather
ambiguous, and as noted by Deardorff; trade theory lacks composite and simple
models to capture the effects of both technology and preferences. 182 What is clear is
that trade barriers should be lowered with as many countries as possible, especially
regional countries. At the same time, transaction costs of investment should be
reduced to the rninimum possible level. Since most services cannot be traded across
borders, it may be necessary to open the services sector to foreign investment.
Investments in services reduce transaction costs and increase productivity in the
economy. Zimbabwe should not expect free trade to be an end all panacea which
will create a free flow of investment and new technology, unless they reduce
transaction costs. The government should take a more proactive role to reduce the
transaction costs.
180
Ibid. They recommend that where the national interest to safeguard particular sectors is too strong, a
transparent exception rule is necessary, without making it so long as to send a weak signal to foreign investors.
181
It does not necessarily follow that foreign investment will lead to more competitiveness than domestic
firms in all sectors, as demonstrated by the example ofKenyan textile manufacturers. See Omotunde, Johnson
E.G., "Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing prospects For Success," The Journal ofModem African Studies ,
Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 1-26, 1991.
182
Deardorff, Alan, V., 'Tireless Firwoes: How Theorems Can Interfere With The Theorems of
International Trade," Journal of International Economics
. 20, pp. 131-142, 1986.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Throughout the century, international trading systems have been characterized
by two apparently conflicting trends: growing protectionism and globalization of free
trade. In an effort to maximize economic welfare gains from expanding production,
countries have attempted to expand their own exports, while at the same time
restricting imports. In addition, capital and labor have continued to relocate
internationally order to reduce production and marketing costs. Domestic policies
have become largely influenced by international trading arrangements. As the debate
on the pros and cons of each strategy continues, the distinction between pure free
trade and pure protectionism has become less clear, resulting in conflicting signals to
governments and the private sector alike.
Since the end ofWorld War n, the trend toward regional trading blocs and the
reduction of quantitative restrictions with more transparent barriers has increased.
In the Third World, pre- 1980s regional trading arrangements were characterized by
import substitution, but the recent wave has been accompanied by export oriented
strategies and efforts to attract foreign investment and technology.
Like most LDCs, Zimbabwe's experience with regional trading arrangements
has been mixed. From 1965 to the early 1980s, the country had relative success with
bilateral trade arrangements, notably with South Africa, but the trading relations did
not deepen to higher levels of economic integration. While South Africa became a
captive trading partner, she gradually reduced the preferences offered to Zimbabwe,
eroding the latter's terms of trade and competitiveness. As frustration with the slow
progress of GATT increased amid oil crises-induced debt, southern Africa saw the
creation of two initially complementary, but gradually competing, regional trading
arrangements, namely SADCC and COMESA (of which Zimbabwe was a founding
member); but both excluded Zimbabwe's main trading partner, South Africa.
117
COMESA's objective was free trade while SADCC's goal was cooperation for
development. As the latter transformed into SADC, the distinction between the two
organizations blurred. In spite of the good intentions at the time, Zimbabwe is now
caught in a regional trade predicament: membership in two overlapping regional trade
arrangements (both with as yet to be realized free trade), and South Africa's
reluctance to restore preferential trade status, which has worsened trade relations with
Zimbabwe's largest trading partner and competitor for regional trade. The situation
is further complicated by the existence of a South African dominated customs union
and series of competing bilateral trade agreements involving South Africa, hence
chnunishing Zimbabwe's competitiveness in the region.
In Chapter I, it was pointed out that the objective of this study was to examine
Zimbabwe's bilateral trade strategy with South Africa, and her continued participation
in overlapping regional trading arrangements using the customs union and free trade
area frameworks. In the following sections, I summarize the main conclusions of the
research, offer recommendations as to Zimbabwe's most appropriate strategy, and
suggest areas for future research.
A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADEAND
THE TREND TOWARD ECONOMIC REGIONALIZATION
As discussed in Chapter H, the theoretical foundations of international trade
and regional trading arrangements range from the highly protective mercantilist view
of the 16th century, through the classical economists who believed in free trade based
on comparative advantages resulting from inherently endowed factors of production
and resources, to the new international trade school of thought that rejects the notion
ofnaturally endowed comparative advantage, arguing that competitive advantages can
be created to redress imperfect markets.
The recent international trade theory debates wavered between perfectly
competitive free trade to the advocation of strategic government intervention in areas
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like R&D, subsidies, export incentives and import restrictions to give domestic firms
advantages over their competitors. It was shown that none of the approaches are
flawless. Each cover some important aspects of international trade, but fail to present
a complete blueprint to guide governments wanting to grapple with difficult domestic
and international macroeconomic imbalances. As a result, most governments have
found utility in the strategic approach, while advocates of free trade, like GATT and
the WTO, continue to prefer the traditional free trade approach with minimum
government involvement.
The theory of regional trading arrangements was shown to be equally
controversial, starting from Jacob Viner's trade creation and trade diversion
hypothesis, to recent contributions which have shown that earlier studies tended to
focus on border issues while neglecting more complex non-tariff aspects, such as non-
tariff barriers, subsidies, competition policy, agricultural policy, harmonization of
economic policies, standards, etc. Therefore, most theoretical guidelines on regional
trade arrangements have tended to be situational and depend on the type of
organization formed, the economic characteristics of the participant countries, their
location and the ultimate objectives. It was also shown that, for small countries like
Zimbabwe, regional trade arrangements can be an alternative, not to free trade, but
to growing protectionism abroad and inefficient import substitution.
Later in the chapter, it was demonstrated that in spite of GATT's progress
toward globalization of free trade, preference for regional trading blocs has increased
since WWII. Arguments for and against this tendency have been equally
controversial, with some arguing that regionalization of trade is a necessary
development to address the slow progress in GATT talks, while others insist that the
proliferation of regional trading blocs has been instrumental in frustrating
liberalization of global trade. Among the cited problems with GATT, the important
ones are:
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Stalled negotiations led to pessimism regarding multilateral
arrangements and the rise of regional blocs. The few countries that
liberalized trade unilaterally on a most-favored-nation (MFN) basis,
mainly in conjunction with a reorientation of domestic policies, did so
in the context of regional, bilateral, or sectoral initiatives.
GATT was seen as part of the US versus those of the then USSR
hegemonic interests, and incapable of dealing with the new world
realities. While it is relatively easier to reduce tariffs, it has been more
difficult to resolve the issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and to
extend GATT to cover other areas like agriculture and services.
Compared to the difficulty in reforming the GATT, regional blocs are
supported because:
Regional trading blocs allow countries and companies to adapt to
numerous economic changes at a more manageable level.
It is easier to negotiate a bilateral or regional agreement than a
multilateral one, thus circumventing the problems associated with non-
tariff barriers. Others have argued that the GATT itself was borne out
of several regional blocs.
Proponents of GATT tend to base their views on concepts such as
multilateralism, free trade, comparative advantage and economic liberalism, which
is consistent with the traditional concept of comparative advantage. Those who back
regional blocs favor free trade in certain cases but also favor economic nationalism,
regionalism and bilateralism, ideas that are consistent with strategic/managed trade
theories and neo-mercantilism.
However, these two trends have brought to light the inherent contradictions
between multilateralism and regionalization of trade. GATT is based on
nondiscrimination and the reliance on tariffs vice quotas for protection, while regional
trading blocs are founded on the principle ofregional preferences and do mscriminate
against non-members, even if they are signatories to the GATT.
The changes in world trade relationships and economic structures have been
accompanied by changes in the role of governments, especially in intervention and
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fostering certain competitive trading relationships justified on the grounds of market
failure to bring about balanced development. It was shown that governments' desire
to mobilize and nurture productive factors in the face of entry barriers, and the need
to redistribute benefits from trade and technology, have been strong factors in
increasing regional economic integration. Active government participation has also
been justified because most successful European and Asian countries seemingly relied
on large scale state intervention in leading edge sectors, including subsidized terms
of credit, provision of infrastructure, suppression ofwages and federal research and
development to correct 'market imperfections.'
With the growing regionalization in developed countries, particularly the EU,
and the formation ofNAFTA, less developed countries found themselves with little
choice but to consolidate their own arrangements so as to increase their bargaining
power in future global trade and development issues. In LDCs, Zimbabwe and South
Africa being no exceptions, governments played key roles not only in starting new
industries, but also planning and controlling economic development through public
sector enterprises.
Two contemporary examples of regional trading arrangements were examined,
one a common market model and the other a free trade approach. The EU and
NAFTA case analysis illustrated that economic integration is a long and complex
process which requires concrete but achievable goals. While each of the two
arrangements has different objectives and depth (on issues like tariffs, movement of
factors, coordination of economic policies), national interests have not been ignored.
The EU's approach ofdeeper integration leaves members inflexible to act unilaterally
as they achieve successively higher levels of integration. In contrast, NAFTA, with
shallow arrangements, gives members flexibility to enter into other extra-regional
arrangements and to coordinate national macroeconomic policies.
121
B. REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
Chapter DI examined the three regional trade arrangements that concern either
Zimbabwe, South Africa, or both. These were SACU, COMESA and SADC, which
relate to customs union, common market, and free trade via economic cooperation for
development models respectively. Each model was analyzed in terms of objectives,
progress and limitations.
SACU is characterized by the overwhelming domination by south Africa over
the economies of the other four smaller members. The agreement provides for free
internal trade (excluding agriculture), common external tariffs, a common customs
pool and a revenue sharing scheme to compensate the members for allowing South
Africa to make their economic policy decisions. The lack of meaningful
industrialization in the smaller SACU members and the disagreements over the
customs revenue sharing arrangements have been a source of conflict within SACU.
It was seen that the agreement inherently suffers from a conflict of interests, with
South Africa seeing it as a source of restricting imports while the other countries see
it as a source of revenue. Instead of deepening integration to achieve a common
market status, SACU has tended toward more shallow arrangements with all the
members joining competing regional trade arrangements.
The free trade area organization involving Zimbabwe is the Preferential Trade
Area for Eastern and Southern African countries (PTA). It was formed in 1981,
through the efforts of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and specifically
excluded South Africa for political reasons. The PTA was later transformed into
COMESA, and its treaty explicitly recognizes establishing ofan economic community
as its ultimate goal. COMESA's main objectives are:
To attain sustainable growth by promoting harmonious trade.
To promote joint economic development in all fields and joint
macroeconomic policies to foster relations among members/
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To promote cross border investment and joint promotion ofR&D.
To strengthen the bargaining position with the rest of the world.
To achieve a free trade area by 2005, with a customs union 10 years
later.
Among COMESA's achievements were the establishment of a Clearing House
in Zimbabwe and PTA Trade bank in Burundi. The main limitation ofCOMESA
were low intra-regional trade and unending arguments about the common list of
qualifying goods. There was also dissatisfaction by some members about the
continued asymmetric trade in favor of the more developed members, particularly
Kenya and Zimbabwe.
SADCC is a regional development organization, whose main objective was
to reduce dependence on South Africa, and its transformed version, SADC (which
now includes South Africa). SADCC was formed in 1980 by nine southern African
countries, including Zimbabwe, all but one ofwhich later joined the PTA. SADCC ' s
main objective was to promote and coordinate regional developmental projects. The
reasons for this emphasis were that:
Most SADCC members wanted to tackle industrial incapacity, and pure
trade could not address their immediate problems including acute
foreign exchange problems.
All SADCC members had bad experiences with free trade zones in the
1960s; the arrangements ensured that all the benefits accrued to the
relatively more developed member.
SADC has gradually shifted emphasis toward intra-SADC trade, cross border
investment, and free movement of factors of production, in addition to development.
The SADC protocol provides for a free trade area in eight years, through phased
tariff reduction. In this respect, SADC overlaps with COMESA, both in its
membership and goals. SADC however encourages bilateral trade measures and the
principle of reciprocal preferences. It was noted that SADC, being the only regional
trade organization that includes both South Africa and Zimbabwe, is the main focus
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of most countries of the sub-region. Notable as well was the skewed intra-SADC
trade in favor of South Africa, and to a lesser extent Zimbabwe, hence the scramble
by most SADC countries to conclude bilateral trade agreements with South Africa.
Other recent SADC developments include:
That the gains achieved by members through SACU should not be
reversed, but harmonized at a higher level of integration.
The recognition that no future meaningful arrangement can exclude
South Africa upon which all the countries are economically dependent.
The signing of the SADC Trade Protocol in March 1997.
The South Africa-EU proposed free trade arrangement has been a cause for
concern for all SADC countries, as they fear trade diversion from such an
arrangement.
The Zimbabwe-South Africa preferential trade arrangements dating back to
1964 were also looked at. It was noted that while the agreement was relatively
harmonious until 1980, post-independent Zimbabwe has faced increasing unilateral
revisions from South Africa, resulting in a highly skewed balance of trade in favor of
the latter. Several weaknesses were cited in the agreement, most notable being that:
The agreement is not based on the principle of reciprocity, and has not
been updated to include new products or revise quota quantities.
Most quotas were specified in value instead of volume terms making
them vulnerable to devaluations and inflation.
Zimbabwean exports to South Africa involve primarily consumption
goods, which not only competed with South African products, but
tended to be demand elastic. On the other hand, South Africa's exports
to Zimbabwe were mostly intermediate and capital goods, and
relatively demand inelastic.
The existence of a customs union (SACU) and competing bilateral
agreement between South Africa and other regional countries limit
Zimbabwe's potential to compete with her partner in those countries
with separate agreements with South Africa.
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The ongoing bilateral trade negotiations to restore and expand the old
agreement have not produced meaningful progress, except agreeing to
reduce textile tariffs to from 90% to 30% over 5 years.
C. MACROECONOMEC INDICATORS
In Chapter IV, various macroeconomic indicators of all SADC countries and
some important non-SADC COMESA members were analyzed. The analysis
revealed huge differences between South Africa and the rest of the Southern African
countries. The main differences highlighted includes the following:
Total GNP and per capita income levels and market size.
Cost, scale, growth and structure of production.
General level of social and economic development and employment.
Purchasing power parity and inflation.
Level of technology, investment and savings rates.
External aid dependence and indebtedness.
Differing natural resource endowment.
Differing public sector participation ratios.
Historical trade patterns and policies.
South Africa is the dominant member of both SACU and SADC, and sells a
significant proportion of her exports to the region, mostly to Zimbabwe, but almost
all her major imports come from outside the region. While South Africa is
Zimbabwe's largest trading partner, the region is also important for two-way trade.
On the other hand, for South Africa, Zimbabwe is the main export market in the
region, but the regional total is a small proportion of total exports. In some measure,
Zimbabwe's trade also exhibits similar triangular trade patterns as in South Africa,
differing only in magnitude.
South Africa protects her domestic industries through high tariffs, prohibitions,
quotas, especially on capital, agricultural and manufactured sector imports. Some
South African tariffs are still well above those recommended by the WTO, but some
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effort has been taken to reduce them over a 12 year period. Exports are promoted
through an array of incentives in R&D, subsidies and cash payments to certain
sectors, which has been a source of complaints not only from Zimbabwe, but also
from other regional countries. On the other hand, Zimbabwe has all but cut export
promotion subsidies, and import duties have been drastically reduced.
The different trade policies in the two countries have contributed to the delays
in finalizing the trade agreement with Zimbabwe and the SADC free trade area
protocol. The irony in the SADC free trade area negotiations is that while most of the
SADC countries favored more rapid removing trade barriers, South Africa preferred
a longer period to allow the other members to 'adjust. ' However, the recent signing
of the SADC trade protocol and the re-start of the bilateral trade negotiations were
positive signs.
D. ZIMBABWE IN SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGIONAL TRADE
ARRANGEMENTS
Zimbabwe finds herself in a dilemma as to what strategy to adopt in handling
her trade relations in southern Africa, especially in light of the deteriorating terms of
trade with South Africa, her main trading partner-competitor in both mutual and
regional trade. This trade strategy is crucial for Zimbabwe's economic survival.
Three sets of possibilities were considered:
A SADC free trade area vice harmonizing into a SADC customs union.
Choice between SADC and COMESA, or to catalyze the unification of
the two overlapping organizations into a broader free trade area.
Continuing the bilateral trade arrangements.
While the traditional approach assumes perfect competition and constant
returns, the new trade theory assumes market failures. In reality, Zimbabwe-South
Africa trade is explained by both approaches. Trade in clothing, textiles, footwear
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some light manufactures and agricultural goods is intra-industry, while that in capital
and most intermediate goods is inter-industry.
The research examined the possible costs and benefits of choosing the most
beneficial option and the likely impact on Zimbabwe's choice of technology, foreign
investment, economic development and welfare. The welfare benefits were measured
by the flexibility to pursue independent extra-regional trade policies, resultant imports
at lower prices, particularly production inputs, while retaining some tariff revenue
earning capacity from such imports. The method used was to construct a model of
free trade and customs unions to compare the possible welfare effects of politically
endogenous external tariffs in a free trade area and customs union.
While essentially biased toward the strategic trade theory, this approach is
useful in explaining issues not adequately covered by traditional and new trade
approaches to choices among regional trade arrangements. The analysis showed that
if the southern African countries could achieve free trade with endogenously
determined external tariffs, Zimbabwe (as a small-competitor country) would most
likely benefit from a free trade area than would otherwise be the case under a customs
union. Whereas a customs union dominated by South Africa might enable Zimbabwe
to increase her competitiveness in the South African market, and the rest of the SADC
countries, Zimbabwe could lose her extra-regional markets due to the likely higher
common external tariffs. A free trade area which gives Zimbabwe the flexibility to
import essential production inputs would improve her intra-industry competitiveness
in South Africa and the rest of the world.
Such free trade area benefits could also be extended to the rest of SADC
countries, including the smaller SACU countries, provided the issue of rules of
origin is resolved early enough to allow the smaller countries to choose their export
niches. It is plausible that the findings of this study could be applied to weaker-
competitor countries in similar regional trading quagmires around the world, for
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example Argentina vice Brazil, Ghana and Senegal vice Nigeria, or New Zealand vice
Australia. Therefore, the issue that needs to be carefully addressed in any free trade
arrangements are the complex rules of origin, as this imposes limitations on
Zimbabwe's ability to attract foreign investment and technology to specialize in those
goods which South Africa might consider a threat to her own industries.
The further entrenchment of bilateral trade arrangements between unequal
trading partners in an environment of intra-industry competitive trade could, in the
long run, worsen Zimbabwe's position vice South Africa. The main argument was
that a series bilateral agreements by many countries would allow South Africa to
compete on more favorable terms in all the spoke countries, but the spokes themselves
would only be competitive in South Africa, and not in each other's markets as no
liberalization would have taken place. In fact, they could only compete indirectly
via South Africa. It was also argued that the strategic positioning of South Africa as
hub would attract all the foreign investment and technology to that country, as only
South Africa would have free trade with all the countries of southern Africa.
Nevertheless, it was pointed out that while South Africa would reap more benefits
from a series of bilateral agreements, she would also be worse-off than if she were to
conclude a free trade agreement with all her neighbors.
Further discussions ofthe continued existence of SACU, SADC and COMESA
and the spreading of bilateral trade agreements, showed that while multiplying
regional trade arrangements would benefit those members who belong to both
organizations, this would divert trade from the rest of the world to South Africa and
hinder global free trade. However, the benefits to South Africa were not clear if that
country were to maintain restrictive trade policies, especially high tariffs. If the
SADC and COMESA were to merge into a broader free trade area, taking into
account transaction costs involved in trading with distant countries, both Zimbabwe
and South Africa would be better-off if this flexibility enabled them to import goods
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from the rest of the world at lower prices. Any alternative will predestine Zimbabwe
to perpetual trade deficits, disagreements with south Africa and other neighbors over
trade policies and unnecessary and costly trade wars.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ZIMBABWE'S REGIONAL TRADING
PARTICIPATION
Given the relative costs and benefits ofthe customs union and free trade areas,
bilateral and free trade areas, and competing regional trade arrangements, the
persuasive arrangement seems to be a free trade area involving all present eastern and
southern African country members of SADC and COMESA. Bilateral trade
agreements should, where unavoidable, be temporary, with definite phase out dates.
As long as South Africa seeks free trade arrangements outside the region while
mamtaining high external tariffs, the move toward a customs union and common
market should be resisted, as this seems to offer Zimbabwe fewer benefits. To speed
up the agreement, the free trade area could cover only those goods which her trading
partners do not consider critical for their own economic survival. Once the free trade
area is in place, Zimbabwe could negotiate for free trade arrangements with other
groups outside the region, like the EU and ECOWAS, to provide her with less
expensive production inputs and minimize restrictions on her exports.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This study only looked at the possible benefits of a free trade area and customs
union using tariff barriers and non-measurable hub-and-spoke theory, and did not
examine the impact of a phased tariffreduction strategy to be adopted by Zimbabwe,
let alone SADC and COMESA. Further research on the ex-ante and ex-post tariffs
of either SADC and COMESA could reveal what strategy would be most appropriate
in reducing external tariffs and effectively deal with South Africa's strategic trade
policies. Also, the utility of a geographically-dispersed COMESA countries was not
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examined. Perhaps using the proximity theory one could examine the optimum size
of the regional grouping in eastern and southern Africa.
130
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams, Nassau, A., (1993), "Worlds Apart: The North-South Divide and the International
System," Zed Books, London.
Aho, Michael, "A Recipe for RIBS—Resentment, Inefficiency, Bureaucracy, and Stupid
Signals," Belous and Hartley, (eds.), The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the
Global Economy, National Planning Association, Washington, DC (pp. 22-29), 1990.
Arrighi, Giovani, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia," Mouton, The Hague, Bagwell,
Kyle, and Staiger, Robert, "The Sensitivity of Strategic Corrective R&D Policy in
Oligopolistic Industries." in Journal ofInternational Economics . Vol. 36, pp. 133-150,
1967.
Arrighi, Giovani, and J. S. Saul, "Nationalism and Revolution in Sub-Saharan Africa," in
Essays on the Political Economy of Africa," edited by Giovani Arrighi and J.S. Saul,
Monthly Review Press. New York, 1973.
Bagwell, Kyle, and Robert Staiger, "The Sensitivity of Strategic Corrective R&D Policy in
Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of International Economics. Vol. 36, No. 1/2, pp.
133-150.
Balassa, Bela, "The Theory ofEconomic Integration", Richard D. Irwin, Inc.,
Homewood, EL, 1961.
Baldwin, Richard, E., and Anthony, J., Venables, "Regional Economic Integration,"
Gene M. Grossman and Kenneth Rogof£ (ed), Handbook ofInternational Economics,
Vol. m, pp. 1597-1644, Elsevier, 1995.
Belous, Richard, S., and Hartley, Rebecca, S., (1990), "Regional Trading Blocs: An
Introduction," RS. Belous and R.S. Hartley, (ed), The Growth of Regional Trading
Blocs in the Global Economy. National Planning Association, Washington, DC, pp.
1-21, 1990.
Bergsten, C. Fred, and Noland, Marcus Noland, "Reconcilable Differences? United
States-Japan Economic Conflict," Institute For International Economics, Washington,
DC, 1993.
Bliss, Christopher, "Economic Theory and Policy for Trading Blocks," Manchester
University Press, Manchester, 1994.
131
Brander, James A., and Barbara J. Spencer, "Export Subsidies and International Market
Share Rivalry," in Journal of International Economics. Vol. 18, pp. 83-100, North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 18 February 1985.
Brander, James A., and Spencer, Barbara J. Spencer, "Unionized Oligopoly and Inter-
national Trade Policy," in Journal of International Economics . Vol. 24, pp. 217-234,
North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1988.
Brander, James A., and Barbara J. Spencer
,
"International R&D Rivalry and Industrial
Strategy," Review ofEconomic Studies . Vol. 50, pp. 707-722, 1983.
Calingaert, Michael, "Europe 1992: A Trading Bloc?," in Belous and Hartley, The
Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy, National Planning
Association, Washington, DC, pp. 62-75, 1990.
Carter, Gwendolen M., and Patrick O'Meara, (ed.), "International Politics in Southern
Africa," Library of Congress, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1982.
Cooper, Richard, V.L., "Making the Best of a 'Second-Best' Solution," Belous and
Hartley, The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy, National
Planning Association, Washington, DC, pp. 30-35, 1990.
Corden, Max, W., "Protection and Liberalization: A Review of Analytical Issues,"
International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper # 54, Washington, DC, August 1987.
Corden, Max W., "Trade Policy and Economic Welfare," Clarendon, Oxford, 1974.
Davis, Donald R., "Intra-Industry Trade: A Hecksher-Ohlin-Ricardo Approach," Journal
of International Economics. Vol. 39, pp. 201-226, North-Holland, 1995.
Deardorff, Alan V., 'Tireless Firwoes: How Theorems Can Interfere With the Theory of
International Trade," Journal of International Economics. Vol. 20, pp. 131-142,
NortrfHolland, 1986.
De Melo Jaime, Panagariya Arvind, and Rodrik, Dani, (1993), "The New Regionalism: A
Country Perspective," in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya, (ed), New
Dimensions in Regional Integration, Center for Policy Research, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1993.
De Melo, Jaime and Panagariya, Arvind, "New Dimensions in Regional Integration,"
Center for Policy Research, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,MA, 1 993
.
132
Deardorff, Alan, V., 'Tireless Firwoes: How Theorems Can Interfere With The Theory of
International Trade," Journal of International Economics . 20, pp. 131-142, 1986.
Dixit Avinash, K., and Joseph, E. Stiglitz, "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity," American Economic Review
. Vol, 67, No. 2, pp. 297-308,
Washington DC, June 1977.
Dixit Avinash, and Norman, Victor, "Theory of International Trade," Cambridge
University Press, London, 1980.
Eaton, Jonathan and Grossman, Gene M, "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under
Oligopoly," Quarterly Journal ofEconomics. Vol. 2, pp. 383-406, 1986.
Electronic Mail & Guardian, "Foreign Investors Stay Away From Zimbabwe," Mail and
Guardian News . South Africa, March 19, 1997.
Electronic Mail & Guardian, (1997), "SA Goods Clamp down" Mail &Guardian News .
April 6, 1997, South Africa.
Electronic Mail & Guardian, "New Trade Data to Exclude SA's neighbors," Mail &
Guardian News. South Africa, April 21, 1997.
Electronic Mail & Guardian, "Free Trade With EU Will Hurt SA's Neighbors," Mail and
Guardian News. South Africa, October 30, 1996 and November 05, 1996.
Ethier, Wilfred J., "National and International Returns to Scale in the Modern Theory of
International Trade," American Economic Review. Vol. 72, No. 1, pp. 389-406,
Washington, DC, 1982.
Farrow, Maureen, A., and Robert C. York, "Regional Trade and Trends: A North
American View from the Inside Out," R.S. Belous and R.S. Hartley, The Growth of
Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy, pp. 76-92, National Planning
Association, Washington, DC, 1990.
Foroutan, Fazaeh, "Regional Integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: Past Experience and
Future Prospects," Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya (ed), New Dimensions in
Regional Integration, Center for Economic Policy Research, Cambridge, MA, pp.
234-277, 1993.
Golt, Sydney, "Trade Issues in the Mid 1980s" and A Policy Statement by the British-
North American Committee, British-North American Committee, October 1982.
133
Goodison, Paul, and Bernadette Nee, "The SADCC Experience," DPMN Bulletin, Vol. 2,
No.l, April 1994.
Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95),
Harare, Zimbabwe, 1991.
Greenaway David, Hine Robert Hine, and Milner Chris Milner, "Vertical and Horizontal
Intra-Industry Trade: A Cross Industry Analysis for the United Kingdom," The
Economic Journal. Vol. 105, pp. 1505-1518, Blackwell Publishers, London,
November 1995.
Grossman, Rene, M., and E. Helpman, "Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of
Growth," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives. Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 23-44, Winter 1994.
Grundy, Kenneth, W., "South Africa in the Political Economy of Southern Africa"
Gwendolen M. Carter, and P. O'Meara (ed.), International Politics in Southern
Africa, (pp. 148-178), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1982.
Guitan, Manuel, "Rules and Discretion in International Economic Policy," International
Monetary Fund . Occasional Paper # 97, Washington, DC, June 1992.
Hanlon, Joseph, "SADCC: Progress and Prospects," The Economist Intelligence Unit,
Report, No. 182, 1984.
Hanlon, Joseph, "Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa,"
Catholic Institute For International Relations, London, 1986.
Hartsmann, Ignatius J., and James R Markusen, "Up the Average Cost Curve: Inefficient
Entry and the New Protectionism," Journal of International Economics . Vol. 20, pp.
225-247, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986.
Hoekman, Bernard, and Simeon Djankov, "Effective Protection and Investment Incentives
in Egypt and Jordan During the Transition to Free Trade With Europe," World
Development, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 281-291, Elsevier Science Limited, 1997.
Holden, Merle, "Economic Integration and Trade Liberalization in Southern Africa: Is
There a Role for South Africa?," World Bank Discussion Paper No. 342, Washington,
DC, 1996.
Hummers, David, and Levinson, James, "Product Differentiation as a Source of
Comparative Advantage?" American Economics Review (AEA Papers and
Proceedings)
. Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 445-449, Washington, DC, May 1993.
134
IBC USA Licencing, Inc., "Political Risk Analysis: Country Profiles, 1996.
International Monetary Fund . "Protection and Liberalization: A Review of Analytical
Issues," Occasional Paper #54, W. Max Corden, Washington, DC, August 1987.
International Monetary Fund
.
"Rules and Discretion in International Economic Policy,"
Occasional Paper #97, Manuel Guitan, Washington, DC, August 1987
International Monetary Fund
. "Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook," Washington, DC,
1996.
Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei, "Improving the Design of Regional
Trade Arrangements," American Economic Review CAEA Papers and Proceed-ings)
.
Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 52-56, Washington DC, 1996.
Johnson, Omotunde, E.G., "Economic Integration in Africa: Enhancing Prospects for
Success," The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 1-26,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.
Kay, George, "Rhodesia, A Human Geography," University ofLondon Press, 1970.
Kelly, Margaret, and Annie, K. McGuirk, "Issues and developments in International
Trade Policy," IMF World Economic and Financial Surveys. Washington, DC, August
1992.
Kemp Murray, C, and H.Y. Wan, Jr., "An Elementary Proposition Concerning the
Formation of Customs Unions," Murray C. Kemp, Three Topics in the Theory Of
International Trade. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1976.
Kenen, Peter B., "The Future of the Trading System," The International Economy
.
3rd
ed., pp. 256-297, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1994.
Keynes, John M., The World Depression: 1929-1939 . University of California Press,
Berkeley, CA, 1973.
Keynes, John M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money . Harcourt,
Brace and World, Inc., New York, NY, 1965.
Knoester, A., and A.H.E.M. Wellink (ed), Tinbergen Lectures On Economic Policy.
North Holland, Amsterdam, 1993.
Krugman, Paul, "Rethinking International Trade," MIT Press . Cambridge, MA, 1990.
135
Krugman, Paul, "Is Free Trade Passe," Journal ofEconomic Perspectives . Vol. 1, No. 2,
American Economic Association, Nashville, TN, pp. 131-144, 1987.
Krugman, Paul, "Is Bilateralism Bad?" E. Helpman and A. Razin (ed), International Trade
and Trade Policy. MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, pp. 9-23, 1991a.
Krugman, Paul, "The Move Toward Free Trade Zones," Policy Implications of Trade and
Country Zones, A Symposium sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City, and Jackson Hole Wyoming, 1991b.
Krugman, Paul, "Free Trade: A Loss of (Theoretical) Nerve? The Narrow and Broad
Arguments for Free Trade," American Economic Review CAEA Papers and
Proceedings) . Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 362-366, May 1993, Washington, DC, 1993.
Lancaster, Kelvin, "Intra-Industry Trade Under Perfect Monopolistic Competition,"
Journal of International Economics. Vol. 10, pp. 151-75, North-Holland, 1980.
Lawrence, Robert, Z., Regionalism. Multilateralism and Deeper Integration. The
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1996.
Legorburu, Beatriz, "Impacts of the MERCUSUR Agreement on the Uruguayan
Economy," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1994.
Libby, Ronald, T., The Politics of Economic Power in Southern Africa. Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1987.
Lucas, Robert, E., "On the Mechanics of Economic Development," Journal of Monetary
Economics. Vol. 22, pp. 3-42, 1988.
Maasdorp, Gavin, Economic Cooperation in Southern Africa: Prospects for Regional
Integration. RISCT, London, 1992.
Mandaza, Ibbo, and Arne Tostesen, Southern Africa: In Search of a Common
Future. Southern African Development Community, Gaborone, Botswana, 1994.
Markusen, James and Venables, Anthony J., "Increasing Returns and Imperfect
Competition: Contradictory Results from Competing Assumptions," in Journal of
International Economics . Vol. 24, pp. 299-316, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1988.
Martin, David, and Phyllis Johndon, "The Struggle for Zimbabwe" Faber and Faber,
London, 1981.
136
Mittelman, James, H., ed, "Globalization: Critical Reflections," International Political
Economy Yearbook. Vol. 9, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, London, 1996.
Mittelman, James, H., "Globalization: Critical Reflections," International Political
Economy Yearbook. Vol. 9, Lynne Publishers, Boulder, London, 1996.
Morici, Peter, "Regionalism: Motivations and Risks," Belous Richard, S., and Rebecca
S. Hartley, The Growth ofRegional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy , pp. 131-
36, National Planning Association, Washington, DC, 1990.
Mussa, Michael, "Making the Practical Case for Free Trade," American Economic Review
(AEA Papers and Proceedings) . Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 372-376, Washington, DC, May
1993.
Nelson, Harold, D., ed., "Zimbabwe: A Country Study," The Secretary of the Army, US,
Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1983.
Norman, Victor, D., and Anthony J. Venables, "International Trade, Factor Mobility and
Trade Costs," The Economic Journal . Vol. 105, pp. 1488-1504, November 1995.
Pack Howard, "Endogenous Growth Theory: Intellectual Appeal and Empirical Short-
comings," Journal of Economic Perspectives . Vol. 8, No. 1, American Economic
Association, Nashville, TN, pp. 55-72, Winter 1994.
PANA, "Third World Not Happy with WTO," PanAfrican News Agency, Dakar, Senegal,
01 November and 05 November 1996..
PANA, "South Africa Tightens Visa Regulations," PanAfrican News Agency, Dakar,
Senegal, 29 October 1996.
PANA, "South African Tariff Cut Negotiations Continue," PanAfrican News Agency,
Dakar, Senegal, 03 December 1996.
PANA, "COMESA to Establish A Common External Tariff," PanAfrican News Agency,
Dakar, Senegal, 21 October 1996.
PANA, "Zimbabwe Stock Market Booming," PanAfrican News Agency, Zimbabwe
Stocks, Dakar, Senegal, 20 November 1996.
PANA, "More Mozambicans Work in South African Mines," PanAfrican News Agency,
Dakar, Senegal, 02 January 1996.
137
PANA, "SADC Leads African Reform," PanAfrican News Agency, Dakar, Senegal, 10
February 1997.
PANA, "South African Tariff Cut Negotiations Continue," PanAfrican News Agency,
Dakar, Senegal, 03 December 1996.
PANA, "South Africa-European Union Pact Worries Neighbors," PanAfrican News
Agency, Dakar, Senegal, 25 October 1996.
Perroni Carlo, and Whalley, John Whaliey, "The New Regionalism: Trade Liberalization
or Insurance?," National Bureau ofEconomic Research, Cambridge, MA, 1994.
Rachel McCulloch, "The Optimality ofFree Trade: Science or Religion," American
Economic Review (AEA Papers and Proceedings). Vol. 83, No. 2, pp. 367-371, May
1993.
Ricardo, David, "The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation," 3rd ed., R. D. Irwin,
Homewood, IL, 1963.
Richardson, Martin, "Endogenous Protection and Trade Diversion." Journal of Inter-
national Economics . Vol. 34, pp. 309-24, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1993.
Romer, Paul, M., "The Origins of Endogenous Growth," Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives. Vol. 8, No.l, pp. 3-22, 1988.
Romer, Paul, M., "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth," Journal of Political
Economy. Vol. 94, pp. 1002-1037, 1986a.
Root, Franklin, R., "International Trade and Investment," 6th ed, South-Western
Publishing Co., Cincinnati, OH, 1990.
SADC, "SADC: Resources and Institutions and Capacity for Integration; The Proceed-
ings of the Consultative Conference held in Lilongwe, Republic of Malawi, lst-4th
February, 1995, SADC, Gaborone, Botswana, 1995.
SADC, "Regional Relations and Cooperation Post-Apartheid: A Macro Framework
Study Report," SADC, Gaborone, Botswana, 1993.
SADC, "Made in SADC," http:www.sadcexpo.org/newsl2.html, Gaborone, Botswana,
1997.
Sapir, Andre, "Regional Integration in Europe," The Economic Journal . Vol. 102,
Blackwell Publishers, CA, pp. 1491-1506, November 1992.
138
Schnitzer, Martin, C, "Comparative Economic Systems," 7th ed, South-Western College
Publishing, Cincinnati, OH, 1997.
Solow, Robert, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function," Review of
Economics and Statistics. Vol. 39, pp. 312-320, 1957.
South Africa Reserve Bank, "Annual Economic Report," South Africa, 1996.
Southern Rhodesia Government, "Trade Agreement Between the Government of
Southern Rhodesia and the Government of South Africa," Southern Rhodesia
Government Notice 811 of 1964, Salisbury, 1964.
Standard Chartered Bank, "Africa Quarterly Review." Standard Chartered Bank, Harare,
Zimbabwe, October 1996.
Standard Chartered Bank, "Africa Quarterly Review." Standard Chartered Bank, Harare,
Zimbabwe, April 1995.
Standard Chartered Bank, "Africa Quarterly Review." Standard Chartered Bank, Harare,
Zimbabwe, October 1995.
Standard Chartered Bank, "Business Trends." Harare, Zimbabwe, August 1996.
Stoneman, Colin and Hanlon Joseph, "Zimbabwe HI: The Private Sector and South
Africa," Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern
Africa, pp. 199-218, Catholic Institute For International Relations, London, 1986.
Strack, Harry, R., Sanctions: The Case ofRhodesia. Syracuse University Press,
Syracuse, NY, 1978.
Swann Peter, Temple Paul, and Shurmer Mark, "Standards and Trade Performance: The
UK Experience," The Economic Journal. Vol. 106 No. 438, pp. 1297-1313,
Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1996.
The Financial Gazette, "SA Sees the Light," The Financial Gazette, Harare, Zimbabwe,
October 1996.
The Economist Intelligence Unit, "World Outlook: Forecasts of Political and Economic
Trends for 1987 in over 180 countries," The Economist Publications Limited,
London, 1994.
The United Nations, International Trade Statistics Yearbook "Trade By Country," New
York, 1994.
139
The United Nations, "World Economic Survey: Current Trends and Policies in the World
Economy," United Nations, New York, 1988.
The United Nations "Current Trends and Policies in the World Economy," World
Economic Survey, pp. 30-47, New York, 1988.
Tropp, Richard, "Seizing the Opportunity Preserved by LDC Blocs," R. S. Belous and
R.S. Hartley (ed.), The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy,
National Planning Association, pp. 102-1 1 1, 1990.
US Government Printing Office, "Survey of Current Business," Vol. 71, No. 11.3,
Washington, DC, August 1991.
Venables, Anthony, J., "Economic Integration and the Location of Firms," The American
Economic Review, AEA Papers, Vol. 85, No. 2, pp. 296-300, Washington, DC,
January 1995.
Viner, Jacob, "International Trade and Economic Development," Lectures Delivered at
the National University of Brazil, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1953.
Viner, Jacob, "The Customs Union Issue," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
New York. 1950.
Weiner, Herbert, E., "America's Role in the Founding of The European Community," R.S.
Belous and R.S. Hartley, (ed.), The Growth of Regional Trading Blocs in the Global
Economy, pp. 57-61, National Planning Association, Washington, DC, 1990.
Wonnacott, Ronald, J., "The Economics of Overlapping Free Trade Areas and the
Mexican Challenge," C. D. Howe Institute, Toronto, 1991.
Wonnacott, Paul, and Ronald, J. Wonnacott, "Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to
a Customs Union? The Curious Missing Foreign Tariffs," The American Economic
Review. Vol. 71, No. 4, September 1981, pp. 704-714, Washington, DC, 1981.
Wonnacott, Ronald J., "Free Trade Arrangements: For the Better of Worse?" American
Economic Review (AEA Papers and Proceedings) . Vol. 86, No. 2, pp. 63-66,
Washington, DC, May 1996.
"World Development Report," World Bank, Washington , DC, 1992.
"World Development Report," World Bank, Washington DC, 1996.
140
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST
Defense Technical Information Center
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944









4. Defense Advisor 1
Embassy of the Republic ofZimbabwe
1608 New Hampshire Ave N.W.
Washington DC 20009














8. Abbie Mayihlome Mpofu 1
15181 New Zengeza 4
P.O. Chitungwiza, Zimbabwe
141
Lt Col C. Nhemachena
579F Wilkes Lane, LaMesa
Monterey, CA 93940








12. Lt Col Levi Mayihlome











3 2768 00339323 2
